Jackson v. State

• Decision Date: 18 February 1958
• Docket Number: No. A-9,A-9
• Citation: 100 So.2d 839
• Parties: Earnest Leon JACKSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 839

100 So.2d 839

Earnest Leon JACKSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. A-9.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Feb. 18, 1958.

Rehearing Denied March 19, 1958.

A. G. Campbell, Jr., De Funiak Springs, for appellant.

Richard W. Ervin and George R. Georgieff, Tallahassee, for appellee.

WINGGINTON, Judge.

Appellant, the defendant at trial, was indicted by a Walton County grand jury and charged with the crime of manslaughter. The indictment was in two counts, the first of which charged defendant which causing the death of one Alto Lee Patterson as a result of culpable negligence in the operation of an automobile; the second charging the same death as a result of defendant's operation of his automobile while intoxicated. At the conclusion of the evidence defendant's motion for a directed verdict as to both counts was denied and the jury found appellant guilty of the offense charged in the first count only, thereby acquitting him of the offense charged in the second count.

On this appeal appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's verdict of guilt, and contends that the trial judge erred in giving certain charges to the jury and in refusing to give certain requested charges.

Insofar as it concerns the sufficiency of the evidence, the question to be here determined is whether the acts of the defendant, as shown by evidence which the jury had the right to believe, when considered separately or in combination, constituted what in law has been termed culpable negligence. That is, that degree of negligence 'of 'a gross and flagrant character, evincing reckless disregard of human life, or of the safety of persons exposed to its dangerous effects, or there is that entire want of care which would raise the presumption of a conscious indifference to consequences or such wantonness or recklessness, or grossly careless disregard of the safety and welfare of the public, or that reckless indifference to the rights of others, which is equivalent to an intentional violation of them. " ¹ This definition has been consistently adhered to by our Supreme Court. ² It does not follow, however, that every fatality, regrettable as it may be, is accompanied by and results from conduct warranting a criminal conviction. That the occurrence of a collision carries with it the presumption of negligence in some degree on the part of someone is not necessarily legally sufficient to warrant a conviction for manslaughter predicated upon culpable negligence. ³ Before one can be so condemned it must be established beyond and to the exclusion of every reasonable doubt ⁴ that the defendant has been guilty of negligence of the character heretofore defined. ⁵ The words 'culpable negligence' as used in F.S., Sec. 782.07, F.S.A., and therefore such as is necessary to sustain a conviction of manslaughter, mean more than such simple negligence as would authorize recovery of compensatory damages in a civil action. ⁶

In the instant case, the unfortunate death of Alto Lee Patterson resulted from a collision which occurred at about 6:10 P.M. on January 29, 1956, between a car driven by the defendant and a pick-up truck driven by one Coleman. From the evidence it appears there were no visual obstructions other than those normally attending the dusk and early dark of a winter's evening. Defendant was proceeding in the direction of Florala, Alabama, and was attempting to negotiate a curve in the road at a point some 200 feet before reaching a store owned and operated by the deceased Patterson, when he side-swiped the pick-up truck driven by Coleman. As a result of this collision the hood of defendant's car became unlatched and flew up and back, thus obscuring his forward vision. Defendant lost control of his car and it proceeded across the road and onto the lefthand shoulder, thence onto the deceased's premises, and crashed into the store building located thereon just as Patterson was closing for the night. There is a complete absence of any positive evidence as to where or how the defendant's car struck Patterson, but when the first witness arrived on the scene his body was found lying across the engine in an unconscious condition. Death ensued before the regained consciousness and before medical aid could be administered.

Defendant's guilt must be established, if at all, from the evidence of events leading to and culminating in the collision between the vehicles. This is true for the reason that defendant's forward vision from and control over his vehicle, without contradiction, ceased at the instant of impact. The principle is well established in this jurisdiction that criminal liability does not attach when the accused is by circumstances and conditions beyond his control and against his will, placed in the position and subjected to the conditions which resulted in the death with which he is charged. ⁷

The evidence concerning defendant's condition of sobriety and the manner in which he was operating his automobile immediately before and at the time of the collision with Coleman's truck is in sharp conflict. Defendant testified, infer alia, that he had been traveling at approximately 60 miles per hour and had slowed down to some extent upon approaching the curve on which the collision occurred; that he was blinded by the lights on Coleman's vehicle; and that it appeared to him Coleman's truck was on the wrong side of the road. He admitted participating in a 'drinking' party the previous night and that he had consumed two beers around 9:30 A.M. on the day of the collision. The only eyewitness not directly involved in the mishap testified that both vehicles were proceeding at approximately 40 miles per hour and appeared to collide at the center of the road. Coleman's testimony indicates that defendant was traveling at approximately 60 miles per hour and on the wrong side of the road. According to Coleman, three wheels of his truck were on his righthand shoulder of the road at the instant of impact. This evidence was corroborated generally by Coleman's wife who was riding in the truck with him. Of the five state's witnesses who testified as to defendant's condition of sobriety, three observed no indication of alcoholic influence one was of the opinion that defendant had been drinking, but was 'naturally groggy and suffering from shock'; and one 'smelled' alcohol when taking defendant to jail some two hours after the accident and after his wounds had been cleaned and treated with alcohol.

When viewed in a light most favorable to the State's position, the only credible evidence tending to establish culpable negligence may be summarized as proving that at the time of the initial collision defendant was (1) travelling at approximately 60 miles per hour; (2) under the influence of alcohol at least to some degree; and (3) across the center line on the wrong side of the road.

With reference to the speed of defendant's vehicle, the evidence shows the incident occurred at dusk or early dark on an open, dry county road and at a time when the weather was clear. There is no evidence tending to establish the nature of traffic conditions or other hazards at or around the scene, and no evidence from which it could be concluded that they were such that one driving an automobile 60 miles per hour would thereby evince culpable negligence.

Speed alone is not necessarily such culpable negligence as to sustain a charge of manslaughter. ⁸ Likewise, that defendant 'had been drinking' or was to some degree under the influence is not proof of culpable negligence. Such evidence is admissible only upon the theory that persons under the influence of alcohol to any considerable degree, though not actually intoxicated, are more apt to be heedless, reckless and daring than when free from such influence; and, standing alone, cannot make an act wanton and reckless that would not otherwise be so. ⁹ Furthermore, defendant's act of crossing over onto the wrong side of the road in attempting to negotiate a curve, while it may have constituted negligence sufficient to sustain civil liability-a point not here decided-falls far short of culpable negligence, ¹⁰ as construed by our Supreme Court in cases arising under the manslaughter statute. In the case of Maxey v. State ¹¹ the defendant, who was driving at a fast rate of speed and smelled of alcohol, while traversing a curve, lost control of his car, which crossed to the lefthand shoulder of the road where it skidded some 300 feet, turned slightly and skidded an additional 150 feet, and turned over three times, killing a passenger. He was acquitted of manslaughter by reason of intoxication but convicted of manslaughter by culpable negligence. In reversing, our Supreme Court stated, through Mr. Justice Drew, that 'the testimony in this case, taken in a light most favorable to the State, is neither consistent with guilt nor inconsistent with innocence. Liberty is too precious a possession to be taken away on evidence which does not measure up to the requirements laid down by the law for conviction.'

In Preston v....