Jackson v. State

• Decision Date: 30 June 2022
• Docket Number: SC19-1624, No. SC21-502
• Parties: Kim JACKSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. Kim Jackson, Petitioner, v. Ricky D. Dixon, etc., Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

347 So.3d 292

Kim JACKSON, Appellant,

v.STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Kim Jackson, Petitioner,

v.Ricky D. Dixon, etc., Respondent.

No. SC19-1624

No. SC21-502

Supreme Court of Florida.

June 30, 2022

Robert S. Friedman, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Thomas Voracek and Karin L. Moore, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, North Region, Tallahassee, Florida, and Stacy R. Biggart, Special Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Gainesville, Florida, for Appellant/Petitioner

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Jason W. Rodriguez, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, for Appellee/Respondent

PER CURIAM.

Kim Jackson appeals the circuit court's order denying numerous guilt-phase claims raised in his postconviction motion filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851 and petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus.¹ For the reasons that follow, we affirm the circuit court's order and deny the habeas petition.

I. BACKGROUND

Debra Pearce was brutally stabbed to death at her home in Jacksonville. Responding law enforcement found Pearce's bloody and bruised body face-down in the kitchen.

Michael Knox, a crime scene investigator, observed that Pearce had been stabbed multiple times in the neck and chest. One stab wound was partially covered by a five-inch-long knife that remained plunged in Pearce's chest. Upon further examination, Knox discovered a detached hair on the back of Pearce's right calf and a small folding pocketknife under her body. Both items were later submitted to the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) for DNA testing. Additionally, Knox noticed a bloody fingerprint on the kitchen sink, which was located right above Pearce's body. Knox processed and photographed the fingerprint, and law enforcement removed the sink from the home.

Law enforcement also sought to find witnesses, but none had observed the crime or the events surrounding it. Consequently, the investigation, led by Detective Craig Waldrup, focused on the physical evidence.

Michelle Royal, a fingerprint examiner with the Jacksonville Sheriff's Office, analyzed the sink fingerprint and determined that it was not of value, meaning that it would not be useful in identifying a suspect. Detective Waldrup sought additional analysis from another sheriff's office. However, that further analysis did not result in any leads.

Meanwhile, almost two years after the murder, Leigh Clark—a DNA analyst for the FDLE—tested the hair found on Pearce's leg. She extracted a full DNA profile from it and later uploaded the profile to the CODIS² database. The submitted profile matched the known DNA profile of Jackson, who was then serving a lengthy prison sentence in Georgia.

Having learned of the DNA match, Detective Waldrup then asked the FBI to compare Jackson's known prints with the sink fingerprint. An FBI analyst concluded that the fingerprint matched Jackson's right ring finger.

Based on these two leads, Detective Waldrup interviewed Jackson at the Georgia prison where he was housed. During the interview, Detective Waldrup asked Jackson if he knew Pearce or had ever been to her house. In conjunction with these questions, Detective Waldrup showed him pictures of Pearce, her home, and the surrounding area. Jackson denied ever knowing or seeing Pearce. Nor, according to him, had he ever been to the home. Jackson would later concede that these statements were false.

Ultimately, almost four years after the murder, the State charged Jackson with first-degree murder in connection with Pearce's death, later filing a notice of intent to seek the death penalty. Though Jackson challenged the lawfulness of the death penalty, he did not seek dismissal of the first-degree-murder charge.

At Jackson's trial, the State called a number of witnesses, including Detective Waldrup, Knox, Clark, and two fingerprint experts. Clark testified that the detached hair found on Pearce's leg was a full marker match with Jackson's known DNA. She further opined that the hair was not naturally shed, briefly alluding to "several published papers in the Journal of Forensic Sciences." She also gave testimony on the pocketknife, indicating that she obtained a mixed profile from blood on it. Pearce was a contributor, but Jackson was not. DNA samples were also obtained from inside Pearce's vehicle, specifically the steering wheel cover. As for a mixed sample obtained from that cover, Clark indicated that Jackson—as a male—could not be excluded as a minor contributor.

The State's two fingerprint experts offered opinion testimony on the sink fingerprint, both stating that it matched a known print from Jackson's right ring finger. Moreover, both agreed that Jackson's right ring finger was coated in something wet at the time he created the print on the sink. When asked on cross-examination whether blood could preserve a preexisting print, one of the experts opined that she had not observed such a situation "in her training and experience."

After the State rested, Jackson requested a judgment of acquittal. He argued that the State presented a wholly circumstantial case, which failed to rebut his reasonable hypothesis of innocence—namely that he was not present for the murder and that his hair had been become detached while he was inside Pearce's home prior to the murder and later came to rest on her leg. Rejecting that argument, "[t]he trial court ruled the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, negated all reasonable hypotheses of innocence, and denied the motion." Jackson v. State , 180 So. 3d 938, 950 (Fla. 2015). In particular, the court relied on the evidence of the bloody fingerprint as establishing Jackson's presence in the home for the murder.

Jackson then presented his case, which primarily consisted of evidence in support of an alibi defense. Jackson and four other witnesses—his father, his wife (Deborah Jackson), his sister (Penny Williams), and a friend (Rose Franklin)—testified that Jackson had been in Georgia celebrating his birthday during the period of time encompassing the murder. In addition, Jackson sought to explain the incriminating answers given to Detective Waldrup during the prison interview. Jackson also called as a witness Michelle Royal, the Jacksonville Sheriff's Office analyst who determined the sink fingerprint to be of no value. On cross-examination, she testified that "even prints of no value can be used to exclude suspects, ... Jackson could not be excluded as the individual who left the sink fingerprint, and ... similarities existed between the sink fingerprint and the known print of Jackson." Id. at 944.

Ultimately, the jury found Jackson guilty of first-degree murder, and, following the penalty phase, it recommended a sentence of death by a vote of 8 to 4.

Accepting that recommendation, the trial court sentenced Jackson to death.

Jackson appealed, raising five issues for our review.³ Rejecting his arguments, we affirmed on all issues. Id. at 949-64. Jackson then filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court, which was denied. Jackson v. Florida , 578 U.S. 979, 136 S.Ct. 2015, 195 L.Ed.2d 223 (2016).

Less than a year later, Jackson filed a postconviction motion in circuit court, which, as later amended, raised over twenty claims for relief. The circuit court ruled that Jackson was entitled to a new penalty phase based on Hurst v. State ,⁴ granted an evidentiary hearing on six guilt-phase claims,⁵ and denied or reserved ruling on the balance of the claims. After the hearing, the court entered an order denying the pending claims, and, consistent with its prior ruling, vacated Jackson's death sentence under Hurst . Jackson now appeals and seeks a writ of habeas corpus.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Postconviction Appeal

Jackson argues that the circuit court erred in denying his claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. We disagree and explain below why his arguments lack merit.

Ineffectiveness claims are governed by the standard set forth by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). See Nelson v. State , 73 So. 3d 77, 84 (Fla. 2011). We have recently described that standard as follows:

Under Strickland v. Washington , a defendant alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel has the burden to demonstrate that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show both that trial counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. Strickland , 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. "Both prongs of the Strickland test present mixed questions of law and fact." Johnson v. State , 135 So. 3d 1002, 1013 (Fla. 2014). "In reviewing a trial court's ruling after an evidentiary hearing on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, this Court defers to the factual findings of the trial court to the extent that they are supported by competent, substantial evidence, but reviews de novo the application of the law to those facts." Id. (quoting Mungin v. State , 932 So. 2d 986, 998 (Fla. 2006) ).

As to the first prong, the defendant must establish "that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Strickland , 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. A court reviewing the second prong must determine whether "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. "[T]here is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim ... to address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one." Id. at 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052.

Smith , 330 So. 3d at 875 (some citations omitted).

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