Jackson v. State
| Decision Date | 19 December 1932 |
| Docket Number | 8853. |
| Citation | 167 S.E. 109,176 Ga. 148 |
| Parties | JACKSON v. STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
Accused put on trial for rape several minutes after counsel were appointed for him held entitled to new trial because deprived of benefit of counsel, notwithstanding failure to ask for continuance or postponement (Const. art. 1, § 1, par 5).
Facts disclosed that accused was brought from convict camp where he was serving misdemeanor sentence unapprised of fact that indictment for rape had been filed against him; that after having his shackles stricken off by order of the court counsel appointed for him were only permitted to confer with him for two or three minutes when the court announced that "the case would go to trial;" and that the uncontradicted evidence on the hearing of the motion for new trial was that the mental condition of accused at the time of the offense was such that the jury might have been influenced to recommend imprisonment rather than the death penalty.
1. The benefit of counsel is a boon conferred by the Constitution of this state upon one accused of crime. The right guaranteed by the Constitution is one of substance and not of symbols. Where it appears upon the hearing of a motion for new trial that the defendant was put to trial upon an indictment for a capital felony, the defendant not being apprised that an indictment had been found against him, and the defendant being brought from the convict camp where he was serving a misdemeanor sentence, and, after having his shackles stricken off by order of the court, and counsel appointed for him were only permitted to confer with their client for two or three minutes when the court announced that "the case would go to trial," a new trial should have been granted. The more especially, where, according to uncontradicted evidence upon the hearing of the motion, it is made to appear that the mental condition of the accused, at the time of the offense was such that the jury trying the case might have been influenced thereby to recommend imprisonment in the penitentiary rather than the punishment of death.
2. In view of the above ruling, no decision is made as to the other special grounds of the motion for new trial, nor is any opinion expressed as to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict.
Error from Superior Court, Screven County; H. B. Strange, Judge.
Sam Jackson was convicted of rape, and he brings error.
Reversed.
H. A Boykin, of Sylvania, for plaintiff in error.
W. G. Neville, Sol. Gen., of Statesboro, Geo. M. Napier, Atty. Gen., and T. R. Gress, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
Sam Jackson was convicted of the offense of rape, without a recommendation, and sentence of death was imposed. His motion for a new trial, based on the general grounds and three special grounds, was overruled, and he excepted. The first special ground alleges that movant was confined on the chain gang of Screven county; that on the afternoon of November 24, 1931, he was brought into court in chains; that the court directed that the shackles be knocked off him; that he was carried out and the shackles removed, and he was brought back immediately into court, and the case was then called for trial; that the indictment upon which he was being prosecuted was found by the grand jury at the November term, 1931, and he was not apprised of the fact until he was brought into court; that when the case was called he had had no opportunity to employ counsel to represent him; that the court thereupon appointed Ernest W. Cail and J. P. Evans as attorneys to represent him, and stated he would give them a few minutes to confer with movant; that movant was taken into the grand jury room, and, after a two or three minute conference, the court had him again called back by the bailiff, together with his counsel, and announced that the case would go to trial, and the court then and there proceeded to direct that the case go to trial, and defendant was convicted. Movant contends that he did not have sufficient time or opportunity in which to inform his counsel as to his defense, or as to what witnesses he desired to have subp naed in his behalf; that neither he nor his counsel had sufficient time to ascertain what any of the witnesses actually knew in regard to the transaction; that he was as much entitled to the privilege of counsel as he was to the presence of his witnesses, and, in the right of counsel, is included the right to have such time between his arrest and his trial as will at least enable his counsel to become acquainted with his case; that for these reasons he did not have sufficient time, nor did his counsel have sufficient time, to become familiar with his case so as to prepare for trial; and that the court erred in forcing him to trial in not giving him sufficient time for himself and his counsel to become acquainted with the facts in the case in order to prepare to present his defense to the jury.
On the hearing an affidavit of the defendant in support of the motion included a statement that about the 5th or 6th of July, 1931, he was arrested for being drunk, and also for rape; that he was carried before the judge of the city court and the officers stated to him that, if he would plead guilty of being drunk, nothing would come of the offense of rape being charged against him; that he was confined in the chain gang from the time of his sentence in July until he was brought to trial on the charge...
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