Robinson v. Securitas Sec.
| Docket Number | 3:22-CV-06165 |
| Decision Date | 24 July 2023 |
| Parties | TOMMY ROBINSON v. SECURITAS SECURITY ET AL. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Louisiana |
REPORT & RECOMMENDATION
Pending before the undersigned Magistrate Judge, on reference from the District Court, are three motions: (1) a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted [doc. #8], filed by Defendants Teresa Johnson Securitas Security Services USA Inc. (hereinafter “Securitas”), and Eddie Walls (collectively “Defendants”); (2) a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted [doc. #16], filed by Defendants; and (3) a motion to file extra exhibits [doc. #22], filed by Plaintiff Tommy Robinson. For reasons assigned below, it is recommended that Defendants' second motion to dismiss [doc. #16], be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. It is further recommended that Defendants' first motion to dismiss [doc. #8], be DENIED AS MOOT.[1]It is ordered that Plaintiff's motion to file extra exhibits [doc. #22] is GRANTED.[2]
Plaintiff worked as a security guard for Securitas from January 2018 until his termination on August 15, 2022. [doc. #16-2]. Approximately three months later, on November 21, 2022 Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), alleging that Securitas discriminated against him because of his age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq. Id. On December 9, 2022, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed the instant civil rights lawsuit, citing Section 706(f) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in his complaint. [doc. #1]. Plaintiff attached his right-to-sue letter from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) dated December 6, 2022. [doc. #1-1].
On March 9, 2023, in response to Defendants' first motion to dismiss, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint. [doc. #13]. Therein, Plaintiff alleges that his supervisor, Teresa Johnson, subjected him to discrimination based on his race and his age. Id. at 1. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Johnson attempted to disparage him in front of other employees and informed new hires that they were not to listen to him because of his age. Id. Plaintiff further alleges that Johnson changed his work assignment without justification and directed discriminatory statements towards him for several months prior to his termination. Id. Plaintiff also alleges that Johnson intended to humiliate him because of his age and race. Id. Finally, Plaintiff alleges that Securitas permitted other similarly situated employees to transfer rather than face termination. Id.
On March 23, 2023, Defendants filed their second motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. [doc. #16]. Therein, Defendants seek dismissal on five grounds: (1) Plaintiff's complaints do not identify any facts to alter the at-will employment presumption under Louisiana law; (2) Title VII does not provide causes of action for age-based discrimination, harassment, or retaliation; (3) Plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies as to his race-based claims; (4) Plaintiff does not allege any viable legal claim against Johnson; and (5) Plaintiff does not state any cause of action against Walls.
On April 14, 2023, Plaintiff filed his opposition. [doc. #20]. Therein, he argues that his complaints satisfy the Rule 8 standard, and, therefore, Defendants' motions should be denied. Id. Plaintiff also argues that his complaints should be liberally construed because of his pro se status. Id.
On April 20, 2023, Defendants filed their reply. [doc. #21].
On May 1, 2023, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file “extra exhibits.” [doc. #22]. Plaintiff seeks to file documents expanding on the factual allegations in his complaints. Id. On May 15, 2023, Defendants filed their opposition to Plaintiff's motion. [doc. #24].
Briefing is complete. Accordingly, this matter is ripe.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure sanction dismissal where the plaintiff fails “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). A pleading states a claim for relief, inter alia, when it contains a “short and plain statement . . . showing that the pleader is entitled to relief ....” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Circumstances constituting fraud or mistake, however, must be alleged with particularity. Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b).
To withstand a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible when it contains sufficient factual content for the court “to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Plausibility does not equate to possibility or probability; it lies somewhere in between. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663. Plausibility simply calls for enough factual allegations to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence to support the elements of the claim. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. Although the court must accept as true all factual allegations set forth in the complaint, the same presumption does not extend to legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663. A pleading comprised of “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” does not satisfy Rule 8. Id. “[P]laintiffs must allege facts that support the elements of the cause of action in order to make out a valid claim.” City of Clinton, Ark. v. Pilgrim's Pride Corp., 632 F.3d 148 (5th Cir. 2010).
“The notice pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 and case law do not require an inordinate amount of detail or precision.” Gilbert v. Outback Steakhouse of Florida Inc., 295 F. App'x. 710, 713 (5th Cir. 2008) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Further, Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 530 (2011). Indeed, “[c]ourts must focus on the substance of the relief sought and the allegations pleaded, not on the label used.” Gearlds v. Entergy Servs., Inc., 709 F.3d 448, 452 (5th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted). “Specific facts are not necessary; the statement need only ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting Bell Atl., 550 U.S. at 555).
Assessing whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663. A well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes the court that actual proof of the asserted facts is improbable, and that recovery is unlikely. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. Nevertheless, a court is compelled to dismiss an otherwise well-pleaded claim if it is premised upon an invalid legal theory. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 320 (1989).
When considering a motion to dismiss, courts generally are limited to the complaint and its proper attachments. Dorsey v. Portfolio Equities, Inc., 540 F.3d 333, 338 (5th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). However, courts may rely upon “documents incorporated into the complaint by reference and matters of which a court may take judicial notice”-including public records. Dorsey, 540 F.3d at 338; Norris v. Hearst Trust, 500 F.3d 454, 461 (5th Cir. 2007) ().
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants discriminated against him because of his race and age, as well as retaliating against him. [doc. #13]. Thus, the Court construes his complaint to allege causes of action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e), et seq; and the Age Discrimination Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq. See Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521 (2011) ( ).
Title VII prohibits an employer from failing or refusing to hire or discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his or her compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-2(a)(1). At the pleading stage, a plaintiff “need not submit evidence to establish the prima facie case for discrimination”; however, “she must plead sufficient facts on all of the ultimate elements of the claim to make her case plausible.” Davis v. Tex. Health & Human Servs. Comm'n, 761 Fed.Appx. 451, 454 (5th Cir. 2019).
Similarly the ADEA prohibits an employer from “discharg[ing] any individual . . . because of such individual's age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1); see also McMichael v. Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc., 934 F.3d 447, 455-56 (5th Cir. 2019). “To establish an ADEA claim, the plaintiff must show that his age was the ‘but-for' cause of his termination-proving that age was a ‘motivating factor' for the decision is not enough.” Id. (quoting Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 180 (2009)...
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