Jackson v. State, X--297

Decision Date10 October 1975
Docket NumberNo. X--297,X--297
Citation319 So.2d 617
PartiesAmy JACKSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
CourtFlorida District Court of Appeals

Louis O. Frost, Jr., Public Defender, and Steven E. Rohan, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Andrew W. Lindsey, and Raymond L. Marky, Asst. Attys. Gen., for appellee.

McCORD, Judge.

Appellant was adjudged guilty of possession of a controlled substance and she appeals from the judgment and sentence. She was arrested initially for violation of Jacksonville Municipal Ordinance 330.116.5 by 'failing to identify herself to a city police officer.' Upon arrest she was placed in the officer's patrol car and transported to the city jail where she was searched by a female correctional officer. A pistol and seven packets of drugs were found on her person. Appellant contends that the search was not conducted as an incident to a Lawful arrest and that it was, therefore, invalid; that the trial court erred in not granting her motion to suppress the evidence. In support of the arrest, appellee relies upon the following pertinent portions of the aforesaid ordinance:

'(a) Right to Detain and Inquire. Any law enforcement officer of the City having reasonable cause to do so may, in the manner hereinafter described, detain any person observed by him in a public place or on private property evidently not his own to inquire into such person's identity.

(b) Reasonable Cause. An officer shall have reasonable cause to detain and inquire when he has reasonable grounds to believe that the person so observed may recently have committed or may imminently commit an offense or any act injurious to the person or property of another in the immediate vicinity, And when one or more of the following circumstances exist:

(1) * * *

(2) * * *

(3) * * *

(4) * * *

(5) the person observed attempts to avoid or escape the approaching officer.' (Emphasis supplied)

As shown by the word 'and' which we have underlined in the quoted portion of the above ordinance, a police officer must have Both reasonable cause to detain and inquire as above defined And (under the contention in the present case) the person observed must attempt to avoid or escape the approaching officer.

Here, the evidence presented by the state shows that two Jacksonville police officers on routine patrol at about 9 p.m. on August 25, 1974, had parked their car and were making a walking routine check of establishments in an area which one of the officers described as one of the highest crime and drug traffic centers in Jacksonville. As further described by the officer, as they walked along and rounded a corner, they observed appellant sitting on the fender of an automobile with a man who 'was looking straight at them.' Appellant and the man were talking and she then jumped down from the automobile fender and proceeded to walk briskly in the other direction. This occurred on a public sidewalk or street in the City of Jacksonville. The officer considered this to be of a suspicious nature, so he called to her and told her to stop. When she did not stop, he briskly hurried in front of her and asked her for identification. She did not respond; he asked her for identification again and she said that she didn't have to show him anything. He informed her that she was required by municipal ordinance to show him identification when requested by him and he then Placed her under arrest for failure to identify herself and transported her to the Duval County Jail. At the jail she gave her name which was found to be correct from a later check, but she did not give any written identification. Also, at the jail, a female correctional officer searched appellant and found the pistol and drugs.

The Jacksonville ordinance also provides as follows as to the manner of detention and inquiry:

'(c) Manner of Detention and Inquiry.

(1) The officer shall detain the person so observed at the time and place where he is found and, first identifying himself and the cause for the detention and inquiry, the offcer shall ask the person detained to identify himself by name and address and may ask him to produce written identification reasonably confirming his identity.

(2) The officer shall release the detained person if he orally identifies himself by name and address and produces written identification reasonably confirming his identity. The officer may request that the detained person forthwith leave the immediate vicinity if the detained person fails to produce written identification reasonably confirming his identity and, in the circumstances set forth in paragraph (6) hereof, the officer has reasonable grounds to believe that such person may imminently commit an offense or any act injurious to the person or property of another in the immediate vicinity.

(3) Any person (i) who declines to identify himself orally by name and address or (ii) who declines or fails to leave the immediate vicinity at the officer's request, after failing to produce written identification reasonably confirming his identity, may be further detained by the officer in the officer's patrol car or at any identification headquarters designated by the Sheriff. During his detention, such person may be further interrogated, photographed and fingerprinted for identification purposes, and an investigation may be made as to whether any law enforcement authority seeks custody of such person for an alleged criminal offense. Unless there is probable...

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7 cases
  • Cobb v. State, 85-2025
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • August 18, 1987
    ...2d DCA 1983); McClain v. State, 408 So.2d 721 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Kearse v. State, 384 So.2d 272 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); Jackson v. State, 319 So.2d 617 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975). See also W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.3(c), at 448-51 (2d ed. 1987). That the defendant in the present case ran wh......
  • Daniels v. State, 88-926
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • May 16, 1989
    ...3d DCA 1987); Cobb v. State, 511 So.2d 698 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987); McClain v. State, 408 So.2d 721 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Jackson v. State, 319 So.2d 617 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975). Therefore, Adams' radio dispatch, alone, could not serve as a reasonable basis for stopping In fact, the evidence establis......
  • Gipson v. State
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • January 20, 1989
    ...individuals); Cobb v. State, 511 So.2d 698 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987) (running upon sighting police in a high crime area); Jackson v. State, 319 So.2d 617 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975) (ending conversation with another individual and walking briskly in the opposite direction); McClain v. State, 408 So.2d 721......
  • Levin v. State, 82-1681
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • September 13, 1983
    ...by the fact that the area in which the individual is traveling is one which has experienced crimes in the past. Jackson v. State, 319 So.2d 617 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975). This is plainly so because a contrary rule would impose a curfew on any person walking during late and unusual hours in most p......
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