Jackson v. The Martin Company

• Decision Date: 29 January 1960
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 11909.
• Citation: 180 F. Supp. 475
• Parties: William E. JACKSON v. THE MARTIN COMPANY, a body corporate, and Local Union No. 738, United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, AFL-CIO, et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland

180 F. Supp. 475

William E. JACKSON v. THE MARTIN COMPANY, a body corporate and Local Union No. 738, United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, AFL-CIO, et al.

Civ. No. 11909.

United States District Court D. Maryland.

January 29, 1960.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Thomas J. Kenney, William F. McDonald and Hugo A. Ricciuti, Baltimore, Md., for plaintiff.

Clarence W. Miles and Benjamin C. Howard, Baltimore, Md., for the Martin Company.

Claude L. Callegary and Christopher H. Foreman, Baltimore, Md., for Union defendants.

THOMSEN, Chief Judge.

On January 14, 1960, Plaintiff, an employee of defendant Martin Company, was a member and an elected Committeeman of defendant Local Union. On that date the Executive Board of the Local Union formally declared Plaintiff ineligible, under Sec. 504 of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (The Landrum-Griffin Act), 29 U.S. C.A. § 504,¹ to hold the position of Committeeman, because he had been convicted of violating and conspiring to violate the Dyer Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2312. The Executive Board therefore "decertified" Plaintiff as a Committeeman, and the Martin Company terminated his employment on January 16, as required by existing seniority rules, since he had been retained in their employ only because his position as Committeeman had given him super-seniority. Contending that his decertification was not required or justified by Sec. 504 and was null and void, Plaintiff filed this action (1) for a declaratory judgment to that effect and (2) for such injunctive relief as may be necessary to preserve or restore his position as Committeeman and his employment by the Martin Company. The Martin Company answered the complaint and the Union defendants answered and moved to dismiss for want of jurisdiction.

The principal questions raised are: (I) Whether this court has jurisdiction of the subject matter (A) under 29 U.S. C.A. § 412, read in connection with 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 411(a) (5), 504 and 529; (B) under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331; or (C) under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1337; (II) (A) Whether defendant was convicted of one of the crimes specified in 29 U.S.C.A. § 504; (B) whether the position of Committeeman is one of the positions dealt with by that section; and (C) whether that section so construed would be unconstitutional; and (III) What relief, if any, Plaintiff would be entitled to under State or Federal law, in view of the constitution of the National Union, the by-laws of the Local Union, and the agreement with the Martin Company.

The case has been presented to the court on a stipulation of facts agreed to by Plaintiff and the Union defendants, and not disputed by the Martin Company. The parties are agreed that the complaint² and other pleadings shall be considered to have been amended to conform to the evidence. F.R.Civ.P. 15(b), 28 U.S.C.A.

Facts

Local Union No. 738, United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization engaged in an industry affecting commerce; it deals with employers about grievances, labor disputes, rates of pay, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment. It operates under a charter from and the constitution of its International Union, and is a certified representative of employees under the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq. The principal office of the Local Union is in Baltimore County, Maryland.

On May 25, 1954, Plaintiff was indicted in this court, along with three other defendants, for violating the Dyer Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2312. In addition to the usual substantive counts, which charged him with transporting in interstate commerce specified stolen automobiles, knowing them to have been stolen, the indictment contained a conspiracy count. That count charged the four defendants with conspiracy "to commit offenses against the United States in violation of 18 U.S. C.A. § 2312, in that they conspired to transport in interstate commerce motor vehicles knowing the same to have been stolen". The conspiracy count continued: "It was part of said conspiracy that said defendants would steal automobiles in Baltimore, in the State and District of Maryland, and thereafter transport the same to other states of the United States for purposes of sale". The count listed four overt acts, namely, the transportation in interstate commerce from Baltimore, Maryland, to points outside the State, of four specified motor vehicles, one by each of the defendants, knowing the motor vehicle to have been stolen. On June 25, 1954, Plaintiff entered a plea of guilty to two of the counts charging substantive offenses and to the conspiracy count. He was given a three year prison sentence, but was released on parole on October 10, 1955, after serving sixteen months, and resumed his employment at the Martin Company.

At all material times, Plaintiff has been a member in good standing of the Local Union. Until January 16, 1960, he was employed as a milling machine operator at the plant of the Martin Company in Baltimore County, Maryland. His union dues were currently paid. His wage rate was $2.67 per hour.

On or about November 25, 1957, Plaintiff was elected to the position of Committeeman of the Local Union for a term of two years, and was re-elected for a further period of two years at an election held on December 15-16, 1959.³

The duties and responsibilities of a Committeeman of the Local Union are set out in its by-laws. They include the investigation, adjustment and settlement of grievances, and the investigation of accidents and injuries in his district. The agreement with the Martin Company provides that there shall be a committeeman for each six stewards, and a steward for each 150 in-unit employees, unless circumstances require more committeemen. A committeeman receives no regular salary from the Union for performing his duties, but when he leaves his work during working hours on union business, the Martin Company pays him his regular hourly wage for the first hour he is away from his regular employment, and the Union continues his compensation at his regular hourly rate for any period of time after the first hour. During the year 1957 the Union paid Plaintiff $188.08; in 1958, $401.03; and in 1959, $120.26.

At a meeting of the Executive Board of the Local Union held on January 14, 1960, a motion was adopted (1) declaring Plaintiff ineligible to hold the position of committeeman in the Local Union, because of his conviction, which the Executive Board construed to be embraced within the provisions of Sec. 504 of the Landrum-Griffin Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 504, and (2) directing a proper officer of the Local Union to notify the Martin Company that Plaintiff was decertified as a Committeeman for that reason. On the same day such notice was given to the Martin Company in writing, but no notice was given to Plaintiff by the Union or its representatives. He was not served with any charges nor given any notice of the meeting at which he was decertified.

On the night of January 14, 1960, while Plaintiff was working, he was notified by a superintendent of the Martin Company that the Local Union had notified the Company that Plaintiff had been expelled as Committeeman and decertified as such. The superintendent further advised Plaintiff that his employment with the Martin Company would be terminated on Saturday, January 16, 1960, when he completed his next work period, because losing his position as Union Committeeman made him ineligible for continued employment under existing seniority rules.

The Constitution of the International Union sets up an elaborate system of appeals from actions of subordinate bodies, and provides (Art. 32, sec. 12): "In no case shall a member or subordinate body appeal to a Civil Court for redress until he or it has exhausted the laws of this International Union * * *."

Discussion

A. Jurisdiction under 29 U.S.C.A. § 412

Sec. 102 of the Landrum-Griffin Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 412, provides: "Any person whose rights secured by the provisions of this subchapter have been infringed by any violation of this subchapter may bring a civil action in a district court of the United States for such relief (including injunctions) as may be appropriate. Any such action against a labor organization shall be brought in the district court of the United States for the district where the alleged violation occurred, or where the principal office of such labor organization is located."

Sec. 101(a) (5) of the Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 411(a) (5), provides: "No member of any labor organization may be fined, suspended, expelled, or otherwise disciplined except for nonpayment of dues by such organization or by any officer thereof unless such member has been (A) served with written specific charges; (B) given a reasonable time to prepare his defense; (C) afforded a full and fair hearing." Plaintiff complains because he was not afforded these safeguards before he was decertified as a Committeeman.

However, Title I of the Act (Subchapter 2 in the 1959 Supp. to 29 U.S. C.A., entitled "Bill Of Rights Of Members Of Labor Organizations"), 29 U.S. C.A. §§ 411 to 415, deals with the union-member relationship, not with the union-officer or union-employee relationships. Strauss v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America,⁴ D.C.E.D.Pa., 179 F.Supp. 297.

As in Strauss, the Plaintiff in the instant case was not fined, suspended, expelled, or otherwise disciplined, nor deprived of any rights which he enjoyed as a member of the Local Union. Moreover, the action of the Executive Committee was not disciplinary action, but a finding that Plaintiff was disqualified to hold the position of Committeeman by reason of Sec. 504 of the Act. A committeeman is an officer or an employee of the Local Union. The constitution of the National Union directs that he shall take the oath of office required of officers; the...