Jackson v. State

• Decision Date: 19 March 2007
• Docket Number: No. S06A1945.,S06A1945.
• Parties: JACKSON v. The STATE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

281 Ga. 705

642 S.E.2d 656

JACKSON v. The STATE.

No. S06A1945.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

March 19, 2007.

Gerald Ray Akin, Columbus, for appellant.

John Gray Conger, Dist. Atty., Dan Trimble, Asst. Dist. Atty., Thurbert E. Baker, Atty. Gen., Jason Charles Fisher, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

HUNSTEIN, Presiding Justice.

Carmen Jackson was convicted of malice murder, felony murder and cruelty to children in the death of her fifteen-month-old daughter, Tytanna Jackson. She appeals from the denial of her motion for new trial.¹ Finding no error, we affirm.

1. The evidence adduced authorized the jury to find that the victim was beaten so severely that her pancreas and duodenum were ruptured and that the contents of the victim's intestines leaked into her abdomen and led to her death within two to four hours due to toxic shock.² Expert testimony established that two to four hours was the maximum time that occurred between the injuries and the victim's death because of the absence of other indicators that would have manifested themselves had the injuries been inflicted earlier. Expert testimony also established that the victim would have begun vomiting immediately after the fatal injuries were inflicted and that the victim would have been in extreme pain. In her trial testimony and statement to police, Jackson claimed that she arrived home from work around 8:30 p.m. on September 18, 1998; that she changed the victim's diaper and put her in her playpen before going to her own bed; and that she did not notice anything wrong with the child until her live-in boyfriend and co-defendant, Timothy Murphy, informed her the victim was having difficulty breathing. Jackson stated she promptly called for medical assistance, which arrived within 10-15 minutes at 12:56 a.m., September 19, at which time the evidence established that the victim had no pulse, was not breathing, was cold to the touch and had fixed and dilated pupils.

We find this evidence sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find Jackson guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the charged crimes. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Banks v. State, 271 Ga. 59(1), 518 S.E.2d 415 (1999). The trial court did not err by denying Jackson's motion for a directed verdict. See Estes v. State, 251 Ga. 347(1), 305 S.E.2d 778 (1983) (directed verdict of acquittal appropriate only when there is no conflict in the evidence).

2. The State's expert testified that he found signs of "battered child syndrome" when he performed the autopsy of the victim based on indications the victim had endured three distinct episodes of abusive injuries, including broken ribs that had been fractured two to four weeks before the victim's death.³ Jackson contends the trial court erred by admitting evidence regarding the broken ribs because the State failed to prove Jackson was the person who inflicted the injuries, see generally Williams v. State, 261 Ga. 640(2)(b), 409 S.E.2d 649 (1991), and thus the evidence was not admissible as a similar transaction. Assuming, without deciding, that the trial court erred by admitting this testimony as similar transaction evidence, we nevertheless conclude based on the overwhelming evidence of Jackson's guilt that it is highly probable the error did not contribute to the judgment and we find beyond a reasonable doubt that the error, if any, was harmless. See, e.g., White v. State, 269 Ga. 74(2), 495 S.E.2d 278 (1998).

3. Jackson failed to object to the prosecutor's closing argument and thus waived her argument on appeal. Mullins v. State, 270 Ga. 450(2), 511 S.E.2d 165 (1999).

4. The transcript reveals that Jackson's counsel objected before any answers were given by the defense witness to allegedly-improper hypothetical questions posed by the prosecutor; that the trial court responded to Jackson's objections by requiring the State to rephrase the questions; and that, as rephrased, the questions were asked and answered without objection. "Because [Jackson] failed to object to the subsequent question, she is precluded from pursuing this ground on appeal. [Cits.]" Sedlak v. State, 275 Ga. 746, 754(4), 571 S.E.2d 721 (2002).

5. Jackson contends that the trial court erred by denying her written request to charge the jury regarding mere presence at the scene of the crime.

The rule that mere presence at the scene of a crime is insufficient to convict is actually a corollary to the requirement that the State prove each element of the offense charged. [Cit.] In the present case, the trial court correctly instructed the jury on the duty of the State to prove each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt and instructed the jury fully on the law of circumstantial evidence. [Cit.]

Chung v. State, 240 Ga.App. 394, 396(2), 523 S.E.2d 615 (1999). Based on the extent of the victim's bruising and injuries, it is clear that Jackson failed to appropriately protect and supervise her daughter and to seek prompt medical care for her. The trial court did not err by denying Jackson's request to charge on mere presence. See id.

6. In her final argument, Jackson asserts that she was denied effective assistance of counsel because her attorney failed to move to sever her trial from that of her co-defendant and failed to object to the prosecutor's allegedly improper closing argument. To...