Jackson v. State, 27536
| Decision Date | 04 May 1955 |
| Docket Number | No. 27536,27536 |
| Citation | 161 Tex.Crim. 464,278 S.W.2d 310 |
| Parties | Anna Lee JACKSON, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee. |
| Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
No attorney on appeal.
Dan Walton, Dist. Atty., Eugene Brady, Jr., Asst. Dist. Atty., Houston, Leon Douglas, State's Atty., Austin, for the State.
The offense is murder; the punishment, two years.
The homicide occurred at the appellant's home after three o'clock in the morning. The appellant and deceased were alone at the time of the homicide. The appellant's husband was out of town. The appellant and deceased had been together at a tavern earlier in the evening and had arrived at appellant's home about midnight.
The State's evidence as to what transpired immediately prior to the homicide came from the dying declarations of the deceased and statements made by the appellant, presumably prior to her arrest.
Officer Randio testified that he went to the hospital and saw the deceased shortly after the shooting and before his death, that the deceased said 'he was going to die; couldn't make it because he was shot bad,' that the deceased further told him that he had been at appellant's home for approximately three hours before she shot him, that during that time he had made three attempts to leave, that on the first two attempts the appellant forcefully prevented him from leaving and on the third she pulled out a gun and shot him as he sat on a couch.
Officer Armstrong testified that he went to the appellant's home shortly after the shooting, found the deceased lying on the floor, and got a pistol from the appellant. He testified, without objection, that the appellant told him that she had written out a statement which she wanted the deceased to sign, that he refused to do so, that she went to the telephone and he hit her with a boot, that she ordered the appellant to leave, that she then went and got a pistol and started shooting at the deceased's feet at he sat on her sofa, that she shot four times and the deceased got up and tried to take the gun away from her, that she emptied the gun at him and then hit him over the head with the pistol and he finally went down. No weapons were found on the body of the deceased.
Appellant testified in her own behalf that the deceased, who had been a roomer in her home, had mistreated her badly prior to the night of the homicide and had often threatened her; that she had agreed to meet him that night in order 'to have a reconciliation with the man, get him in a nice humor until Jack (her husband) came home'; that the cab driver brought them home after midnight and came in the house with them; that the men had a drink and the cab driver left; that she sat there and talked to the deceased and tried to get him to make a statement in writing concerning some of his mistreatment of her; that he refused; that she went to the telephone to call the police chief, and the deceased hit her in the head with a boot; that she pushed him back and went in the bedroom, got the pistol and returned; and that she fired at his feet as he sat on the sofa. She stated that the deceased got up and grabbed her by the arm and they fell, but that the pistol was empty by that time and she hit him across the face with the pistol. She denied that she had ever been intimate with the deceased but admitted having gone out with him at night while her husband was out of town.
The jury resolved the disputed issue of self defense against the appellant, and we find the evidence sufficient to support the conviction.
Bill of exception No. 1 relates to the admission of the dying declarations of the deceased. If there was any error in the admission of such testimony, the same was cured when the appellant testified about the same matters.
Bill of exception No. 2 and a challenge to the array and motion to quash the jury panel raise the question of the absence of women on the panel from which the jury was drawn to try this case.
The trial began and the motion was filed on November 22, 1954. The Constitutional Amendment, Section 19 of...
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Sanders v. State of South Carolina, Civ. A. No. 68-877.
...for selecting and drawing juries. See: Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680; Jackson v. State of Texas, 161 Tex.Cr.R. 464, 278 S.W.2d 310; York v. United States, 8th Circuit, 167 F.2d 847; State v. Litteral, 227 N.C. 527, 43 S.E.2d XII. "COURT APPOINTED ATTORNEY......
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State v. Sanders, 18823
...for selecting and drawing juries. See: Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680; Jackson v. State of Texas, 161 Tex.Cr.R. 464, 278 S.W.2d 310; York v. United States, 8th Circuit, 167 F.2d 847; State v. Litteral, 227 N.C. 527, 43 S.E.2d Defendant next argues that the......
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Rogers v. State
...a mixed jury might separate for the night so long as the male and female groups were each in the charge of a bailiff. In Jackson v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 278 S.W.2d 310, we held that in jury wheel counties the Constitutional Amendment could not be complied with until August, In the case at ba......