Jackson v. Sch. Bd. of Okaloosa Cnty.
| Decision Date | 02 August 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 1D20-423,1D20-423 |
| Citation | 326 So.3d 722 |
| Parties | Mary Beth JACKSON, Appellant, v. The SCHOOL BOARD OF OKALOOSA COUNTY, Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
D. Ty Jackson and George Levesque of GrayRobinson, P.A., Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Nathan A. Adams, IV, and Tiffany A. Roddenberry of Holland & Knight LLP, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
Mary Beth Jackson, a former Superintendent of Schools for Okaloosa County, appeals an order dismissing her complaint against the Okaloosa County School Board seeking reimbursement for attorney's fees and costs incurred in challenging her suspension from office by the Governor. Because judicial review of this matter would violate the separation of powers and constitute an unjustified expansion of the common law, we affirm the circuit court's order dismissing her complaint with prejudice.
Jackson was serving her second term as the elected Superintendent of Schools for Okaloosa County when Governor DeSantis suspended her from office under article IV, section 7(a) of the Florida Constitution. As detailed in Executive Order 19-13, Jackson's suspension followed the Commissioner of Education's recommendation and was based in part on grand jury reports stemming from allegations of a teacher abusing developmentally challenged students. The executive order alleged that Jackson was incompetent and neglected her duty as Superintendent "due to her failure to provide adequate, necessary and frequent training, a lack of supervision of school district personnel, and a failure to implement adequate safe-guards, policies, and reporting requirements to protect the safety and well-being of the students." Fla. Exec. Order No. 19-13 (Jan. 11, 2019).
Jackson disputed the allegations of the executive order and requested a formal hearing before the Florida Senate.1 The Senate President appointed a special master to receive evidence and render an advisory report on Jackson's suspension and potential removal from office. After the final hearing but before the special master issued his final report, the Governor reinstated Jackson to her former position as Superintendent "in expectation of [her] immediate resignation." Fla. Exec. Order No. 19-166 (July 17, 2019). Upon reinstatement, Jackson immediately resigned.
Jackson then filed a complaint seeking reimbursement from the Okaloosa County School Board of the substantial attorney's fees and costs she incurred in challenging her suspension. Jackson alleged that she is entitled to such reimbursement under the common law as explained in Thornber v. City of Fort Walton Beach , 568 So. 2d 914 (Fla. 1990), and related authority. She argued this common law remedy is independent of statute and is not barred by sovereign immunity. Jackson then sought a partial summary judgment as to her entitlement to reimbursement.
In response, the School Board moved to dismiss Jackson's complaint, arguing that section 112.44, Florida Statutes (2019), provides the sole method of recovering fees and costs in suspension and removal proceedings, and she had failed to satisfy the preconditions for an award under that statute. The School Board also argued that the doctrine of separation of powers prevents an award to Jackson under the common law.
After a hearing on both motions, the circuit court agreed with the School Board's arguments and dismissed Jackson's complaint with prejudice. Given the final order of dismissal, the court did not rule on Jackson's motion for partial summary judgment. This appeal followed.
"A trial court's ruling on a motion to dismiss based on a question of law is subject to de novo review." Execu-Tech Bus. Sys., Inc. v. New Oji Paper Co., 752 So. 2d 582, 584 (Fla. 2000) ; Todd v. Johnson , 965 So. 2d 255, 256 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007). In reviewing a final order of dismissal of a complaint, this court must accept as true a complaint's well-pleaded factual allegations and must draw all reasonable inferences from these allegations in the plaintiff's favor. Allen v. Frazier , 132 So. 3d 361, 363 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014).
Florida courts generally follow the "American Rule," under which parties pay their own attorney's fees absent a fee-shifting statute or contractual provision that allows the successful litigant to collect his or her fees from the losing party. See Trytek v. Gale Indus., Inc. , 3 So. 3d 1194, 1198 (Fla. 2009) ; see also Main v. Benjamin Foster Co. , 141 Fla. 91, 192 So. 602, 604 (1939).
But here, Jackson asserts a common law right to reimbursement of her legal expenses from the School Board for actions taken by the Governor. She argues that she is entitled to relief under the test announced in Thornber , 568 So. 2d at 917, because the allegations of misconduct that formed the basis for her suspension arose during the performance of her public duties, and she successfully defended against such suspension by virtue of her reinstatement by the Governor.
However, Thornber and the other cases on which Jackson relies are materially distinguishable. In fact, both parties agree that the issue here—whether a court may award attorney's fees and costs incurred by a public official in challenging a suspension order issued by the Governor under article IV, section 7(a) —is one of first impression.
In all prior cases when Florida courts have awarded attorney's fees to a public official in the absence of a statutory basis, the public official succeeded in litigation arising from civil, criminal, or administrative actions. See, e.g. , Thornber , 568 So. 2d at 916 (); Leon Cnty. v. Stephen S. Dobson, III, P.A. , 957 So. 2d 12, 13 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (); Ellison v. Reid , 397 So. 2d 352, 354 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981) ().
By contrast, this case involves the suspension and reinstatement of a public official where the Constitution has vested all power in the executive and legislative branches, save for limited judicial review. To begin, the power of suspension lies exclusively with the Governor. Art. IV, § 7(a), Fla. Const.; see also State ex rel. Kelly v. Sullivan , 52 So. 2d 422, 425 (Fla. 1951) (). And "so long as the Governor acts within his jurisdiction as charted by [the Constitution], his action may not be reviewed by the courts." State ex rel. Hardie v. Coleman , 115 Fla. 119, 155 So. 129, 133 (1934).
Beyond this narrow jurisdictional review, the check on the executive suspension power rests with the Senate. "The Senate is nothing less than a court provided to examine into and determine whether or not the Governor exercises the power of suspension in keeping with the constitutional mandate." Id. at 134. To be sure, the Senate has the exclusive authority to remove or reinstate a suspended officer, unless the Governor reinstates the officer before Senate removal. Art. IV, § 7(a)–(b), Fla. Const. Neither the evidence supporting the Governor's order of suspension nor the Senate's judgment of removal or reinstatement may be reviewed by the courts. See Israel v. DeSantis , 269 So. 3d 491, 495 (Fla. 2019).
With this constitutional framework in mind, Jackson has already exhausted the limited mechanism by which the courts may review the exercise of the Governor's suspension power. Her challenge to the Governor's authority to suspend her from office failed. Jackson, 268 So. 3d at 663. This should end the judicial inquiry, as the separation of powers doctrine provides that one branch may not encroach upon the powers of another. See Chiles v. Children A, B, C, D, E, & F , 589 So. 2d 260, 264 (Fla. 1991) ; Art. II, § 3, Fla. Const. "Whether there is any merit to the grounds listed in [the executive order] for Jackson's suspension from office is a determination to be made exclusively by the Florida Senate under the Constitution." Jackson , 268 So. 3d at 665 (Lagoa, J., concurring in result).
For her part, Jackson argues that she is not asking the courts to delve into the merits of her suspension or reinstatement, which she agrees is an inquiry inappropriate for the courts to entertain. Yet she calls the suspension order "improvident" and lacking in justification, contends that she was wrongfully suspended, and proclaims that the "truth regarding [her] faithful and upstanding service as Superintendent was revealed" by her reinstatement. In essence, Jackson is asking the courts to pass judgment on a value determination constitutionally committed to another branch of government.
It is true that the Governor exercised his constitutional prerogative to reinstate Jackson to office—in the expectation of her imminent resignation—but beside the point. "[T]he courts may not inquire into the factual basis for reinstatement, any more than they may inquire as to the sufficiency of the evidence for suspension." Sullivan , 52 So. 2d at 425.
At bottom, there is simply no constitutional space, or judicially discoverable or manageable standards, for a court to determine whether Jackson "successfully defend[ed] against unfounded allegations of official misconduct." Ellison , 397 So. 2d at 354. For this reason, Florida law reserves to the legislative branch as part of its plenary authority over expulsion proceedings the sole mechanism for awarding attorney's fees and costs to a reinstated public official. See § 112.44, Fla. Stat.2
We therefore affirm.
...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Gate Venture, LLC v. Skinner
...its attachments. Banks v. Alachua Cnty. Sch. Bd. , 275 So. 3d 214, 215 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019) ; see also Jackson v. Sch. Bd. of Okaloosa Cnty. , 326 So. 3d 722, 725 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021) (noting that in reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to dismiss, an appellate court must accept as tr......