Jackson v. State

Citation577 S.E.2d 570,276 Ga. 408
Decision Date24 February 2003
Docket NumberNo. S02A1837.,S02A1837.
PartiesJACKSON v. The STATE.
CourtGeorgia Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Christopher E. Latham, Robert J. Storms, Decatur, for appellant.

J. Tom Morgan, Dist. Atty., Barbara B. Conroy, Robert M. Coker, Asst. Dist. Attys., Thurbert E. Baker, Atty. Gen., Madonna M. Heinemeyer, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee. HUNSTEIN, Justice.

Jerome A. Jackson was indicted on charges of malice murder, felony murder based on aggravated assault, aggravated assault and two counts of involuntary manslaughter (based on reckless conduct and pointing a weapon) arising out of the shooting death of Princess Thomas. A jury acquitted him of malice murder and found him guilty of the remaining charges.1 The trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment on the felony murder conviction. Jackson appeals from the denial of his motion for new trial arguing, inter alia, that his convictions for felony murder based upon aggravated assault and involuntary manslaughter based upon reckless conduct are mutually exclusive. We agree and reverse.

1. The jury was authorized to find that Jackson and the victim were involved in a romantic relationship. Jackson and his friend Larry Lovett were invited to the victim's apartment the evening of June 14, 1999. The victim's two cousins were visiting her at that time; both cousins saw Jackson in possession of a handgun he was keeping in his book bag. The victim and Jackson were talking in the kitchen when the cousins stepped out for a few minutes. Upon their return five or ten minutes later, the cousins saw Jackson and Lovett "rushing" from the apartment and found the victim collapsed in the kitchen. Expert testimony established that she had been shot once in the head from a distance of less than two feet. Lovett told the police that he saw Jackson put a .380 caliber handgun to the victim's head and heard him threaten to kill her. The weapon then fired and the two men fled the apartment. Jackson threw the murder weapon into the trash where Lovett retrieved it; it was in his possession when he was arrested by police at a nearby MARTA station shortly after the homicide.

Jackson was arrested several weeks later in Florida. In his statement to the police, Jackson admitted he fired the gun but claimed the shooting was an accident. At trial Lovett repudiated his statement to the police; he testified that Jackson made no threats and that the shooting was an accident.

We find the evidence adduced was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find Jackson guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes for which he was convicted. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).

2. Jackson challenges his convictions for felony murder and involuntary manslaughter predicated upon reckless conduct, contending that they were mutually exclusive because the verdict reflects the jury may have found that Jackson acted with both criminal intent and criminal negligence in regard to his actions involving the victim. The evidence adduced was sufficient to support a verdict based upon either offense. However, rather than instructing the jury not to return a mutually exclusive verdict, the jury here was expressly charged that it could render a verdict of guilty on every count in the indictment.2

Verdicts are mutually exclusive "where a guilty verdict on one count logically excludes a finding of guilt on the other. [Cits.]" United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 69 fn. 8, 105 S.Ct. 471, 83 L.Ed.2d 461 (1984). Accord Dumas v. State, 266 Ga. 797, 800, 471 S.E.2d 508 (1996) (verdicts are mutually exclusive where it is "both legally and logically impossible to convict [the accused] of both counts").3 Looking at the essential elements for both felony murder and involuntary manslaughter, OCGA §§ 16-5-1(c), 16-5-3, guilty verdicts on these offenses are not mutually exclusive as a matter of law because felony murder, like involuntary manslaughter, does not require proof of a criminal intent to murder to support a conviction. Smith v. State, 267 Ga. 372(6), 477 S.E.2d 827 (1996).

That does not end the inquiry, however, because both felony murder and involuntary manslaughter are predicated upon the commission or omission of another offense or act. OCGA §§ 16-5-1(c), 16-5-3. We agree with Jackson that a mutually exclusive verdict may be rendered in a particular case where the offenses or acts alleged in the indictment as underlying the felony murder and involuntary manslaughter counts reflect that the jury, in order to find the defendant guilty on both counts, necessarily reached "two positive findings of fact that cannot logically mutually exist." Strong v. State, 223 Ga.App. 434, 436, 477 S.E.2d 866 (1996) (Beasley, C.J., dissenting), rev'd in Kimble v. State, 236 Ga.App. 391(1), 512 S.E.2d 306 (1999). To determine whether this occurred, the alleged underlying offenses or acts must be carefully scrutinized.

Case law is clear that convictions for both felony murder and involuntary manslaughter do not exclude each other in those situations where the offenses underlying the convictions can be reconciled by looking to either the legal requirements for each underlying offense or to the unique facts adduced at trial. See, e.g., Carter v. State, 269 Ga. 420(5), 499 S.E.2d 63 (1998) (where two-year-old victim sustained numerous potentially fatal injuries, felony murder/cruelty to children conviction not mutually exclusive of involuntary manslaughter/simple battery conviction); Smith v. State, supra, 267 Ga. at 376(6), 477 S.E.2d 827 (convictions for felony murder/aggravated assault and involuntary manslaughter/reckless conduct not mutually exclusive where evidence showed defendant intentionally assaulted one victim, while acting recklessly toward another victim); Robinson v. State, 254 Ga.App. 842(1), 563 S.E.2d 919 (2002) (convictions for aggravated assault and reckless conduct not mutually exclusive because charges involved two different victims); Davis v. State, 245 Ga.App. 402(1), 538 S.E.2d 67 (2000) (verdicts for both first and second degree vehicular homicide not mutually exclusive where evidence of different traffic offenses underlay each conviction).

In the instant case, Jackson contends his felony murder and involuntary manslaughter guilty verdicts are mutually exclusive because they represent a positive but illogical finding by the jury that he acted with both criminal intent and criminal negligence in shooting the victim.

Felony murder requires the accused to possess the criminal intent to commit the underlying felony. See Chapman v. State, 275 Ga. 314(3), 565 S.E.2d 442 (2002). Jackson was convicted of felony murder based on an assault, here aggravated into felony status by the use of a deadly weapon. OCGA § 16-5-21(a)(2). There are two ways to commit an assault: when a person "[a]ttempts to commit a violent injury to the person of another," OCGA § 16-5-20(a)(1), and when a person "[c]ommits an act which places another in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury." Id. at (a)(2).

"[A]n aggravated assault with a deadly weapon based on OCGA § 16-5-20(a)(1) cannot be committed by criminal negligence." Dunagan v. State, 269 Ga. 590, 591-592(2), 502 S.E.2d 726 (1998). Proof of criminal intent is essential for a conviction of an (a)(1) assault. Id.

Reckless conduct, on the other hand, is "an act of criminal negligence, rather than an intentional act, that causes bodily harm or endangers the bodily safety of another." Lindsey v. State, 262 Ga. 665, 666(2)(b), 424 S.E.2d 616 (1993). It involves "consciously disregarding a substantial and unjustifiable risk that [a person's] act or omission will cause harm or endanger the safety of the other person." OCGA § 16-5-60(b). Proof of criminal negligence is essential for a conviction of reckless conduct. Grant v. State, 257 Ga.App. 678(1)(c), 572 S.E.2d 38 (2002).

Given the different elements of these two offenses, we have held that a verdict of guilty as to aggravated assault based on OCGA § 16-5-20(a)(1) requires a finding of an intentional infliction of injury, which precludes the element of criminal negligence in reckless conduct. Dunagan, supra; Sheats v. State, 210 Ga.App. 622(1), 436 S.E.2d 796 (1993); Idowu v. State, 233 Ga. App. 418(2), 504 S.E.2d 474 (1998). These cases recognize that the requisite mental states for these two offenses cannot logically and legally co-exist. "Mutual exclusion means that a finding of guilt on the essential elements of one count by definition excludes a finding of guilt based on an essential element of another count." Gutierrez v. State, 235 Ga.App. 878, 880(2), 510 S.E.2d 570 (1999). A finding of guilt on the essential element of criminal intent for aggravated assault based on OCGA § 16-5-20(a)(1) thus excludes a finding of guilt based on the essential element of criminal negligence for reckless conduct.4

Looking to the facts in this case, we conclude that the jury's verdict finding Jackson guilty of felony murder predicated upon an OCGA § 16-5-20(a)(1) aggravated assault on Princess Thomas was mutually exclusive of a verdict finding Jackson guilty of involuntary manslaughter predicated upon reckless conduct in regard to the same act involving the same victim at the same instance of time. Accord Kolokouris v. State, 271 Ga. 597, 599(2), 523 S.E.2d 311 (1999) (mutually exclusive verdict not returned when jury convicted accused only of reckless conduct and he "was not found guilty of any crime based on an intentional criminal act. [Cit.]") The jury convicted Jackson of killing the victim with criminal intent and with criminal negligence, that is, of killing both with and without an intention to do so. "Obviously, the two verdicts were mutually exclusive." Dumas v. State, supra, 266 Ga. at 800(2), 471 S.E.2d 508.5

"[W]here there are mutually exclusive convictions, it is insufficient for an...

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    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • 19 Octubre 2020
    ...(a) (1) and a finding of criminal negligence for involuntary manslaughter based on reckless conduct. Previously, in Jackson v. State , 276 Ga. 408, 577 S.E.2d 570 (2003), we evaluated verdicts like those in Springer and concluded that they were mutually exclusive because they "represent[ed]......
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