Jackson v. St. Charles Parish Hous. Auth. Bd. of Commissioners

• Decision Date: 21 February 2020
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 18-7917
• Citation: 441 F.Supp.3d 341
• Parties: Leala JACKSON v. ST. CHARLES PARISH HOUSING AUTHORITY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana

441 F.Supp.3d 341

Leala JACKSON

v.ST. CHARLES PARISH HOUSING AUTHORITY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, et al.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 18-7917

United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana.

Signed February 21, 2020

Nghana Lewis Gauff, Nghana Lewis Gauff, LLC, LaPlace, LA, Robert Charles Jenkins, Robert C. Jenkins & Associates, New Orleans, LA, for Leala Jackson.

John David Ziober, Schutte, Terhoeve, Richardson, Eversberg, Cronin, Judice & Boudreaux, Baton Rouge, LA, for Webb Jay, IV, Leatrice Hollis, St. Charles Parish Housing Authority.

SECTION M (1)

ORDER & REASONS

BARRY W. ASHE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the Court is a motion to dismiss third amended petition and alternatively, motion to stay, filed by defendants St. Charles Parish Housing Authority (the "Authority"), Webb Jay, IV, and Leatrice Hollis (collectively, "Defendants").¹ Plaintiff Leala Jackson opposes the motion.² Having considered the parties' memoranda, the record, and the applicable law, this Court issues this Order and Reasons dismissing all of Jackson's claims other than those for denial of pre-deprivation process and for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural Background

Jackson commenced this lawsuit on August 20, 2018.³ On September 20, 2018, the named defendants filed a motion to dismiss.⁴ Jackson amended her petition on March 26, 2019,⁵ and her amended petition drew another motion to dismiss.⁶ On June 17, 2019, Jackson again amended her petition,⁷ and on the same day, the Court dismissed the two then-pending motions to dismiss as moot.⁸ The named defendants filed a motion to dismiss second amended petition on July 29, 2019.⁹ On September 30, 2019, Jackson amended her petition for the third time.¹⁰ The Court denied Jackson leave to file a fourth amended petition on November 6, 2019.¹¹ On November 27, 2019, Defendants filed their motion to dismiss third amended petition.¹²

In the operative complaint (the third amended petition), Jackson claims (1) federal and state due-process violations against Jay and Hollis, personally; (2) retaliatory discharge, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against Jay and Hollis, personally; (3) retaliatory discharge, in violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601, et seq. , against all Defendants; (4) age discrimination, pursuant to Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq. , against the Authority; (5) retaliatory discharge, pursuant to Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq. , against the Authority; (6) intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED"), pursuant to Louisiana Civil Code article 2315, against Jay and Hollis, personally; and (7) breach of contract against the Authority.¹³ Although Jackson does not refer to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621, et seq. , in her complaint, she appears to state claims arising under this statute.

B. Factual Background

This case arises out of an employment dispute over the events leading to and surrounding Jackson's termination as an employee of the Authority.¹⁴ Jackson was a classified civil servant of the State of Louisiana and employed by the Authority at the times relevant to her claims. Jay is chair of the Authority's board of commissioners (the "Board"), and Hollis is executive director of the Authority and was Jackson's immediate supervisor.

According to Jackson, on August 7, 2018, Jay told Jackson that she had given herself two raises illegally and that she had a choice of resigning with a recommendation from the Authority, or face an investigation that could result in her arrest. Jackson denied any wrongdoing and opted for the investigation, after which Hollis informed her that she would be placed on administrative leave during the investigation. Jackson alleges that on August 10, 2018, an Authority employee called to tell her she could pick up her paycheck and that her pay had been reduced by $8.00 per hour, which Jackson confirmed upon receipt of the check.¹⁵ On August 15, 2018, Jackson alleges that the Board's attorney, Don Paul Landry, called to tell her that "there had been a ‘friendly mistake’ and that it was ‘all civil service's fault,’ " that "civil service had started the investigation and had messed up," that she could return to work, and, in response to Jackson's inquiring about her pay reduction, that "she would ‘have to negotiate that with Leatrice (Hollis).’ "¹⁶ Landry allegedly also told Jackson that "Hollis wanted to ‘take supervisor’ out of [her] job description."¹⁷ Jackson alleges she later learned that Hollis had called the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") to have her access to HUD's Public Information Center suspended, and that Hollis had accessed her locked office using a credit card to open the door and left several file cabinets open.¹⁸

On August 21, 2018, Jackson lodged an appeal with the Louisiana State Civil Service Commission (the "CSC"), in which she alleged that she had been demoted and had her pay cut without cause and without proper notice. According to Jackson, on September 18, 2018, Dr. Trent Desselle notified the Authority that "he authorized medical leave for [her], due to severe emotional distress that she was experiencing as a result" of the aforementioned events.¹⁹ In September 2018, Jackson lodged a complaint with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the "EEOC") alleging age discrimination, and in mid-October, she amended this complaint to add a constructive-discharge claim. On November 4, 2018,²⁰ Hollis directed correspondence to Jackson informing her that her employment with the Authority was terminated. The following day, Jackson amended her CSC appeal to allege that she had been terminated without cause, notice, or an opportunity to review and respond to evidence that formed the basis of her termination. In May 2019, while being interviewed by the EEOC, Jackson told the EEOC that she had been unlawfully terminated as a result of "refusing to cower to Defendants' intim[id]ating tactics and threats to report her to the police," lodging an appeal with the CSC, and filing her discrimination charge with the EEOC.²¹ On May 16, 2019, Jackson received a right-to-sue letter from the Department of Justice.

II. PENDING MOTION

Defendants now move to dismiss Jackson's third amended complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), and alternatively, to stay this proceeding.²² Defendants first argue that Jackson's Title VII claims must be dismissed because she is not a "person" under Title VII as she does not allege that the Authority employed at least 15 employees at all pertinent times – nor can she because, they assert, the Authority did not employ more than eight employees during the relevant period.²³ Defendants state that Jackson, in what they read to be an attempt to circumvent this numerosity requirement, makes an incorrect legal conclusion in alleging that the Authority is a "local agency and instrumentality" of the State, as La. R.S. 40:384(16) makes it clear that the Authority is "not a state agency for any purpose."²⁴ They next argue that Jackson's procedural due-process claims should be dismissed because administrative remedies must be exhausted for such claims to be viable, yet her appeal before the CSC remains pending.²⁵ Defendants assert that Jackson's § 1983 retaliatory-discharge claim also must be dismissed because the CSC, in the pending appeal, retains exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute about her termination, so she has not exhausted her administrative remedies.²⁶ In regards to her FMLA claim, Defendants likewise urge that the CSC retains jurisdiction over this employment dispute, and add that (1) because neither Jay nor Hollis is alleged to have been her employer, they cannot have any FMLA liability; (2) Jackson is not an eligible employee under the FMLA because she fails to allege that the Authority employed at least 50 employees at the worksite or within 75 miles, and this requirement applies to public employees; (3) Jackson provides no support for her contention that Dr. Desselle's letter, received during the pendency of her suspension and investigation, required the Authority to halt its investigation and refrain from making an adverse employment decision; (4) Jackson never made an FMLA claim, or so much as mentioned the FMLA, until she first amended her petition on March 26, 2019, well after she had been suspended with pay and subsequently terminated; and (5) she does not allege a single element of an estoppel claim to prevent Defendants from raising their defenses.²⁷ Defendants next argue that Jackson fails to establish an age-discrimination claim because her allegations are conclusory and insufficient to establish a prima facie claim for age discrimination under the ADEA, and the CSC retains exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute concerning her termination.²⁸ Defendants maintain that Jackson's Title VII retaliatory-discharge claim should be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and because she cannot allege a claim under Title VII.²⁹ Finally, Defendants argue that Jackson's state-law claims cannot be maintained if her federal claims are dismissed; that, regardless, Jackson fails to allege grounds for supplemental subject-matter jurisdiction, as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, though she does list the relevant statutory provisions; and that Jackson's breach-of-contract claim is simply a compensation claim, for which the CSC retains exclusive jurisdiction.³⁰ In the alternative to dismissal, Defendants ask the Court to stay the action pending a final determination of the CSC appeal.³¹

In opposition, Jackson begins by arguing that Defendants' points about the FMLA and Title VII numerosity requirements fail because of (1) the "hybrid economic realities" of her employment as a classified state civil servant working at the Authority, and (2) the Authority's representation to her and other employees at the Authority that they were...