Jackson v. People

• Decision Date: 10 December 1962
• Docket Number: No. 20168,20168
• Citation: 151 Colo. 171,376 P.2d 991
• Parties: Thomas JACKSON, Plaintiff in Error, v. PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Defendant in Error.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Page 991

376 P.2d 991

151 Colo. 171

Thomas JACKSON, Plaintiff in Error, v. PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Defendant in Error.

No. 20168.

Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc.

Dec. 10, 1962.

Crisjohn & Dyer, Dove Creek, for plaintiff in error.

Duke W. Dunbar, Atty. Gen., Frank E. Hickey, Deputy Atty. Gen., J. F. Brauer, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for defendant in error.

HALL, Justice.

We refer to the parties by name.

On August 29, 1961, there was lodged in a justice court in Dolores County, Colorado:

'The Complaint and Information of Patrick G. Waters made before G. P. McAlroy Esq., one of the Justices of the Peace in and for said County, * * * who * * * says that Mr. Thomas L. Jackson on the 28 day of August, A.D.1961, in said County did attempt to take Game with a spot light with loaded firearm. Contrary to the form of the statute * * *.'

On that same day, at 10:00 A.M., Jackson appeared before McAlroy and entered a plea of not guilty. Hearing was had at that time, and Jackson was found guilty and fined $100.00 and costs of $5.00. Jackson paid the fine and costs.

On September 6, 1961, Jackson filed with McAlroy, in duplicate, his 'Notice of Appeal' and on the same day filed with the county court of Dolores County a copy of said notice and paid to the justice of the peace and to the county court all fees required for perfecting an appeal.

On October 16, 1961, the people filed in the county court the following MOTION:

'COME NOW the People of the State of Colorado by Al H. Haas, District Attorney, by his duly qualified deputy, Willard W. Rusk, Jr., and move the Court for the issuance of a Writ of Procedendo and as grounds therefore state that the notice of appeal heretofore filed by the defendant does not comply with the Statute.'

On December 11, 1961, the county court entered its findings and judgment dismissing the appeal. Appearing therein is the following:

'Appeals are creatures of statute, and a party desiring to avail himself of the right to a trial de novo by taking an appeal, must comply with the provisions of the statute on the subject. The mandatory provisions of the statute involved are clear and unambiguous and the Court must enforce statutes as written.

'Wherefore, It Is Ordered and Adjudged that the appeal of the defendant, Thomas Jackson, be dismissed and that a Writ of Procedendo issue to the trial Court.'

Jackson is here by writ of error seeking reversal.

The people urged as reason for dismissal of the appeal in the county court only one ground, namely, that the notice of appeal filed by Jackson failed to comply with the statutory requirements governing appeals.

In this court much of the argument of counsel deals with the question of whether one who has been convicted can, after paying his fine, appeal from the judgment. The people contend that the fine having been paid, all questions before the court have become moot.

The notice of appeal which Jackson filed consists of two legal sized sheets setting forth in great detail the facts surrounding his trial, conviction, payment of fine and costs of appeal.

The statute in effect at the time of this appeal is CRS '53, 79-15-11 (Perm.Supp.). It provides as follows:

'(1) * * *.

'(2) Any person convicted of a criminal offense before a justice of the peace may appeal to the appellate court within ten days from the date of such conviction, by filing with the justice of the peace or the clerk of his court a notice of appeal, in duplicate, and shall, at the same time, pay the cost of granting the appeal only. The notice shall set forth the title of the case, the name and address of the appellant, and the appellant's attorney, if any, and identification of the offense or crime of which the appellant was convicted, a statement of the judgment, including its date, and any fine or sentence imposed, and a statement that the appellant appeals from the judgment. * * *'

The objection to the notice is highly technical. Failure to include an 'identification of the offense' was in no manner prejudicial to the people. The notice filed contained sufficient information to enable the people to know with certainty what case was being appealed. The notice given motivated the justice of the peace to prepare his 'Transcript of Criminal docket' and to forward the same, together with all papers in the case, to the proper county court, and to accept from Jackson the prescribed fee of $1.50 for these services.

Understandably, Jackson, having been arrested at 11:00 P.M. and tried and convicted at 10:00 A.M. the following morning would be at a disadvantage in seeking to inform the people of the 'identification' of the offense.

The people suggest that Jackson might have been found guilty in two or more cases by the same justice of the peace, on the same day, with the same punishment imposed, and under such circumstances the district attorney would not know which case was being appealed. We are persuaded that the prospect of such befuddlement and confusion befalling the district attorney of Dolores County is extremely remote.

In 51 C.J.S. Justices of the Peace, § 154b, page 294, we find the following language to which we subscribe:

'* * * The notice must be definite and certain, but it should be liberally construed, and mere inaccuracies or clerical mistakes which do not defeat the purpose of the notice will not vitiate it. If the notice conveys to the adverse party sufficient information to enable him to know what is required of him it need go no further. The notice is sufficient if it informs appellee of enough of the facts concerning the appeal from which any reasonable person would conclude that he had knowledge that the appeal had been taken. * * *

'The notice of appeal from a justice's judgment, to be effective, must properly designate the judgment appealed from, by a description sufficient to show the applicability of the notice to the judgment, without resort to extrinsic evidence. The object of a notice of appeal is accomplished when the appellate court can ascertain from an inspection of the notice of what particular judgment the appellant complains. * * *' Giving to the statute in question a liberal construction which most courts sanction, we conclude that the notice of appeal filed was, under the circumstances of this case, sufficient to meet the requirements of the statute and that the appeal was perfected and the county court erred in sustaining the motion to dismiss.

The further contention, that the question of the right to appeal is now moot for the reason that Jackson has paid his fine, is without merit.

Jackson entered a plea of not guilty. The judgment of guilt was expressly made reviewable. The question of guilt is not moot; it is not academic, but very live and real.

Jackson's good name has by the judgment of guilt been impaired. He now is burdened with the stigma of guilt which could be of immeasurably greater importance to him and his future status among his fellowmen than the punishment administered.

On entry of the judgment of guilt, Jackson had the right to appeal and his appeal was perfected on compliance with CRS '53, 79-15-11(2), (Perm.Supp.), (L. 55, p. 501), supra, and 79-15-11(5) which provides:

'The defendant shall pay the docket fee of five dollars, required by the appellate court, within twenty days from the date of the appeal, and upon a failure so to do, the appeal shall be dismissed by the appellate court.'

Prior to 1955 one taking an appeal from a judgment of guilty by a justice of the peace was required, as a prerequisite to the right of appeal, to furnish a bond:

'* * * in a penalty double the amount of fine and sufficient to cover all costs * * *.'

In 1955 the legislature saw fit to dispense with the requirement of a bond, thus preserving to those unable to furnish bond the right to appeal. In lieu of the requirement for bond, the legislature provided, CRS '53, 79-15-11(3) (Perm.Supp.):

'When an appellant desires to stay the judgment of the justice of the peace, he shall execute a bond to the people of the state of Colorado, with sufficient security, to be approved by such justice of the peace, in a penalty double the amount of the fine and sufficient to cover all costs, and conditioned for the payment of the amount of the judgment of the appellate court against such defendant, for the defendant's appearance in such appellate court, as and when required, and for compliance with the orders of the appellate court. Thereupon,...