Jackson v. State

• Decision Date: 04 September 2014
• Docket Number: No. CR–03–800.,CR–03–800.
• Citation: 439 S.W.3d 675,2014 Ark. 347
• Parties: Anarian Chad JACKSON, Petitioner v. STATE of Arkansas, Respondent.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

2014 Ark. 347

439 S.W.3d 675

Anarian Chad JACKSON, Petitioner

v.STATE of Arkansas, Respondent.

No. CR–03–800.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

Sept. 4, 2014.

Anarian Chad Jackson, pro se appellant.

No response.

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

Petitioner Anarian Chad Jackson has filed a fifth petition requesting this court to reinvest jurisdiction in the trial court to consider a petition for writ of error coram nobis in which he makes an additional request to recall the mandate.¹ He has also filed a motion to expand the page limitations under Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 2–1(h) (2013). Petitioner's motion to exceed the page limit is moot because his petition was filed by the clerk with the pages that petitioner would add. His petition to reinvest jurisdiction and recall the mandate is denied.

A prisoner who appealed his judgment and who wishes to attack his conviction by means of a petition for writ of error coram nobis must first request that this court reinvest jurisdiction in the trial court. Martin v. State, 2012 Ark. 44, 2012 WL 310981 (per curiam) (citing Kelly v. State, 2010 Ark. 180, 2010 WL 1507210 (per curiam)). A petition in this court is necessary because the circuit court can entertain a petition for writ of error coram nobis after a judgment has been affirmed on appeal only after this court grants permission. Cox v. State, 2011 Ark. 96, 2011 WL 737307 (per curiam). This court will grant permission to proceed with a petition for the writ only when it appears that the proposed attack on the judgment is meritorious. Whitham v. State, 2011 Ark. 28, 2011 WL 291873 (per curiam). Where a petitioner seeks the writ on the same grounds as a previous petition, this court has discretion to determine whether a petitioner's application for the writ will be permitted, provided that the petitioner has alleged additional facts in support of the grounds. See Rodgers v. State, 2013 Ark. 294, 2013 WL 3322344 (per curiam).

Petitioner was convicted of first-degree murder for killing Charles Raynor, and the jury imposed a life sentence. This court affirmed the judgment. Jackson v. State, 359 Ark. 297, 197 S.W.3d 468 (2004). The evidence at trial established that appellant and another member of petitioner's gang shot Raynor, who was a member of a rival gang. See id.

Takesha Griffin testified at the trial. She was called by the prosecution and treated as a hostile witness. During her trial testimony, she testified that she did not give a statement to police about petitioner's involvement in Raynor's death, that she was high on crack at the time of her statement that the prosecution later introduced, and that she had been kept at the Little Rock Police Department for five or six days and was willing to say or do anything to leave. Id. Griffin's testimony about the circumstances concerning her statement implicating Jackson was not consistent with a recording of her testimony before a federal grand jury, which was introduced into evidence, or with later testimony by the detectives who had taken her statement. The audio tape of Griffin's statement reflected that she had testified under oath that petitioner admitted killing Raynor because Raynor had tried to kill petitioner at least four times, that she had heard on the street that petitioner and Raynor wanted the same girl, and that petitioner had told her the type of guns that he and the other shooter had used to kill Raynor. Id.

Petitioner's motion concerns Griffin's recanted statement. Petitioner has twice previously asserted prosecutorial misconduct involving the alleged suppression of information about Griffin's time spent with the police. See Jackson v. State, CR–03–800, 2009 WL 888649 (Ark. Apr. 2, 2009) (unpublished per curiam); Jackson v. State, 2010 Ark. 81, 2010 WL 1006491 (per curiam). The State argues that petitioner's claims are abuse of the writ under O'Neal v. State, 2010 Ark. 425, 2010 WL 4366898 (per curiam). Petitioner asserts that he has made new arguments concerning prosecutorial misconduct in administering an oath to Griffin and that there are new issues in the petition concerning suppressed statements by Griffin that petitioner was in Texas at the time of the murder.

It is a petitioner's burden to show that the writ is warranted. Smith v. State, 2012 Ark. 403, 2012 WL 5304089 (per curiam). This burden is a heavy one, for a writ of error coram nobis is an extraordinarily rare remedy, more known for its denial than its approval. Anderson v. State, 2012 Ark. 270, 423 S.W.3d 20 (per curiam). The remedy in a proceeding for a writ of error coram nobis is exceedingly narrow and appropriate only when an issue was not addressed or could not have been addressed at trial because it was somehow hidden or unknown and would have prevented the rendition of the judgment had it been known to the trial court. Burks v. State, 2011 Ark. 173, 2011 WL 1522524 (per curiam). To warrant a writ of error coram nobis, a petitioner must bring forth some fact, extrinsic to the record, that was not known at the time of trial. Pinder v. State, 2011 Ark. 401, 2011 WL 4492362 (per curiam).

Petitioner's allegations that the prosecutor exceeded his statutory authority by administering the oath to Griffin do not provide new grounds for the writ. That claim arises from facts that were not extrinsic to the record and were known at trial. As a consequence, the claim is not one cognizable in an error-coram-nobis proceeding, will not support issuance of the writ, and provides no basis to reinvest jurisdiction in the trial court to pursue the writ. See Hoover v. State, 2012 Ark. 136,2012 WL 1036114 (per curiam); see also Hall v. State, 2013 Ark. 404, 2013 WL 5596282 (per curiam) (holding that claims that could have been raised at trial are not grounds for the writ).

Petitioner also alleges that Griffin, during her time at the police station, made statements prior to the one played for the jury at trial, and petitioner appears to contend that these prior statements would have exonerated him by providing an alibi and serving to impeach Griffin's later statement implicating him in the murder. Petitioner attached to the petition an affidavit from Griffin in which she states that she made statements, one that was recorded and one that she wrote, that petitioner was in Texas at about the time of the murder. To the extent that petitioner intended these additional facts to provide support for his previous claims that the prosecution suppressed evidence about Griffin's time at the police station, the additional facts are not sufficient to support permitting an application for the writ to go forward.

Where a petitioner seeks the writ on the basis of a violation of the requirements of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), he must establish that evidence was suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently. Burgie v. State, 2013 Ark. 356, 2013 WL 5434695 (per curiam). Where a petitioner offers nothing to show that information was concealed from the defense, and the issue could have been determined with certainty at the time of trial, the petitioner has not demonstrated a Brady violation that warrants issuance of the writ. Id. Petitioner has...