Jackson v. State

• Decision Date: 24 September 1923
• Docket Number: 127
• Citation: 254 S.W. 531,160 Ark. 198
• Parties: JACKSON v. STATE
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

254 S.W. 531

160 Ark. 198

JACKSON v. STATE

No. 127

Supreme Court of Arkansas

September 24, 1923

Appeal from Sebastian Circuit Court, Fort Smith District; Jno. E Tatum, Judge; affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

T S. Osborne, for appellant.

J S. Utley, Attorney General, John L. Carter, W. T. Hammock and Darden Moose, Assistants, for appellee

OPINION

HART, J.

Alonzo Jackson prosecutes this appeal from a judgment of conviction against him for the crime of unlawfully making mash, in violation of the statute.

The first assignment of error questions the sufficiency of the indictment. The defect complained of is in the following:

"The defendant, Alonzo Jackson, in the county, district and State aforesaid, on the 2d day of February, 1923, unlawfully, wilfully and feloniously did make mash, wort and wash fit for the distillation and the manufacture of alcoholic liquor, the said Alonzo Jackson not being a person authorized under the laws of the United States to manufacture sweet cider, vinegar, non-alcoholic or spirits for other than beverage purposes, against the peace and dignity of the State of Arkansas."

It is first insisted that, inasmuch as the statute uses the words "a person duly authorized under the laws of the United States," that the omission of the word "duly" in the indictment renders it defective. We do not think so. The words "duly authorized" as used in the statute can mean nothing more than authorized according to the statute. Hence the omission of the word "duly" takes nothing away from the meaning of the statute.

The omission of the word "beverages" from the indictment is merely a clerical error. Its omission could not mislead a person of common understanding, and does not vitiate the indictment. The rule prescribed by our statute is that no indictment is insufficient which does not tend to the prejudice of the substantial rights of the defendant on the merits. Walker v. State, 50 Ark. 532, 8 S.W. 939, and Rinehart v. State, ante, p. 129.

Another ground for the reversal of the judgment is that the statute in question is invalid because it is not in harmony with the 18th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. On this point it would be sufficient to say that the act in question has been held valid by this court in Logan v. State, 150 Ark. 486, 234 S.W. 493. In addition it may be said that this holding is in accord with the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in U. S. v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 67 L.Ed. 314, 43 S.Ct. 141.

With regard to the question in the opinion, among other things, Chief Justice TAFT said: "We have here two sovereignties, deriving power from different sources, capable of dealing with the same subject-matter within the same territory. Each may, without interference by the other, enact laws to secure prohibition, with the limitation that no legislation can give validity to acts prohibited by the amendment. Each government, in determining what shall be an offense against its peace and dignity, is exercising its own sovereignty, not that of the other."

The main reliance for a reversal of the judgment is that the evidence is not sufficient to support the verdict. In this connection it may be said that the court told the jury that the words "mash, wort and wash fit for distillation" mean intended for distillation of spirituous liquors. This...