Jackson v. State
| Decision Date | 06 April 1920 |
| Docket Number | 16243 |
| Citation | 127 N.E. 870,101 Ohio St. 152 |
| Parties | Jackson v. The State Of Ohio |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Criminal law-Manslaughter Unintentional killing by automobile- Unlawful act as proximate cause - Charge to jury.
1. To warrant a conviction of manslaughter, on account of the unintentional killing of a human being by the operation of a motor vehicle in violation of a valid statute, the violation of such statute must have been the proximate cause of death.
2. In such a prosecution a charge of the court, which eliminates from the consideration of the jury the question of proximate cause, is prejudicial and reversible error.
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The plaintiff in error was convicted of manslaughter in the court of common pleas of Hamilton county, Ohio. The judgment of conviction was affirmed by the court of appeals. The pertinent facts appear in the opinion.
Mr. W. W. Bellew, for plaintiff in error.
Mr Louis H. Capelle and Mr. Charles H. Elston, for defendant in error.
The plaintiff in error, Van Jackson, was indicted by the grand jury of Hamilton county for manslaughter for killing one John Schademan on October 7, 1917. The indictment was in the short form provided for by Section 13583, General Code, and omitting the formal parts, charged that Van Jackson "on the 7th day of October in the year 1917, with force and arms at the County of Hamilton, State of Ohio, unlawfully did kill one John Schademan, then and there being, contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided and against the peace and dignity of the State of Ohio."
The evidence disclosed that the decedent was killed by an automobile, that the automobile was driven at a rate of speed in excess of fifteen miles per hour, and that the place where he was struck by the automobile was in a municipality in Hamilton county "not closely built-up." There was much evidence tending to show that plaintiff in error was the driver of the automobile.
The state claimed that the unlawful act that resulted in the killing of Schademan was a violation of Section 12603 General Code, which reads: "Whoever operates a motor vehicle or motorcycle on the public roads or highways at a speed greater than is reasonable or proper, having regard for the width, traffic, use and the general and usual rules of such road or highway, or so as to endanger the property, life or limb of any person, shall be fined," etc. The state also claimed it was a violation of Section 12604, General Code, which reads: "Whoever operates a motor cycle or motor vehicle at a greater speed than eight miles an hour in the business and closely built-up portions of a municipality or more than fifteen miles an hour in other portions thereof or more than twenty-five miles an hour outside of a municipality, shall be fined," etc.
At the request of the state, and before argument, the court gave the following special charge to the jury: "I charge you that if you find from the evidence in this case beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, 'Van Jackson, while operating an automobile, struck and killed the decedent, John Schademan, and you further find beyond a reasonable doubt that at the time he struck the said John Schademan, the defendant was operating the automobile in a municipality in Hamilton county, Ohio, at a rate of speed greater than fifteen miles per hour, it is your duty to find the defendant guilty of manslaughter."
It will be observed that the charge...
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People v. Maloney, 24831.
...question whether death was occasioned as the direct and natural result of defendant's conduct. Counsel cite in support, Jackson v. State, 101 Ohio St. 152, 127 N.E. 870, and People v. Barnes, 182 Mich. 179, 148 N.W. 400. Instructions given in those cases are easily distinguished from that g......