Jackson v. State

• Decision Date: 09 June 1999
• Docket Number: No. 98-1171.,98-1171.
• Citation: 736 So.2d 77
• Parties: Gregory JACKSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

736 So.2d 77

Gregory JACKSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 98-1171.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

June 9, 1999.

Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender, and Louis G. Carres, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Maya Saxena, Assistant Attorney General, Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.

GROSS, J.

Gregory Jackson appeals his convictions after a jury trial of grand theft of a motor vehicle and possession of a motor vehicle with an altered vehicle identification number, contrary to sections 812.014(1)(c)6 and 319.33(1)(d), Florida Statutes (1997). We reverse, because the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to sustain the convictions.

The evidence at trial showed that at about 10:00 p.m. on August 21, 1997, Officer Baldwin of the Hollywood Police Department was driving southbound on Interstate 95. He saw a Cadillac with a Florida tag. Due to the high incidence of stolen 1970's and 1980's models of General Motors cars, the officer ran a tag check on the Cadillac. The check revealed that the tag had been reported stolen off of a 1986 red, four-door Oldsmobile. As a result, Officer Baldwin stopped the Cadillac, which made no attempt to flee.

Jackson was the driver of the car. There were three other passengers. The officer discovered that Jackson's driver's license was suspended. Jackson handed the officer a Florida identification card and a vehicle title. The vehicle identification number (VIN) on the title matched the VIN number located on the dashboard of the driver's side of the car; however, the officer noticed that the VIN number plate on the dashboard was only partially riveted in place, in a manner that was different from the way that a manufacturer usually attaches such plates to a vehicle. The rivets used on the dashboard plate were larger than those normally used by manufacturers.

Investigating further, the officer noticed other discrepancies. A safety placard containing the vehicle's information and VIN number, usually located on the driver's side front door, had been removed by some chemical agent. Due to the absence of the placard, the officer was unable to compare the VIN number on the door with that on the dashboard. The officer searched in other locations for possible identifiers of the vehicle. He looked in the trunk, but the placard on the trunk lid had been removed. He looked on the fire wall of the vehicle under the hood, but was unable to locate a VIN number.

Jackson told the officer that he had purchased the Cadillac. Jackson's name was on the title he handed to the officer. The title showed that the vehicle had been transferred to Jackson on August 17, 1997. He was cooperative with the officer. The keys fit the ignition and the steering column was not punched or stripped. There were no pry marks on the doors of the car.

Officer Baldwin placed Jackson under arrest for possession of a vehicle with an altered VIN number and for driving with a suspended driver's license. The vehicle was towed to the police department so that it could be further investigated by an auto theft detective.

The next morning, Detective Hetzel, a specialist in auto theft, took over the investigation. He testified that 1,500 cars are stolen every year in Hollywood, Florida. Some are shipped overseas, others are altered and resold. There was no sign of forced entry to the Cadillac. The detective noticed that the dashboard VIN plate was loose, not "very, very secure" as they usually are. The detective determined that the VIN plate belonged to a 1983 Cadillac, not the 1986 Cadillac that had been seized from Jackson. The VIN plate was registered to Roselyn Brockington from Homestead, whom Detective Hetzel never contacted.

Detective Hetzel spent "a day or more" checking out various serial numbers on the car. On certain parts, the detective traced the numbers to an Oldsmobile. In the 1980's, Oldsmobile and Cadillac parts were interchangeable. The VIN sticker in the trunk was missing, but the detective could see adhesive where the sticker had been peeled off. The identification stickers usually on the seat belts had been removed. Also missing were the packing slips usually hidden in American cars giving a description of the car and the VIN. Finally, Detective Hetzel located the confidential number on the vehicle, consisting of the last eight numbers of the VIN and "one character up front." From this number the detective determined that the Cadillac belonged to Barbaro Perez.

Detective Hetzel opined that someone had gone through a lot of trouble to make sure that the vehicle was difficult to identify. It had taken the detective almost two days to identify the Cadillac. The state introduced no fingerprint testimony concerning prints taken from areas where the VIN number had been altered. Nor did the state offer any testimony as to how long it would have taken to have made the alterations to the vehicle that the detective observed.

Barbaro Perez testified that the Cadillac was reported stolen after his wife had discovered the car missing on August 17, 1997, a Sunday. He last saw the Cadillac on Saturday night. Perez never removed any of the VIN numbers from the car. He retrieved the car after a call from the police. Perez noticed that the ignition key had been changed, the gears did not shift properly, the brake lights did not come on when the brake pedal was pressed, and his license plate was missing.

The state rested after the testimony of Baldwin, Perez, and Hetzel. The defense moved for a judgment of acquittal based on the failure of the state to prove an intentional theft or a knowing possession of a vehicle with an altered VIN number. The motions were denied.

The defense called Nathaniel McNear, a good friend of Jackson's for ten years. McNear testified that on August 17, 1997, at about 5:00 p.m., he and Jackson were driving south on US-1 near Cutler Ridge, when they saw the Cadillac on the side of the road with "for sale" signs on the windshield and the back window. They slowly drove by because Jackson wanted to look at the car. They did not stop, since McNear was in a rush.

Later on, Jackson told McNear that he was going to go back and look at the car. Jackson said that he wanted to buy the car and asked to borrow $400. When McNear said he did not have the money to lend, Jackson said that he was going to ask his sister and his father for the money. The next day, Jackson asked McNear if he could borrow McNear's license plate, because he was going to pick up the car and did not want to get pulled over for not having a tag. McNear let Jackson borrow the tag, which originally belonged to a 1986 Oldsmobile. McNear testified that he had sold the Oldsmobile, but kept the tag; he wrote the tag number on a piece of cardboard, and put it on the car. The Oldsmobile was later stolen from the buyer.

Two or three days after first seeing the car, Jackson brought the car to McNear's house, and gave no indication that the car was stolen. McNear did not look for VIN numbers or stickers on the car. He did not notice any pry marks and saw that the keys were in the ignition. Other than cracked seats, he did not see anything wrong with the car. On cross-examination, McNear conceded that he did not see Jackson actually purchase the car or sign the title which was eventually given to Officer Baldwin.

After the defense rested, Jackson renewed his motion for judgment of acquittal, which was denied. As part of the instruction to the jury, the trial court read that part of the standard instruction based on section 812.022(2), Florida Statutes (1997) which provides:

Proof of possession of recently stolen property, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to an inference that the person in possession of the property knew or should have known that the property had been stolen.

Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) p. 212. The jury found Jackson guilty of grand theft, possession of a motor vehicle with an altered vehicle identification number, and driving with a suspended license. The jury found Jackson not guilty of petit theft, a charge based on the theft of McNear's license plate.

Jackson points out that as to the state of mind element of both felonies, the evidence was circumstantial. To prove grand theft under section 812.014(1)(c)6, the state must prove that the defendant knowingly obtained or used the property of another with the intent to either temporarily or permanently deprive the other person of a right to the property or a benefit from the property or to appropriate the property to his own use or the use of another person not entitled to its use. See §§ 812.014(1)(a) & (b), 812.014(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (1997). Section 319.33(1)(d), Florida Statutes (1997), makes it unlawful to "possess... a motor vehicle ... on which the motor number or vehicle identification number has been, destroyed, removed, covered, altered, or defaced, with knowledge of such destruction, removal, covering, alteration, or defacement." (Italics supplied). Jackson asserts that because the circumstantial evidence of his guilty knowledge was not inconsistent with a reasonable hypothesis of innocence, his felony convictions should be reversed.

I

In State v. Law, 559 So.2d 187, 188 (Fla.1989), the supreme court set forth the standard of review for circumstantial evidence cases:

A special standard of review of the sufficiency of the evidence applies when a conviction is wholly based on circumstantial evidence. Where the only proof of guilt is circumstantial, no matter how strongly the evidence may suggest guilt, a conviction cannot be sustained unless the evidence is inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The question of whether the evidence fails to exclude all reasonable hypotheses of innocence is for the jury to determine, and where there is substantial, competent evidence to support the jury verdict, we will not

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