Jackson v. State, 22418

Citation219 Ga. 819,136 S.E.2d 375
Decision Date13 April 1964
Docket NumberNo. 22418,22418
PartiesEdward JACKSON v. The STATE.
CourtSupreme Court of Georgia

Syllabus by the Court

For reasons stated in the opinion, the trial court did not err in denying the amended motion for new trial.

The plaintiff in error. Edward Jackson, was jointly indicted with Willie Edward Stone and James Henry Pace for the murder of Duard Elmer Little. Jackson was separately tried and was convicted of murder without recommendation. To a judgment of the trial court overruling his motion for new trial on the general and on each of several special grounds he excepts and brings his case by writ of error to this court for review.

LeRoy S. Briean, Atlanta, for plaintiff in error.

Eugene Cook, Atty. Gen., Rubye G. Jackson, Asst. Atty. Gen., William T. Boyd, Sol. Gen., J. Walter LeCraw, William E. Spence, Atlanta, for defendant in error.

MOBLEY, Justice.

1. The general grounds and the first special ground, which alleges that the testimony of an accomplice of the defendant was not corroborated, will be considered together, as this ground is only an elaboration of the general grounds. The testimony of the accomplice was corroborated, and the evidence was fully ample to support the verdict.

Pace, a co-indictee, testified that he, Stone, and Jackson conspired to rob the deceased, and that Pace and Stone went to the store to effect the robbery, while Jackson remained in the car, which they parked across the railroad tracks directly in front of and about 75 feet from the store. Pace testified that Jackson first mentioned going out on Gordon Road and robbing a store, that they went out to a named store, Jackson went in, came back and said, 'it didn't seem like it was too much money in there,' so then Jackson drove to Mr. Little's store, where Jackson went in and came back saying, 'it looked like it should be a right smart of money in there'; that then Jackson drove the car across the railroad tracks and parked, and Jackson and Stone went to the store saying they were going to rob it, but came back saying there were other people in the store, so they waited about 15 minutes in the car and them Pace and Stone went to the Little store and left Jackson sitting in the car; that when they entered the store Pace drew a pistol on Little and engaged in a tussle with him during which the pistol which he held in his hand fell to the floor; that suddenly Little released his hold on him and sank to the floor; that Stone took the money from the cash register and they returned to the car, where Jackson was waiting; that they then drove to the house of a friend of Jackson's, where Pace changed clothes and washed the blood from his hands. Little died from the gun shot wound.

The testimony of Pace was corroborated by two girls, who in going from their home to Little's store saw the parked automobile, which fitted the description of Pace's car, parked across the railroad tracks in front of the Little store and saw one man sitting in it, with two men coming from the direction of Little's store, one of whom was identified as Jackson by one of the girls; and as they came back from the store, they saw the three men sitting in the car. This supported the testimony of Pace that Jackson and Stone first went to the store leaving him sitting in the car, came back when they found several people there, the three sat in the car for a few minutes before he and Stone, leaving Jackson in the car, went over and robbed the store. Several witnesses testified as to seeing Jackson and two other men at the house where Pace said they went after the robbery. The bloody clothes were found where Pace said they were put. An employee of Little, who was in the store when he was killed, identified Stone and Pace as the ones who came into the store. There was other evidence corroborating Pace's testimony. See Whaley v. State, 177 Ga. 757(2)(3), 171 S.E. 290, as to sufficiency of evidence to corroborate testimony of an accomplice. Jackson, who was 37 years old, was, according to Pace, the leader and planner of the robbery, with Pace who was 29, and Stone, 20, active participants therein.

2. Special grounds 2, 3, and 4 which except to the admission of testimony without setting out or pointing out in the record what testimony was improperly admitted are insufficient to constitute an assignment of error.

5. Ground 5 which complains of the court's refusal to direct a verdict of not guilty is without merit. 'It is not error in a criminal case to refuse to direct a verdict of not guilty.' Cornett v. State, 218 Ga. 405(3), 128 S.E.2d 317, and cases cited.

6. There is no merit in ground 6 which complains of the refusal of the court to declare a mistrial on motion of defendant's counsel because the solicitor general in his argument to the jury said, 'that from his deductions, movant was a murderer.' The evidence authorized that deduction and thus the argument was permissible. Montos v. State, 212 Ga. 764(7), 95 S.E.2d 792.

7. Special grounds 7 and 8 allege as error the refusal to grant a mistrial on motion of the defendant's counsel because the solicitor general read certain excerpts from decisions of this court to the court in the presence and hearing of the jury.

(a) In ground 7 the excerpt was the following quotation from Eberhart v. State, 47 Ga. 598: 'We have, however, no sympathy with that sickly sentimentality that springs into action whenever a criminal is at length about to suffer for crime. It may be a sign of a tender heart, but it is also a sign of one not under proper regulation. Society demands that crime shall be punished and criminals warned, and the false humanity that starts and shudders when the...

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16 cases
  • Flynt v. State
    • United States
    • United States Court of Appeals (Georgia)
    • March 4, 1980
    ...v. State, 124 Ga. 408, 409, 52 S.E. 534 (1905); Brand v. Wofford, 230 Ga. 750, 754(9), 199 S.E.2d 231 (1973), and Jackson v. State, 219 Ga. 819, 821, 136 S.E.2d 375 (1964). 'Flights of oratory and false logic do not call for mistrials or rebuke. It is the introduction of facts not in eviden......
  • Drake v. Kemp
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (11th Circuit)
    • May 31, 1985
    ...Presnell v. State, 241 Ga. 49, 243 S.E.2d 496 (Ga.1978); Hawes v. State, 240 Ga. 327, 240 S.E.2d 833 (Ga.1977); Jackson v. State, 219 Ga. 819, 136 S.E.2d 375 (Ga.1964); (approving the reading of Eberhart ).3 Scalawag has acquired a dictionary definition: "Scalawag" n. [origin unknown] 1: ra......
  • Bryan v. State, s. 51292
    • United States
    • United States Court of Appeals (Georgia)
    • January 5, 1976
    ...such as Patterson v. State, 124 Ga. 408, 409, 52 S.E. 534, Brend v. Wofford, 230 Ga. 750, 754(9), 199 S.E.2d 231, and Jackson v. State, 219 Ga. 819, 821, 136 S.E.2d 375. 'Flights of oratory and false logic do not call for mistrials or rebuke. It is the introduction of facts not in evidence ......
  • Britten v. State
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Georgia
    • May 31, 1965
    ...grounds of the motion for new trial are not meritorious. The verdict was amply authorized by the evidence. In Jackson v. State, 219 Ga. 819, 822, 136 S.E.2d 375, 378, this court quoting from Gore v. State, 162 Ga. 267, 134 S.E. 36, held: 'Where three persons conspire to rob a merchant in hi......
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