Jackson v. Roberts (In re Jackson)

• Decision Date: 19 August 2020
• Docket Number: Docket No. 19-480,August Term, 2019
• Citation: 972 F.3d 25
• Parties: IN RE: Curtis James JACKSON, III, Debtor. Curtis James Jackson, III, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. William Leonard Roberts, II, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

972 F.3d 25

IN RE: Curtis James JACKSON, III, Debtor.

Curtis James Jackson, III, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.William Leonard Roberts, II, Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 19-480

August Term, 2019

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Argued: January 23, 2020

Decided: August 19, 2020

Frederick A. Braunstein, Robins Kaplan LLP, New York, NY (Paul V. LiCalsi, Robins Kaplan LLP, New York, NY and Glenn A. Danas, Robins Kaplan LLP, Los Angeles, CA, on the brief) for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Jonathan D. Goins, Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP, Atlanta, GA (Leron E. Rogers and John T. Rose, Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP, Atlanta, GA, and Nicholas P. Hurzeler, Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP, New York, NY, on the brief), for Defendant-Appellee.

Before: PIERRE N. LEVAL, REENA RAGGI, DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, Circuit Judges.

LEVAL, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff Curtis James Jackson III appeals from the judgment of the District Court for the District of Connecticut (Warren W. Eginton, J .) granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant William Leonard Roberts II on the grounds that Jackson's claim of violation of the Connecticut common law right of publicity is preempted by the Copyright Act. Jackson and Roberts are both recognized hip-hop recording artists, known to the public by their stage names: Jackson is known as "50 Cent" and Roberts is known as "Rick Ross." This dispute arises from Roberts's use of a sample taken from one of Jackson's best-known songs, "In Da Club," in a mixtape entitled Renzel Remixes , which Roberts released for free in 2015, in advance of Roberts's then-upcoming commercial album, Black Market . Jackson's complaint alleged that, on the mixtape, Roberts's use of Jackson's voice performing "In Da Club," as well as of Jackson's stage name in the track title identifying that song, violated Jackson's right of publicity under Connecticut common law. The district court granted Roberts's motion for summary judgment. Because we conclude that Jackson's claim is preempted under either the doctrine of implied preemption or under the express terms of § 301 of the Copyright Act, we AFFIRM the grant of summary judgment.

A. BACKGROUND

In 2003, Jackson released his debut rap album, Get Rich or Die Tryin’ , which includes the song "In Da Club." Billboard named "In Da Club" as one of the "Hot 100 Songs of the Decade." The song helped to propel Jackson to international fame. Jackson recorded "In Da Club" pursuant to an agreement (the "Recording Agreement") with his then record label, Shady Records/Aftermath Records ("Shady/Aftermath"). By operation of the Recording Agreement, Jackson owns no copyright interest in "In Da Club."¹ Moreover, Jackson granted to Shady/Aftermath the "perpetual and exclusive rights during the term of [the Recording Agreement]," and a non-exclusive right thereafter, to use Jackson's name and likeness "for the purposes of trade, or for advertising purposes ... in connection with the marketing and exploitation of Phonograph Records and Covered Videos hereunder." App'x at 52. Shady/Aftermath, however, agreed to refrain from licensing the recordings made pursuant to the Recording Agreement "for use in a commercial in the United States [with certain exceptions]" or "for use as a ‘sample’ " without Jackson's consent. Id. at 54. Those restrictions "apply [during and] after the term of [the Recording] Agreement," subject to certain other conditions. While the term of the Recording Agreement is not clear, Jackson contends (and Roberts does not dispute) that it terminated in 2014. Id .

In November 2015, Roberts released the mixtape Renzel Remixes for free over the internet. In the hip-hop world, a "mixtape" — unlike a commercial album — is an album of material generally produced by a recording artist for free distribution to fans. As both Jackson and Roberts agree, it is common for hip-hop mixtapes to include "remixes," often consisting of new vocal recordings by the releasing artist, combined with samples of songs by other artists who are identified by name. And as both Jackson and Roberts agree, many hip-hop artists (including Jackson himself) have created mixtapes that included samples of recordings of other artists without obtaining permission from either the recording artist or the copyright holder of the work sampled. Some (but not all) mixtapes are released for free in advance of an upcoming commercial album by the same artist and include material that promotes the upcoming release.

Roberts's Renzel Remixes mixtape is a compilation of 26 remixes in which Roberts performs his own new lyrics over audio samples of popular songs by well-known recording artists. For 11 remixes, the track list identifies 18 original recording artists associated with the samples, including, for example, "Hello (Feat. Adele)," "Bill Gates (Feat. Lil Wayne)," and "In Da Club (Ft. 50 Cent)."² The "In Da Club (Ft. 50 Cent)" track consists of Roberts rapping over the original instrumental track of Jackson's song, followed by a roughly thirty-second sample of Jackson singing his refrain from the original "In Da Club" recording, reproduced without alteration. Roberts did not obtain or request permission from Shady/Aftermath or from Jackson to include those in his mixtape, or to use Jackson's stage name.

Roberts included in the "In Da Club (Ft. 50 Cent)" remix several references to his then-upcoming commercial album, Black Market , repeating the lines "Only on the Black Market, December 4th / The Album is out." The cover art for Roberts's mixtape included a reference in small white typeface to Black Market and its release date, as shown below:

Jackson brought this action against Roberts on December 23, 2015, alleging that Roberts's use of his voice (in the "In Da Club" sample) and his stage name (in the track title) violated his right of publicity under Connecticut common law.³ Both parties moved for summary judgment on the issue of Roberts's liability. Roberts argued, inter alia, that his use was protected by the First Amendment, that Jackson's claim was preempted by the Copyright Act, and that Jackson had no publicity rights associated with "In Da Club," having transferred them to Shady/Aftermath in the Recording Agreement. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Jackson v. Roberts , No. 3:17-cv-550, ECF No. 100 (D. Conn. May 8, 2018).

The district court granted Roberts's motion for summary judgment, concluding, in an order of September 28, 2018, that, under the Recording Agreement, Jackson had "surrendered his rights to the use of his name, performance and likeness associated with the master recording of ‘In Da Club’ in connection with the advertising and marketing of ‘Phonograph Records,’ " and that his "right of publicity claim is preempted" because Jackson "cannot assert a tort action based on the rights that he has contractually surrendered." App'x at 604– 05. Jackson timely appealed.

B. DISCUSSION

i. Recording Agreement

As a preliminary matter, we note that the district court erred in interpreting the relevant provisions of the Recording Agreement to reach the conclusion that Jackson "surrendered his rights to the use of his name, performance and likeness associated with the master recording of ‘In Da Club.’ " App'x at 604. While the district court correctly noted that under Section 8.01 of the Recording Agreement, Jackson granted to Shady/Aftermath the "perpetual and exclusive" rights to utilize his name and likeness "for the purposes of trade, or for advertising purposes ... in connection with the marketing and exploitation of Phonograph Records and Covered Videos hereunder," that grant was exclusive only "during the term of the Recording Agreement," which, the parties appear to agree, ended in 2014. Accordingly, upon expiration of the Recording Agreement, Jackson recovered a shared interest in his right of publicity and is not contractually precluded from bringing this right of publicity claim. We therefore disagree with the district court's dismissal of Jackson's claim to the extent it was based on the court's finding that "[Jackson] cannot assert a tort action based on the rights that he has contractually surrendered." App'x at 605.

ii. Copyright Act Preemption

Jackson contends that the district court erred in concluding that his claim is preempted. Although relying on reasoning that differs in some regards from the district court's, we agree with the court's result and conclude that Jackson's claim is preempted under the doctrine of implied preemption. We hold, in the alternative, that Jackson's claim as to the use of his voice on Roberts’ mixtape is preempted by the express terms of § 301 of the Copyright Act ("statutory preemption"). Generally stated, implied preemption precludes the application of state laws to the extent that those laws interfere with or frustrate the functioning of the regime created by the Copyright Act.⁴ Statutory preemption preempts state law claims to the extent that they assert rights equivalent to those protected by the Copyright Act, in works of authorship within the subject matter of federal copyright. See 17 U.S.C. § 301.

a. Implied Preemption

The doctrine of implied preemption will bar a state law claim where, "under the circumstances of a particular case, the challenged state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council , 530 U.S. 363, 373, 120 S.Ct. 2288, 147 L.Ed.2d 352 (2000) (alterations omitted); see also Goldstein v. California , 412 U.S. 546, 561, 93 S.Ct. 2303, 37 L.Ed.2d 163 (1973) (addressing the scope of implied preemption by the Copyright Act).⁵ What constitutes a "sufficient obstacle" is a "matter of judgment, to be informed by examining the federal statute as a whole and identifying its purpose and intended effects." Crosby , 530 U.S. at 373, 120 S.Ct. 2288. If, by reason of state law, a federal statute's "operation within its...