Jackson v. Slaughter

• Decision Date: 20 December 1944
• Docket Number: No. 6142.,6142.
• Citation: 185 S.W.2d 759
• Parties: JACKSON et al. v. SLAUGHTER et al.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 759

185 S.W.2d 759

JACKSON et al. v. SLAUGHTER et al.

No. 6142.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Texarkana.

December 20, 1944.

Rehearing Denied January 25, 1945.

Appeal from District Court, Wood County; Paul G. Brown, Judge.

Suit by Thelma Cooper Jackson and husband against E. M. Slaughter and others to establish title to an interest in real estate. From an adverse judgment, plaintiffs appeal.

Judgment reformed, and as reformed, affirmed.

See also 185 S.W.2d 764.

Stewart, Burgess & Morris and W. Carloss Morris, Jr., all of Houston, P. O. Lopp, of Dallas, and C. W. Vickery, of Quitman, for appellants.

Robert F. Higgins and Dillard Baker, both of Houston, Jones & Jones, of Mineola, H. P. Smead, Bramlette, Levy, Gibson & Bolton, McLemore & McLemore, and R. L. Whitehead, all of Longview, and Lasseter, Simpson, Spruiell & Lowry, Oran Lowry, and Weeks, Hankerson & Surles, all of Tyler, for appellees.

HARVEY, Justice.

May 1, 1924, R. F. Green brought suit in the District Court of Wood County, Texas, against Anna Belcher and her two brothers, Looney Cooper and Jerry Cooper, together with several other defendants, said cause styled Green v. Belcher et al., No 5264, in which he sought to recover the fee simple title to a fifty-acre tract of land out of the George Brewer Survey in Wood County. All the defendants were personally served, except Looney Cooper, who was cited by publication. The judgment rendered in the case on June 8, 1925, recited an appearance by him through attorneys, and awarded to R. F. Green an undivided seven-tenths (7/10) interest in the land described in the original petition, with the exception of ten acres in which it was determined he had no interest. The remaining three-tenths (3/10) interest was found to be owned by Anna Belcher, Looney Cooper and Jerry Cooper, in equal shares, through inheritance from their deceased parents, Austin and Lizzie Cooper. The judgment further found that the defendant Jerry Cooper had received out of the estate of Austin and Lizzie Cooper the sum of $125, and that Anna Belcher and Looney Cooper had received nothing out of such estate, by reason of which they ought to recover from Jerry Cooper all of his interest in the land involved in the suit, and it was accordingly decreed that Anna Belcher and Looney Cooper each be vested with a one-half interest in the one-tenth interest that otherwise would have been recovered by Jerry Cooper.

About the year 1943, the record not disclosing the exact file date, Thelma Cooper Jackson, as one of the two heirs at law of her father, Jerry Cooper, filed suit in the District Court of Rusk County, Texas, styled Thelma Cooper Jackson et vir. v. E. M. Slaughter et al., No. 8511, to establish title in her to one-half of Jerry Cooper's original 1/10 interest in the land, together with a 1/60 interest inherited from Looney Cooper, who had died intestate in 1936. The basis of the above-mentioned suit as set forth in plaintiffs' petition was that the judgment entered in the case of R. F. Green v. Anna Belcher et al., in 1925, in so far as it undertook to divest the interest of Jerry Cooper out of him and vest it in Anna Belcher and Looney Cooper was totally void because there was no pleading in the suit in behalf of Anna Belcher and Looney Cooper as against Jerry Cooper upon which such judgment could have been rendered, and for the further reason that no citation of any kind was issued or served upon Jerry Cooper seeking any relief against him, and therefore the district court never acquired jurisdiction over the person of Jerry Cooper so as to authorize the entry of such judgment against him.

Various defenses were pleaded by the several defendants, the more important ones being that plaintiffs' cause of action constituted a collateral attack on the judgment in the case of R. F. Green v. Anna Belcher et al., which judgment they asserted was valid on its face and was not subject to such an attack, and that the cause of action was barred by the two and the four year statutes of limitation. The case was tried before the court, without a jury, and judgment entered denying any recovery in favor of the plaintiffs, either in the surface estate of the land involved in the suit, or in the mineral estate, and such plaintiffs bring this appeal.

At the outset, it is to be noted that this is not a suit to set aside or have vacated the judgment rendered in 1925 in the case of R. F. Green v. Anna Belcher et al. Rather, it is an action to establish title to an interest in the land in controversy in the plaintiff, who stands on the proposition that the judgment referred to is an absolute nullity, and as such is subject to collateral attack. Such being the nature of the suit, the two and four year statutes of limitation are not applicable, suits for land being excluded from the operation thereof by specific terms of the statute itself, Art. 5529, R.S. of Texas, 1936, Jewell v. Hart, Tex.Civ.App., 244 S.W. 827. These defenses, therefore, are not available to the defendants (appellees) herein as they would be if the proceeding were one to set aside the judgment.

On this appeal, appellants concede that if the record does not show on its face that the judgment assailed is void, they are not entitled to recover, other than a small interest in the surface estate of the land involved, which is claimed by them irrespective of the validity of the judgment. No contention is made by them that if the judgment is not void as disclosed by the judgment roll itself, that purchasers under the judgment are not protected, nor do they assert that they are making a direct attack on the judgment. They elect to stand or fall on the point urged by them that the judgment in question is totally void and subject to objection when offered in evidence in any proceeding. Consequently, the one matter presented for our determination is whether or not such judgment is wholly void for the reasons advanced as to its invalidity.

In determining the validity of a judgment, one is not restricted to the face of the judgment alone, but resort many be had to the judgment roll, or record, which includes the pleadings filed in a suit. This principle is of such universal application that citation of authorities is not deemed necessary. In the case now under advisement, the district court had jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject matter; the question at issue is whether or not it had authority to make the disposition of the rights and equities of the three defendants, as it did, under the record as presented in this suit. Plaintiffs (appellants) objected to the judgment when offered in evidence, and then introduced the record in the case in which it was rendered. Among the papers was a pleading on behalf of Anna Belcher, Looney and Jerry Cooper, which was styled "Trial Amendment" by such designation written in ink on the back of the instrument as well as by interlineation on the face of it, and filed the same day that the judgment was dated. This pleading contained a plea of "not guilty", a plea that the deed was a mortgage, and prayed that the defendants be given title to the land sued for. The trial judge in his findings of fact in the instant case found that if there were any cross action filed by Anna Belcher and Looney Cooper against their co-defendant, Jerry Cooper, it was not in the file containing the papers in the case. He further found that the records in the district clerk's office did not reflect any missing papers, except in so far as the judgment recitals, length of time since the judgment was rendered, and the pleadings styled "Trial Amendment", might indicate to the contrary. Upon this state of facts, and the circumstance that there is absent from the record any pleading asking for affirmative relief against Jerry Cooper by Anna Belcher and Looney Cooper, appellants urge that the court was without authority to enter that part of the judgment divesting title out of Jerry Cooper and to that extent it was void.

So often has it been stated in the adjudicated cases, as well as by text-writers, that a judgment, the final action taken by a court of competent jurisdiction in disposing of matters properly before it, is of such solemn import and of such supreme importance that every intendment should be given it in order to sustain its validity, that to give further emphasis to the thought would be almost a matter of triteness. Judgments constitute the considered opinion of courts; they are judicial acts with the primary...