Trombley v. O'Neill

• Decision Date: 07 March 2013
• Docket Number: No. 8:11–CV–0569 (GTS/CFH).,8:11–CV–0569 (GTS/CFH).
• Citation: 929 F.Supp.2d 81
• Parties: Rick TROMBLEY, on Behalf of Himself, and His Minor Children, H and N, Plaintiff, v. John O'NEILL, Individually and as Comm'r of Essex Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs.; Jeffery Letson, Individually and as Essex Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs. Child Protective Serv. Caseworker; Kim Marie, Individually and as Essex Cnty. Foster Care Caseworker; and Michael Gallant, Individually and as Attorney for Essex Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York

929 F.Supp.2d 81

Rick TROMBLEY, on Behalf of Himself, and His Minor Children, H and N, Plaintiff,

v.John O'NEILL, Individually and as Comm'r of Essex Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs.; Jeffery Letson, Individually and as Essex Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs. Child Protective Serv. Caseworker; Kim Marie, Individually and as Essex Cnty. Foster Care Caseworker; and Michael Gallant, Individually and as Attorney for Essex Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., Defendants.

No. 8:11–CV–0569 (GTS/CFH).

United States District Court,

N.D. New York.

March 7, 2013.

Rick Trombley, Lewis, NY, pro se.

Towne, Ryan & Partners, P.C., Claudia A. Ryan, Esq., John F. Moore, Esq., of Counsel, Albany, NY, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM–DECISION and ORDER

GLENN T. SUDDABY, District Judge.

Currently before the Court, in this pro se civil rights action filed by Rick Trombley (“Plaintiff”), on behalf of himself and his minor children H and N, against John O'Neill, Jeffery Letson, Kim Marie and Michael Gallant (“Defendants”), is Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). (Dkt. No. 19.) For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' motion is granted.

I. RELEVANT BACKGROUNDA. Plaintiffs' Complaint

Generally, construed with the utmost of special liberality, Plaintiff's Complaint asserts the following five claims against Defendants,¹ seeking damages only, arising from the removal of H and N from his custody: (1) a claim that Defendants Jeffery Letson (“Letson”) and Michael Gallant (“Gallant”) illegally entered Plaintiff's home without probable cause or a warrant and attempted to remove H and N in violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment; (2) a claim that Defendants Letson, Gallant and John O'Neill (“O'Neill”) filed a petition to remove H and N from Plaintiff's custody without grounds to do so in violation of his rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; (3) a claim that Defendant Kim Marie (“Marie”) discriminated against Plaintiff based on his gender during the custody evaluation in violation of his rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; (4) a claim that Defendants Marie and Gallant coerced Plaintiff into an admission of neglect in violation of his rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; and (5) a claim that Defendants conspired to violate his constitutional rights. ( See generally Dkt. No. 1 [Pl.'s Compl.].)

Generally, in support of these claims, Plaintiff alleges as follows: Plaintiff petitioned for temporary custody of his son, N, due to the alleged addiction problems of N's mother, “Korrin.” (Plaintiff was already the custodial parent of H, who is not Korrin's child.) As a result, Family Court Judge Richard Meyer (“Judge Meyer”) assigned Defendant Letson, a Child Protective Services Caseworker for Essex County Department of Social Services (“DSS”), to the case. On May 17, 2008, Plaintiff found Korrin using cocaine at their home, while caring for the children. A domestic incident ensued, after which both Plaintiff and Korrin were arrested. Upon his release from the police station, Plaintiff returned home with H and N. Korrin did not return to the home.

According to arrest records submitted by Plaintiff in response to the current motion, of which the Court takes judicial notice, Plaintiff was arrested on May 18, 2008 for Assault in the Third Degree and Endangering the Welfare of a Child. According to the information, Plaintiff was accused of intentionally striking Korrin with his open hand several times, resulting in a cut across Korrin's nose and swelling of her forehead above the eye. Also, Plaintiff was accused of doing so in the presence of H and N, where alcohol, and possibly narcotics, were involved. ( See Dkt. No. 25 at 89–94 [Ex. N to Pl.'s Response to Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss].)

On May 19, 2008, Letson and a coworker appeared at Plaintiff's home with two State Troopers for the purpose of removing H and N from the home and placing them in foster care. Plaintiff requested several times that Letson, Letson's coworker and the two Troopers leave the home, but they refused. When Plaintiff attempted to leave the home with his sons, he was prevented with the threat of arrest. Finally, after two and a half hours, Letson, his coworker and the Troopers left.

On May 20, 2008, Plaintiff was summoned to Family Court on a Child Neglect Petition filed by DSS, after which H and N were placed in foster care. After H and N were placed in foster care, an order of protection was issued directing that Korrin stay away from the home and that both Plaintiff and Korrin follow the order. The order of protection was issued at the request of Defendant Gallant. Defendant Marie was assigned to assist both Plaintiff and Korrin with the foster care process, but Marie took the side of Korrin from the start.

Within a month, Korrin was allowed back into the home, with a new order of protection issued to both Plaintiff and Korrin.

On August 26, 2008, after Plaintiff was coerced by his attorney as well as by Defendants Gallant and Marie, Plaintiff made a general admission of neglect. As a result, Plaintiff was subject to a year of supervision by DSS.

Pursuant to the August 21, 2008 Order of Family Court Judge Richard B. Meyer, Plaintiff's consent to the entry of an order of fact-finding without an admission was accepted, and the court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Plaintiff committed acts constituting child neglect of H and N. Moreover, the court acknowledged that Plaintiff appeared with counsel, and that Plaintiff voluntarily, intelligently and knowingly consented to the entry of an order of a finding of neglect without admission. ( See Ex. L to Aff. of Michael Gallant, Dkt. No. 19–4.)

In November 2008, Korrin attacked Plaintiff in front of several witnesses, after which the police were called but no arrests were made. Korrin reported the incident to her probation officer and Defendant Marie. Thereafter, both Korrin and Plaintiff were arrested. H and N were scheduled to return home on December 4, 2008, but as a result of the arrests, Defendant Marie and Judge Weyer would not allow it.

The following February, at the request of Defendant Marie, H was returned to the custody of his biological mother, “Jaime.”

In May 2009, another incident occurred between Plaintiff and Korrin, after which the police were called, but no arrests were made. Korrin reported the incident to Defendant Marie, who contacted the police and advised them of the order of protection. Plaintiff was then arrested for first degree criminal contempt, a felony. At some point thereafter, Plaintiff was arrested for a misdemeanor-level criminal contempt related to the use of alcohol in violation of the order of protection. Plaintiff was eventually sentenced on May 17, 2010 to one year in jail for the misdemeanor charge.

In January 2010, ten days after Korrin completed an in-patient program, and at the request of Defendant Marie, Judge Weyer ordered that Korrin have custody of N. N remains in Korrin's care.

B. Defendants' Motion

Generally, in support of their motion to dismiss the complaint, Defendants assert the following arguments: (1) Defendants are entitled to statutory, qualified and absolute immunity from Plaintiff's claims, and (2) even if Defendants are not immune, Plaintiff fails to plausibly state a claim against them because (a) Plaintiff's false arrest claim is barred by the statute of limitations, (b) even if not time-barred, Plaintiff's allegations that he was prevented from leaving his home with the threat of arrest does not plausibly state a claim for false arrest, (c) Defendants Letson and Marie have no authority to prosecute Plaintiff, (d) Plaintiff fails to allege any facts in support of a claim against Defendants in their official capacities, (e) Plaintiff's procedural and substantive due process rights have not been violated, (f) Plaintiff was not discriminated against, and (g) Plaintiff has failed to allege any personal involvement of Defendant O'Neill in any of the actions underlying his claims. ( See generally Dkt. No. 19–28 [Defs.' Mem. of Law].)

Generally, in response to Defendants' motion, Plaintiff argues that (1) Defendants' immunity arguments should be denied in all respects and (2) Defendants' argument that Plaintiff's false arrest claim is untimely should be denied. Plaintiff does not respond to the remaining of Defendants' arguments in support of their motion to dismiss. ( See generally Dkt. No. 25 [Pl.'s Response].)

Generally, in reply to Plaintiff's response, Defendants argue that (1) they are entitled to statutory, qualified and absolute immunity; (2) Plaintiff's false arrest claim is untimely, subject to this Court's application of the “prisoner mailbox defense”; and (3) Defendants should prevail on the remainder of their arguments in support of their motion to dismiss because Plaintiff failed to contest them. ( See generally Dkt. No. 30 [Defs.' Reply.] )

II. RELEVANT LEGAL STANDARDSA. Legal Standard Governing Motions to Dismiss for Failure to State Claim

It has long been understood that a defendant may base a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted on either or both of two grounds: (1) a challenge to the “sufficiency of the pleading” under Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2); or (2) a challenge to the legal cognizability of the claim. Jackson v. Onondaga Cnty., 549 F.Supp.2d 204, 211, nn. 15–16 (N.D.N.Y.2008) (McAvoy, J., adopting Report–Recommendation on de novo review).

Because such motions are often based on the first ground, a few words on that ground are appropriate. Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a pleading contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). In the Court's view, this tension between permitting a “short and plain statement” and requiring...