Jackson v. State, AZ-198

Decision Date16 April 1985
Docket NumberNo. AZ-198,AZ-198
Citation468 So.2d 346,10 Fla. L. Weekly 991
Parties10 Fla. L. Weekly 991 Michael James JACKSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
CourtFlorida District Court of Appeals

Michael E. Allen, Public Defender, and Michael J. Minerva, Asst. Public Defender, Tallahassee, for appellant.

Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and Henri C. Cawthon, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

The public defender for the Second Judicial Circuit has filed an Anders brief in this cause, Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). We find two of the potential grounds for relief identified by the public defender to be without merit. However, we find reversible error raised by one ground. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for new trial.

Appellant was charged by information with grand theft, Sections 812.014(1)(a), (b), (2)(b)1., Florida Statutes (1983). At the time of the events giving rise to this case, appellant was associated with an automobile repair and refurbishing business known as Automotive Specialists. The complainant, Glenn Bradshaw, owner of Automotive Specialists, alleged that appellant had refused to turn over to the business certain monies appellant had collected from a customer, Dale Stout.

The primary area of dispute below was over appellant's relationship with Bradshaw, and hence Automotive Specialists. Appellant's testimony was that his affiliation with Automotive Specialists was not that of employer/employee, but rather that he was an independent contractor. Appellant testified that he solicited personal business, which he then took to Automotive Specialists for the necessary repair work, paying Bradshaw $200.00 per month rent for the privilege of utilizing the premises. Out of the business generated, appellant testified, he paid Bradshaw fifty percent of the after-cost profits. Bradshaw, on the other hand, testified that he employed appellant as a paint and body man, paying him a commission based on fifty percent of the after-cost profits. Although Bradshaw acknowledged renting shop space to appellant to allow him to perform certain independent contract jobs, Bradshaw emphatically denied that the general business relationship between him and appellant was that of landlord-tenant.

As might be expected, appellant and Bradshaw disagreed as to whether the Stout work was performed for Automotive Specialists or for appellant as independent contractor. Bradshaw, while acknowledging that appellant had evidently solicited Stout's business, insisted that the Stout repairs constituted an Automotive Specialists' project. Bradshaw testified that appellant had utilized the business premises and tools, as well as one of Bradshaw's employees, to assist appellant in completion of the required tasks. Bradshaw's testimony was bolstered by the testimony of his shop foreman, Marcus Williamson, who agreed that appellant was an employee of Automotive Specialists, rather than an independent contractor, and that the repair work done on Stout's van was a shop, rather than individual, project.

Appellant testified that, contrary to Bradshaw's assertions, his work for Stout was strictly based on a contract between him and Stout. 1 Appellant's version was bolstered by the testimony of Stout, to the effect that his dealings were strictly with Jackson, although the fact that Stout knew the work was to be done in Automotive Specialists' shop makes his testimony susceptible to the inference that it was a shop job, rather than Jackson's. Appellant testified that the reason Bradshaw had brought criminal charges against him was because they had been having numerous personal and professional conflicts, and thus Bradshaw was attempting to "get back" at appellant. Appellant attempted to bolster this proposition with the proffered testimony of a former Automotive Specialists' employee Gloria Brown, who confirmed that Bradshaw had promised to "get even" with appellant. Appellant also proffered the testimony of Ms. Brown that Bradshaw had made romantic advances toward her, as well as appellant's girlfriend. The trial court rejected this proffer, as well as appellant's attempts to cross-examine Bradshaw as to these allegations, ruling the evidence improper impeachment of Bradshaw's character.

Regarding the alleged theft, Bradshaw testified that on the day in question he had been informed by appellant that the repairs to Stout's van were complete. As a result, Bradshaw testified, he had been informed by appellant that appellant was going to return the van to Stout. When appellant had failed to return by 5:00 P.M. that day, Bradshaw and Williamson began searching for appellant, Williamson finding him at a 7-11 store. Bradshaw testified that appellant had told him that the reason appellant had failed to return with the money for the Stout job was because he "was in a bind" for money. Bradshaw further testified that appellant had promised to repay the disputed sum over a period of time. Although Bradshaw's testimony indicated that the business practice of having appellant, rather than Bradshaw, deal with the customers--including collecting the shop's bills--was the rule rather than the exception, Bradshaw denied that appellant had any authority to sign Stout's receipt as paid in full.

Appellant's motions for directed judgment of acquittal, made at the close of both the state's case and appellant's testimony, were denied by the trial judge. Instead, the trial judge found appellant guilty as charged. He explained that he found appellant's testimony regarding his independent employment status vague, and hence unworthy of belief. However, the trial court withheld adjudication of guilt, and placed appellant on two years probation. One of the terms of probation required appellant to pay Bradshaw $800.00 restitution, the amount appellan...

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3 cases
  • Lewis v. State
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • November 21, 1990
    ...Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974); Marr v. State, 494 So.2d 1139, 1143 (Fla.1986); Jackson v. State, 468 So.2d 346 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985); Lavette v. State, 442 So.2d 265 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), petition for review denied, 449 So.2d 265 (Fla.1984); Gamble v. Stat......
  • Bartlett v. State
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • August 7, 2000
    ...Thomas v. State, 584 So.2d 1022, 1023 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), the defense remains available in theft cases. See Jackson v. State, 468 So.2d 346, 348 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985); Adams v. State, 443 So.2d 1003, 1006 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). See generally State v. Dunmann, 427 So.2d 166, 169 (Fla.1983); Stat......
  • D.J.G. v. State
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • December 9, 1987
    ...regarding immunity from or a threat of criminal prosecution before the witness's bias or prejudice might be shown; Jackson v. State, 468 So.2d 346 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)--in a non-jury trial, when the major part of the state's case depended upon the testimony of one witness, trial court erred ......
1 books & journal articles
  • Other rules governing both physical and testimonial proof
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Florida Family Law Trial Notebook
    • April 30, 2022
    ...court assumed the trial court honored its own evidentiary ruling and thus refused to consider the proffered testimony. Jackson v. State , 468 So.2d 346 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). Palos v. State Trial court denied request to cross-exam a witness. Trial counsel was required to at least proffer what......

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