Jackson v. State, A16A0738

Decision Date03 November 2016
Docket NumberA16A0738
Citation339 Ga.App. 313,793 S.E.2d 201
Parties JACKSON v. The STATE.
CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals

Margaret Elizabeth Heinen, for Appellant.

Dawn Marie Baskin, for Appellee.

Peterson, Judge.

The Spanish Inquisition and the English Court of Star Chamber shared a common practice: secret trials. See In re Oliver , 333 U.S. 257, 268–69, 68 S.Ct. 499, 92 L.Ed. 682 (1948). To prevent the recurrence of similarly abusive institutions, English common law developed a requirement that trials be public. Id. at 268 & n.21, 68 S.Ct. 499. This mandate that trials be public is firmly established in both the U.S. Constitution and the Georgia Constitution. See U.S. Const. Amend. VI.; Const. of Ga.1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XI (a). These constitutional commands do not depend on the nature of the crime charged, or on how certain we are of the accused's guilt. Only under very limited circumstances and by using very specific procedures can a trial court close part of a trial; failure to follow those procedures is error. And so it is here. Randy Jackson was accused of heinous crimes against his own stepdaughter, and the evidence against him was overwhelming (and largely undisputed). Nevertheless, we must reverse his conviction because the trial court closed the courtroom for the testimony of the victim without following the procedures mandated by the Supreme Court of the United States to safeguard a defendant's right to a public trial.

Jackson was indicted in 2007 for sexual offenses against his stepdaughter, R.S., that began when R.S. was 11 years old. Prior to jury trial, the State filed a motion to close the courtroom during R.S.'s testimony.1 The State specifically requested that the courtroom be closed to keep "members of [Jackson's] extended family, as well as any other persons or unnecessary courtroom personnel, out of the courtroom during the course of [R.S.'s] testimony," for the purpose of protecting R.S. and ensuring that her testimony was not influenced by any spectator.

At a November 2007 hearing on the State's motion, the State argued that R.S., who was then 16 years old, would have to testify about allegations that "are most personal violations, which are sexual in nature" and would be "very gruesome" because they involved her stepfather, Jackson. In support of its motion, the State relied upon OCGA § 17–8–53 and OCGA § 17–8–54, and asked the court to close the courtroom to Jackson's family and to all non-essential courtroom personnel. Jackson objected to the closing of the courtroom and argued that there were no aggravating circumstances requiring the closing of the courtroom because R.S. would be almost 17 years old at the time of the trial and there were no allegations that the offenses were committed by force or violence. The trial court took the matter under advisement.

At a subsequent motions hearing, the trial court stated that it would grant the State's motion to close the courtroom. When the trial court asked the State to confirm whether it wanted the courtroom closed only to Jackson's family members, the State responded that it wanted the courtroom closed to any person who was not necessary to the trial, including family members. The court reiterated that it was granting the State's motion.

Jackson's trial took place in November 2007. When the State called R.S. to testify, it asked the trial court to clear the courtroom of all unnecessary personnel. The court then addressed the courtroom and stated:

Ladies and gentlemen, those of you in the courtroom, I'm going to ask you to leave during the testimony of this witness, unless you are a law enforcement officer or somehow or otherwise involved in the court system. The transcript notes reflect that the courtroom was then cleared and R.S. took the stand to testify.

R.S. was 16 years old at the time of the trial. R.S. testified that Jackson first made her touch his penis when she was 11, he began touching her breasts and genital area soon after, and then this touching led to daily sexual intercourse or oral sex by the time she was 12. R.S. resisted the touching and intercourse at first, but she feared getting hurt if she resisted and later began to accept the abuse as "normal" as it occurred "pretty much every day."

Jackson was convicted of incest, statutory rape, child molestation, and two counts of aggravated child molestation. The trial court sentenced Jackson to a total of 50 years to serve. Jackson appeals from the denial of his motion for new trial.2

1. The evidence was sufficient to support each of Jackson's convictions.

Jackson does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his convictions. In fact, he concedes that the evidence was legally sufficient. Despite his concession, we nevertheless independently review the evidence and conclude that it was sufficient to support each of his convictions.

The victim, R.S., was Jackson's stepdaughter and testified that Jackson made her touch his penis when she was 11, he began touching her breasts and genital area soon after, this touching led to daily sexual intercourse, and then they began performing oral sex on each other when she was 12. The testimony of a single witness is generally sufficient to establish a fact. See former OCGA § 24–4–8.3 Based on the evidence that Jackson had sexual intercourse with his stepdaughter, the jury was authorized to find him guilty of incest. See OCGA § 16–6–22(a)(1) (a father commits the offense of incest when he engages in sexual intercourse with a stepchild). The victim testified that she was 12 years old when she began having daily sexual intercourse with Jackson, and her testimony was corroborated by Jackson's admission to committing the acts. Thus, the evidence was sufficient to sustain Jackson's conviction for statutory rape. See OCGA § 16–6–3 (a person commits the offense of statutory rape when he engages in sexual intercourse with a person who is under the age of 16 years and is not his spouse, but the unsupported testimony of a victim is insufficient to establish the offense); Perdue v. State , 250 Ga.App. 201, 202–03 (1), 551 S.E.2d 65 (2001) (the victim's testimony that she had sex with her stepfather, the defendant, beginning when she was 12 years old was corroborated by, among other things, the defendant's admissions, and therefore the evidence was sufficient to support the statutory rape convictions).

The victim also testified that Jackson sometimes put his finger inside her vagina when she was about 14 or 15 years old, and this was sufficient to support his conviction for child molestation. See OCGA § 16–6–4(a)(1) (a "person commits the offense of child molestation when such person ... does any immoral or indecent act to or in the presence of or with any child under the age of 16 years with the intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of either the child or the person."). The victim also stated that Jackson performed oral sex on her and she performed oral sex on him, which was sufficient to support his two convictions for aggravated child molestation. See OCGA § 16–6–4(c) (the offense of aggravated child molestation occurs when a person commits an offense of child molestation that involves an act of sodomy).

2. Jackson's conviction must be reversed because the trial court erred by closing the courtroom.

Jackson argues that the trial court erred when it completely closed the courtroom to all non-essential courtroom personnel. Jackson argues that the (1) State did not advance an overriding interest to justify a closure, (2) the total closure was overbroad and unnecessary to protect any interest articulated by the State, and (3) the court failed to make specific factual findings to show that the closure was necessary and narrowly tailored. We agree with Jackson's last argument, and reverse his conviction.

(a) The closure of the courtroom was total.

Before addressing the merits of Jackson's argument, we must consider the State's assertion that the courtroom was closed only to Jackson's family members and that Jackson failed to preserve any challenge to this partial closure because, although he objected to a complete closure, he did not specifically object to a partial closure. A partial closure occurs when some members of the public are permitted to attend, while a total courtroom closure involves exclusion of all members of the public. See Bucci v. United States , 662 F.3d 18, 23 (1st Cir. 2011) ; Judd v. Haley , 250 F.3d 1308, 1315 (11th Cir. 2001). This distinction matters because a when the courtroom is only partially closed to spectators, "the impact of the closure is not as great, and not as deserving of such a rigorous level of constitutional scrutiny." Delgado v. State , 287 Ga.App. 273, 280 (2), 651 S.E.2d 201 (2007) (footnote omitted).

The State's assertion that courtroom was only partially closed is wholly unsupported by the record. The State asserts that it moved to remove only Jackson's family from the courtroom, not for a total closure. The State further argues that, because the court granted that motion, the record shows that the court only partially closed the courtroom. But the record clearly shows that the State moved to close the entire courtroom. In its motion, the State specifically requested that the courtroom be closed to exclude Jackson's extended family, "as well as any other persons or unnecessary courtroom personnel[.]" The State reiterated this request at least twice. At a November 2007 hearing, the State asked for "closure of the courtroom of non-courtroom personnel." At a subsequent hearing, after the trial court took the matter under advisement, the trial court asked the State to confirm whether it wanted closure of the courtroom only to family members. In response, the State said:

Your Honor, actually, the motion was to close the courtroom to any personnel who is not necessary to the trial, specifically, the family members, but also to anyone else who is not necessary during this.

Despite the State's clear and unequivocal...

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