Jackson v. State, No. 2-09-023-CR (Tex. App. 4/15/2010), 2-09-023-CR.
| Decision Date | 15 April 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 2-09-023-CR.,2-09-023-CR. |
| Parties | JOEMAR JACKSON, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, State. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Appeal from Criminal District Court No. 3 of Tarrant County.
Panel: WALKER, LIVINGSTON, and GARDNER, JJ.
DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex.R.App.P. 47.2(b)
Appellant Joemar Jackson appeals his conviction for capital murder. In six issues, Jackson argues that the trial court erred by denying his Batson challenge, by overruling his objections to the State's closing argument, by refusing to grant a mistrial based on inadmissible hearsay, by overruling his objection to later hearsay, and by not including an accomplice-witness instruction in the jury charge. We will affirm.
Eric Witt was a drug dealer in the Como area of Fort Worth. He was at his home one evening with his friend Kretearria Porter when Jackson came over, purchased some drugs from Witt, and left. Another man showed up to buy drugs after Jackson left. As the man was leaving Witt's house, two men carrying guns forced their way inside. The first man carried a black gun, and the second man carried a silver gun; both men had bandanas covering their faces below their eyes. The first man shot Witt in the hand as he was trying to shut the door on the men, and Witt fell to the ground.
One of the men ordered Porter to lay on the floor. The man with the silver gun asked Witt, "E, where's the dope at?" Witt told him it was in a cracker box in the kitchen. One of the men searched Witt's pockets as he lay on the floor. The man with the black gun stood over Witt and shot Witt in the back of the head as they were leaving. The two men left, and the man who had just purchased drugs fled out the front door after them. Witt died from the gunshot wound to his head.
Police eventually arrested James Phillips, Kenneth Francis, Nathaniel Baldwin, and Jackson in connection with Witt's murder. Francis admitted to participating in the robbery, and he told detectives that Jackson was the robber who shot Witt. Phillips also admitted to participating in the robbery and told detectives that Jackson was the shooter.
At Jackson's trial, Francis testified that Phillips, Baldwin, and Jackson had planned to rob Witt and that Francis's role was to go to Witt's house to buy drugs so that he could determine how many people were inside Witt's house. By the time Francis got to Witt's house, Phillips and Jackson were already inside; Francis saw Witt and Porter laying on the floor, Phillips standing over Witt with a chrome gun, and Jackson in the kitchen with a black gun. Witt was pleading for them not to kill him and was saying, Francis ran back to his car and heard a gunshot. Sometime after the robbery, Francis saw Jackson and asked him why he had shot Witt. Jackson told him, "When I shot E, [Phillips] threw up." Francis testified that he had agreed to testify for the State in exchange for an eight-year sentence for conspiracy to commit robbery.
Phillips testified that on the day of Witt's murder, Baldwin had showed up at his house and had told him, "Let's go get this money." Phillips did not know exactly what he was talking about, but he knew that Baldwin was asking if he wanted to go rob someone. Phillips got in the car with Baldwin, Jackson, and Francis and learned that they planned to rob Witt. Phillips testified that Baldwin's role in the robbery was "[j]ust getting the door open." According to Phillips, Baldwin approached Witt's house first under the guise of purchasing drugs, and while Baldwin was inside, Jackson "bust[ed] up in there." Phillips said that he and Francis were still outside when they heard a gunshot. Phillips went inside and saw that Witt had been shot in the hand. Phillips started grabbing money and drugs. He was carrying a chrome-plated revolver. He testified that he ran to his mother's house after the robbery and threw up at her house from running so hard. Phillips explained that he had agreed to testify for the State in exchange for a twenty-five-year sentence for capital murder.
LaTonia Clark testified that Francis was her boyfriend when Witt was murdered. On the night of Witt's murder, Clark heard Phillips tell Francis that he wanted to rob Witt because he and Jackson had seen "a lot of money or drugs" at Witt's house. Later that night, Francis was taking a bath when he told Clark about the robbery. He was crying, and he told Clark that Jackson had shot Witt in the back of the head and that Phillips had thrown up in Witt's house.
Lee Hall testified that he lives in Como and knows Jackson, Phillips, Francis, and Baldwin. After Witt's murder, Hall overheard a conversation between Jackson and a man who lives next door to Hall's grandmother. Jackson was talking about Phillips and said, Hall explained that when Jackson said he "ain't never did no dirt with [Phillips]," Jackson meant that he had never committed a crime with Phillips. Hall also overheard Jackson tell the man, "Man, I should have murked [Phillips]," which is a street term for murder.
Donald Coleman testified that he had a sexual relationship with Phillips at the time of Witt's murder and that Phillips had told him that Phillips, Jackson, and Francis robbed "the dope man." Coleman testified that Phillips had told him that Jackson shot Witt during the robbery.
Marquies Amos testified that he knows Phillips, Francis, Baldwin, and Jackson and that he had known Witt. Amos said that Phillips had told him that Jackson shot Witt during the robbery. Amos also testified that Jackson confessed to him that he had shot Witt because, during the robbery, Phillips was calling Jackson by his name in front of Witt and because Witt was telling Jackson, "I know where y'all live." Amos agreed to testify for the State in exchange for a plea agreement with his brother regarding unrelated charges.
The jury convicted Jackson of capital murder. Acknowledging that the State had waived the death penalty, the trial court sentenced Jackson to life in prison.
In his first issue, Jackson argues that the trial court erred by overruling his Batson challenge regarding the State's use of a peremptory strike on veniremember 3, who was African-American. Jackson asserts that the State's proffered race-neutral reason for striking veniremember 3 was a pretext for racial discrimination. Jackson is African-American.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits race-based jury selection. U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 1719 (1986); Jasper v. State, 61 S.W.3d 413, 421 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001); see Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 35.261(a) (Vernon 2006). In the face of perceived purposeful discrimination, the defendant may request a Batson hearing to address the challenge. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 35.261(a).
Trial courts follow a three-step process when resolving Batson challenges. Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 476, 128 S. Ct. 1203, 1207 (2008); Young v. State, 283 S.W.3d 854, 866 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1015 (2009). First, the defense must make a prima facie case of racial discrimination. Snyder, 552 U.S. at 476, 128 S. Ct. at 1207; Watkins v. State, 245 S.W.3d 444, 447 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 92 (2008). Second, if the prima facie showing has been made, the burden of production shifts to the State to articulate a race-neutral reason for its strike. Snyder, 552 U.S. at 476, 128 S. Ct. at 1207; Watkins, 245 S.W.3d at 447. Third, if the State tenders a race-neutral explanation, the trial court must then decide whether the defendant has proved purposeful racial discrimination. Snyder, 552 U.S. at 476, 128 S. Ct. at 1207; Watkins, 245 S.W.3d at 447.
The step-two explanation need only be race neutral on its face. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767-68, 115 S. Ct. 1769, 1771 (1995); Watkins, 245 S.W.3d at 447. The ultimate plausibility of that race-neutral explanation is to be considered as part of the third step of the analysis, in which the trial court determines whether the defendant has satisfied his burden of persuasion to prove that the strike was indeed the product of the State's purposeful discrimination. Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768, 115 S. Ct. at 1771; Watkins, 245 S.W.3d at 447. Throughout the challenge, the burden of persuasion remains with the defendant. Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768, 115 S. Ct. at 1771; Ford v. State, 1 S.W.3d 691, 693 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). The defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the allegations of purposeful discrimination were true in fact and that the prosecutor's reasons were merely a sham or pretext. Watkins, 245 S.W.3d at 451-52.
On appeal, a trial court's ruling on the issue of discriminatory intent must be sustained unless it is clearly erroneous. Snyder, 552 U.S. at 477, 128 S. Ct. at 1207; Watkins, 245 S.W.3d at 448. Appellate courts must give great deference to credibility and demeanor determinations made by the trial court in connection with a Batson inquiry. Snyder, 552 U.S. at 477, 128 S. Ct. at 1208. The court of criminal appeals has explained our review of a Batson ruling as follows,
In assaying the record for clear error, vel non, the reviewing court should consider the entire record of voir dire; it need not limit itself to arguments or considerations that the parties specifically called to the trial court's attention so long as those arguments or considerations are manifestly grounded in the appellate record. But a reviewing court should examine a trial court's conclusion that a facially race-neutral explanation for a peremptory challenge...
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