Jackson v. State
| Decision Date | 09 October 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. S07A0824.,S07A0824. |
| Citation | 651 S.E.2d 702,282 Ga. 494 |
| Parties | JACKSON v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Brian Steel, Steel Law Firm, P.C., Atlanta, for Appellant.
Thurbert E. Baker, Atty. Gen., Benjamin Henry Pierman, Asst. Atty. Gen., Peggy Ann Katz, Asst. Dist. Atty., Paul L. Howard, Jr., Dist. Atty., Bettieanne C. Hart, Asst. Dist. Atty., for Appellee.
The appellant, Shelton Jackson, appeals from his conviction of numerous crimes, including malice murder, stemming from the shooting death of Grant Reynolds.1 On appeal, Jackson contends, among other things, that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to improper comments by the prosecutor on Jackson's right to remain silent and by failing to object to an improper "golden rule" argument by the prosecutor in closing. Because we conclude, among other things, that, even if Jackson's trial counsel provided deficient performance, Jackson has failed to prove the prejudice prong of his ineffectiveness claim, we affirm his convictions.
1. The evidence would have authorized a jury to find that, on May 17, 2001, Larentae Mumphery, Grant Reynolds, and Roger Mumphery (Larentae's cousin) went to an apartment complex in Atlanta to meet with Jackson and Jarvis Mathews so that Reynolds could inspect and possibly purchase a set of tire rims. Larentae Mumphery and Mathews had known each other in middle school and high school, and about a week before May 17, 2001, Larentae saw Mathews at a gas station and asked Mathews about some rims that were on his car. Mathews told Larentae that he had some more rims at his house, and Larentae later called Mathews and arranged to meet him at the foregoing apartment complex in order for Grant Reynolds to look at the rims. Larentae testified that Reynolds was not going to purchase the rims that day and did not have any money with him. According to Larentae, the trio met Mathews at the apartment about 4:00 p.m. on May 17, and Mathews called someone on his cell phone and told the person to bring the rims to the apartment.
Larentae testified that, a few minutes later, Jackson arrived at the apartment. Larentae stated that Jackson stood in the door of the apartment and never came inside; that Jackson and Reynolds spoke in the doorway; that he (Larentae) could see them the whole time; that Jackson screamed "where's the money"; and that Jackson then started shooting at the Mumpherys and Reynolds. According to Larentae, after Jackson started shooting, Reynolds "tussled" with Jackson and Reynolds then jumped back into the apartment. Larentae added that Reynolds and Jackson did not "tussle" before the shooting started. Larentae testified that, once Jackson shot at Reynolds, he pointed the gun at him and fired the gun. According to Larentae, once the shooting started, "everybody just started running" and tried to get out a back door or window that had burglar bars on it. Larentae added that, while the victims were running around, Jackson continued to shoot at them, and that, because he (Larentae) could not find a way out of the apartment other than through the front door, he laid down and played dead. Larentae also testified that he could not tell if Mathews had a gun, and that he did not know the exact number of shots that were fired, but that it seemed like it was about ten shots.
Roger Mumphery gave testimony that was consistent with the testimony given by Larentae, except that Roger testified that Mathews also fired some shots. According to Roger, when Jackson and Reynolds were standing in the door, Jackson asked Reynolds "where the money at" and then started shooting at Reynolds. Reynolds then jumped into the apartment, and Jackson started shooting at the Mumpherys and Reynolds. Roger testified that all three victims were running around the apartment screaming that they did not have any money, and that Jackson was shouting "where the money at" and shooting at them. Roger added that Reynolds was not armed when he went to the apartment.
During the shooting, Larentae Mumphery was shot once in the thigh, and Grant Reynolds was shot twice and died from his wounds. Reynolds was found in a hallway off the main living room of the apartment. Police found eight shell casings at the crime scene, including some in the hallway and around the living room, and forensic evidence established that they were all fired from one gun. Moreover, the medical examiner testified that there was no soot, searing, or stippling on Reynolds, indicating that he was shot from a distance of greater than three feet. Jackson and Mathews fled the crime scene immediately after the shooting.
The Mumpherys both spoke with the police on the day of the shooting and identified the shooter as a very large man, with Larentae estimating that the shooter was about 6' 1" tall and 250 pounds. At trial, Jackson testified that he weighed about 300 pounds at the time of the shooting. In August 2001, both Roger and Larentae identified Jackson from photographic lineups without hesitation, and in September 2001, Jackson was arrested.
Jackson testified at trial that, when he arrived at the apartment, Grant Reynolds pulled a gun on him; that he (Jackson) and Reynolds struggled over the gun near the front door of the apartment; that the gun fired during the fight; that he got possession of the gun; that he "was scared" and "shot two times"; that he then ran out to his car; that he fell and the gun fired twice; and that he (Jackson) On cross, Jackson admitted that he shot Reynolds, but that he did so "out of self-defense"; that he did not shoot at Larentae; and that Larentae must have gotten shot while Jackson and Reynolds were struggling over the gun.
Having reviewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find Jackson guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes for which he was convicted.
2. Jackson contends that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to improper comments by the prosecutor on Jackson's right to remain silent.
To prevail on his ineffectiveness claim, Jackson must show that counsel's performance was deficient and that, but for that deficient performance, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of his trial would have been different.3 Moreover, "in ruling on an ineffectiveness claim, this Court need not analyze the deficient performance prong if the Court determines the prejudice prong has not been satisfied."4
Our examination of the record shows that the prosecutor did improperly comment on Jackson's silence by questioning him regarding why he did not come forward after the incident and report that he had acted in self-defense.5 However, even if trial counsel's performance was deficient in failing to object to the prosecutor's comments, we conclude that Jackson has failed to carry his burden of proof on the prejudice prong of his ineffectiveness claim. In this regard, because two eyewitnesses testified that Jackson was under no threat of physical harm when he deliberately started shooting at them, because shell casings were found in the hallway and around the living room, thus contradicting Jackson's testimony that all the shots were fired at the front door of or outside the apartment, and because forensic evidence showed that Reynolds was shot from a distance of greater than three feet, there is significant evidence refuting Jackson's claim that he shot Reynolds in self-defense. For this reason, we conclude that Jackson has failed to show that, if trial counsel had objected to the prosecutor's comments, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different.6
3. Jackson contends that the prosecutor improperly commented in her opening statement on the evidence that she expected the defense would offer at trial, and that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to object to the comment.
In her opening statement, the prosecutor stated that she expected that Jackson's trial counsel would Assuming that this statement violates the rule we established in Parker v. State,7 which was decided after Jackson's trial, to the effect that "it is inappropriate for a prosecutor in a criminal case to discuss in opening statement the evidence she anticipates the defense will present at trial,"8 and assuming that trial counsel provided deficient performance in failing to object to the comment, we conclude that Jackson has failed to carry his burden to establish the prejudice prong of his ineffectiveness claim. Because the trial court "clearly and repeatedly instructed the jury that opening statements were not evidence"9 and clearly instructed the jury on the State's burden of proof,10 and because there is significant evidence refuting Jackson's claim of self-defense, we conclude that Jackson has failed to carry his burden to show that, if trial counsel had objected to the prosecutor's comment, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different.11
4. Jackson next contends that the trial court erred in failing to give his requested charge on voluntary manslaughter. We conclude that the trial court did not err, as the State's evidence did not warrant a charge on voluntary manslaughter and as Jackson's testimony showed that he "was just fighting for his life" and that, in doing so, he panicked and shot the victim "out of self-defense." "At best, this evidence shows that Jackson was attempting to repel an attack, not that he was so angered that he reacted...
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