Jackson v. Record Pub. Co.

• Decision Date: 07 February 1935
• Docket Number: 13995.
• Parties: JACKSON v. RECORD PUB. CO.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

178 S.E. 833

175 S.C. 211

JACKSON v. RECORD PUB. CO.

No. 13995.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

February 7, 1935

Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Richland County; W. H Townsend, Judge.

Action by Tillman Jackson against the Record Publishing Company. From an adverse judgment, plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.

D. W Robinson, of Columbia, for appellant.

Benet Shand & McGowan and G. Duncan Bellinger, all of Columbia, for respondent.

BONHAM Justice.

The appellant was a candidate for nomination to the office of Senator from Lexington County in the Democratic Primary Election of 1932. For nomination to the same office, Dr. E. L. Dreher and C. E. Taylor were candidates. At a campaign meeting these candidates were present and each of them made an address. The respondent is an afternoon newspaper published daily in the city of Columbia, just across the river from Lexington county. It published the following account of that meeting:

"DRIVE OPENS IN LEXINGTON

Crowd hears aspirants make maiden talks Wednesday at Summerland.

(Special to The Record)

Lexington, July 20.-The County political campaign opened at Summerland today with about 1,700 people attending the first meeting. County Chairman Cyrus L. Shealy presided.

Dr. E. L. Dreher, Leesville, candidate for the Senate, was the first speaker.

He charged the present delegation with taking away the privilege of the people to elect their own commissioners and with hogging the Lexington Water Power Company.

Saluda, he said, had received $75,000 for damaged roads, while Lexington received only 'two creosoted pine pole' bridges. 'Cip Jones,' he declared, "said two years ago "we don't want money, we want roads and bridges." We didn't get the roads and bridges. Who got the money?' he asked.

Tillman Jackson declared himself for an economy program.

Rural school education was the keynote of the speech of George Kraft.

Alfred G. Smith declared he would, if elected, see that factories were brought to Lexington.

C. E. Taylor, the last senatorial candidate to speak said his past record was an open book. He charged C. E. Jones and Tillman Jackson with stealing the school bill he had worked on for three weeks. Jones, he said, had helped to rob more women and children in and around Batesburg than anybody ever had and he had helped organize one of the most gigantic steals ever put over on the people.

Candidates for the house of representatives and for county offices were to be heard later in the afternoon."

The appellant brought action against the paper for libel, alleging that the publication was willfully false and malicious; that this plaintiff never sold, traded, or bartered away the rights of Lexington county or of the public, in or to any of the roads and bridges of said county; and never in any way attempted to sell or barter away the rights of the county or of the public, in or to any of its roads and bridges. This plaintiff never stole any school bill of C. E. Taylor; that it was uttered with intent to injure and defame the plaintiff, to hold him up to public scorn and contempt, to convey to plaintiff's constituency and the public that he was dishonest in his public and private life, that he was a criminal and had violated the criminal laws of his state, that he was unworthy of public trust and confidence, and unfit to seek or receive the votes of his fellow citizens, and the publication conveyed to the readers of the article this false and libelous meaning.

The defendant, by answer, admitted the publication of the article; it alleged that the article is not open to the construction sought to be given it by the plaintiff in these particulars: It does not charge plaintiff with selling, trading, or bartering away the rights of Lexington County in any roads or bridges of the county, or in attempting to do so; and, on information and belief, the language was not understood to make such charges as set forth in the complaint, by those having heard it; that the language in the speech of C. E. Taylor to the effect that plaintiff and C. E. Jones had stolen Taylor's school bill had reference to the fact that plaintiff (a member of the House) had introduced a bill in the Legislature along lines previously advocated by Taylor; and by him introduced in the Senate, and a copy of which was introduced by plaintiff and C. E. Jones in the House. Defendant further answered that plaintiff is a member of the House of Representatives of South Carolina, from Lexington county, and at the time of the publication of the alleged libelous matter was a candidate for the State Senate from that county; was a participant in the meeting at which the remarks set out in the published article were made; that said remarks were made by political opponents of plaintiff and was legitimate political criticism uttered by other candidates; that the article as published by defendant is substantially a correct account of a political meeting and the statements made by candidates thereat; that such article was published by defendant in its capacity of a daily newspaper, was made without malice, and was privileged.

The case came on to be tried by the late Judge W. H. Townsend and a jury. At the conclusion of the testimony for the plaintiff, the defendant's attorneys announced that the defendant would offer no evidence, and thereupon moved for the direction of a verdict for defendant. After argument, the motion was granted.

Plaintiff appeals upon two exceptions which make these questions:

1. That the language of the printed article of and concerning the plaintiff, with the attendant and surrounding circumstances, as shown by the evidence, was reasonably calculated to convey to the minds of the readers and of the public a meaning defamatory of the plaintiff, and was reasonably calculated to injure the character of the plaintiff.

2. Under the evidence and the pleadings, the court, under proper instruction, should have submitted the case to the jury.

There is little ground for contention over the principles of law which govern actions for libel and slander. The difficulty lies in the application of the law to the facts of each case.

It is true that he who publishes does so at his own peril.

It is true that one who offers himself as a candidate for public office becomes a legitimate object of legitimate criticism of his policies, acts, and of his fitness and qualifications for the office he seeks. Such right is not authority for false and malicious statements, libelous or slanderous in their nature.

A newspaper is privileged to publish accounts of a public meeting, provided such publication does not contain charges or statements, made by the paper, or a third person, which impute to another the commission of a crime or of acts which will bring him into contempt and ridicule of the public, and cause him to incur its hatred, or which will injure him in his business or calling, or which are false and malicious.

When the language alleged to be libelous, or slanderous, is plain and unambiguous, and admits of but one reasonable construction, it becomes a matter of law for the action and determination of the court. If said language be ambiguous, or doubtful of meaning, it should be left to the jury to determine in what sense it was used, and what its meaning is.

We apprehend that there will be no controversy over these postulates of the law. With them in mind let us analyze the pleadings and scan the evidence to determine whether the circuit judge was correct when he directed a verdict for the defendant in this case.

The complaint plants its allegations of libelous utterances upon those portions of the published article which it is claimed charge that the plaintiff "sold, traded or bartered away the rights of Lexington County or the public in or to any of the roads or bridges of said County; or attempted to do so; That he and C. E. Jones stole a bill of C. E. Taylor."

In support of the proposition of the complaint that these charges apply to him and injure him, plaintiff relies upon these statements in the published article:

"Dr. E. L. Dreher was the first speaker. He charged the present delegation with taking away the privilege of the people to elect their own commissioners and with hogging the Lexington Water Power Company."

It will be observed that the complaint does not state this as one of the alleged libelous utterances.

Continuing: "Saluda, he said, had received $70,000 for damaged roads while Lexington received only 'two creosote pine pole bridges,' 'Cip Jones' he declared, said two years 'we don't want money, we want roads and bridges.' We didn't get the roads and bridges. Who got the money? he asked."

It will be observed that there is no reference in that paragraph to the plaintiff by name. But it is argued by plaintiff that inasmuch as he was a member of the legislative delegation it did refer to him, and was so understood. There is no reference in that especial paragraph to the "present delegation." Moreover, it is an established fact that the jurisdiction and supervision of the roads and bridges of the county was solely in the hands of the county commissioners; placed there by section 4582 et seq., Code 1932, which commissioners were appointed by the Governor by and with the consent of the Senate and a majority of the House Delegation. As a member of the delegation the plaintiff knew this, and the public is charged with a knowledge of a public law. It is patent that the language complained of did not refer to plaintiff.

Plaintiff depends upon the further statement from this published article to show that it is libelous in its application to him: "C. E. Taylor, (was) the last senatorial candidate to speak * * *. He charged C. E. Jones and Tillman Jackson with...