Jackson v. United States
| Citation | 488 F.Supp.3d 818 |
| Decision Date | 22 September 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 4:19-cv-00199-KGB |
| Parties | Larry JACKSON and Sederick Noble, Plaintiffs v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Arkansas |
Anthony Bryce Brewer, Rainwater, Holt & Sexton P.A., Little Rock, AR, for Plaintiffs.
Lindsey Mitcham Lorence, U.S. Attorney's Office Eastern District of Arkansas, Little Rock, AR, for Defendant.
Before the Court is the motion for summary judgment filed by defendant the United States of America (Dkt. No. 5). For the following reasons, the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over plaintiff Sederick Noble's Federal Tort Claims Act claim, and this claim is dismissed without prejudice. In addition, the United States is entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff Larry Jackson's Federal Tort Claims Act claim, and this claim is dismissed with prejudice.
The facts are largely undisputed. On March 22, 2019, Mr. Jackson and Mr. Noble (collectively, "plaintiffs") filed a complaint against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671 – 2680 (Dkt. No. 1). Mr. Jackson seeks to recover $35,000 in damages, and Mr. Noble seeks to recover $250,000 (Id. , ¶¶ 16–17). The United States filed a motion for summary judgment, a brief in support thereof, and a statement of material facts (Dkt. Nos. 5, 6, 7). Plaintiffs filed a response (Dkt. No. 8), to which the United States filed a reply (Dkt. No. 9). The motion is ripe for review and, for the following reasons, the Court grants in part and denies in part as moot the motion.
Summary judgment is appropriate under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure only "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute is genuine only if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ; Miner v. Local 373 , 513 F.3d 854, 860 (8th Cir. 2008). "The mere existence of a factual dispute is insufficient alone to bar summary judgment; rather, the dispute must be outcome determinative under prevailing law." Holloway v. Pigman , 884 F.2d 365, 366 (8th Cir. 1989).
The party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ; Farver v. McCarthy , 931 F.3d 808, 811 (8th Cir. 2019). If the moving party carries its burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to establish the existence of a genuine issue for trial. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) ; Prudential Ins. Co. v. Hinkel , 121 F.3d 364, 366 (8th Cir. 1997). The non-movant " ‘must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,’ and must come forward with ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’ "
Torgerson v. City of Rochester , 643 F.3d 1031, 1042 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (quoting Matsushita , 475 U.S. at 586, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348 ). The court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in its favor. See Anderson , 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
The summary-judgment record, viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, is as follows. On March 23, 2016, plaintiffs were seriously injured in a motor-vehicle collision at an intersection in Little Rock, Arkansas (Dkt. No. 7-1, at 4). At the time of the accident, plaintiffs were passengers in a shuttle van owned and operated by the Department of Veterans Affairs ("VA") (Id. ). Mr. Jackson's counsel sent a letter to the VA, dated February 13, 2018, stating, in relevant part, that:
We represent Larry Jackson for personal injuries received in an automobile collision of March 23, 2016. It is our understanding that Mr. Jackson was received [sic] treatment for his injuries at the VA in North Little Rock. Please send our office a complete itemized statement for all services rendered to Mr. Jackson beginning on March 17, 2017 to present.
(Dkt. No. 8-1). Not having received a response, Mr. Jackson's counsel sent a second letter to the VA, dated May 16, 2018, explaining that:
(Dkt. No. 8-2). Mr. Jackson's counsel received the requested medical records from the VA in July 2018 (Dkt. No. 8-3).
Thereafter, Mr. Jackson filed an administrative complaint with the VA, which was received on August 17, 2018 (Dkt. No. 7-1, at 1,1 5–7). On September 20, 2018, the VA denied Mr. Jackson's administrative complaint, concluding that it was untimely because it was filed more than two years after the claim accrued (Id. , at 1, 10–11). Mr. Noble did not file an administrative complaint with the VA (Id. , at 1). Plaintiffs filed a complaint against the VA in this Court on March 22, 2019 (Dkt. No. 1).
Because Mr. Noble did not exhaust his administrative remedies, the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over his FTCA claim, and the claim must be dismissed without prejudice. Additionally, because Mr. Jackson's FTCA claim was not timely filed, and because Mr. Jackson has not offered an acceptable reason for failing to comply with the FTCA's statute of limitations, the United States is entitled to summary judgment on Mr. Jackson's FTCA claim.2
Neither party has challenged the Court's subject-matter jurisdiction. However, "[c]ourts have an independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even when no party challenges it." Hertz Corp. v. Friend , 559 U.S. 77, 94, 130 S.Ct. 1181, 175 L.Ed.2d 1029 (2010) ; see also Sanders v. Clemco Indus. , 823 F.2d 214, 216 (8th Cir. 1987) (). Because Mr. Noble did not file an administrative complaint with the VA based on the record evidence before the Court, his claim must be dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
"In 1946, Congress passed the FTCA, which waived the sovereign immunity of the United States for certain torts committed by federal employees." F.D.I.C. v. Meyer , 510 U.S. 471, 475, 114 S.Ct. 996, 127 L.Ed.2d 308 (1994) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) ). Section 2675(a) provides that "[a]n action shall not be instituted upon a claim against the United States ... unless the claimant shall have first presented the claim to the appropriate Federal agency and his claim shall have been finally denied by the agency in writing and sent by certified or registered mail." 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a)
The United States moves for summary judgment on Mr. Noble's FTCA claim, maintaining that "[a] motion to dismiss for failure to timely present an administrative tort claim is now proper as a challenge for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." (Dkt. No. 6, at 1).3 For support, the United States cites the Supreme Court's 2015 decision in United States v. Kwai Fun Wong , 575 U.S. 402, 135 S. Ct. 1625, 191 L.Ed.2d 533 (2015), in which the Court held that 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) ’s two-year and six-month limitations periods are non-jurisdictional and subject to equitable tolling. Kwai Fun Wong abrogated the Eighth Circuit's decision in T.L. ex rel. Ingram v. United States , 443 F.3d 956 (8th Cir. 2006), which treated the FTCA's statute of limitations as jurisdictional.
Kwai Fun Wong involved the two-year and six-month time limits in § 2401(b), not § 2675(a) ’s presentment requirement, which is at issue here. Importantly, Kwai Fun Wong , in this Court's view, says nothing to undermine the Supreme Court's earlier observation that "[t]he most natural reading of [ § 2675(a) ] indicates that Congress intended to require complete exhaustion of Executive remedies before invocation of the judicial process." McNeil v. United States , 508 U.S. 106, 112, 113 S.Ct. 1980, 124 L.Ed.2d 21 (1993). The McNeil Court went on to uphold the district court's dismissal of an unexhausted FTCA claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, reasoning that "[t]he FTCA bars claimants from bringing suit in federal court until they have exhausted their administrative remedies." Id. at 113, 113 S.Ct. 1980.
This Court's reading of Kwai Fun Wong is bolstered by the fact that the Eighth Circuit has consistently held that "[p]resentment of an administrative claim is jurisdictional and must be pleaded and proven by the FTCA claimant." Bellecourt v. United States , 994 F.2d 427, 430 (8th Cir. 1993) ; see also Mader v. United States , 654 F.3d 794, 805 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (); Melo v. United States , 505 F.2d 1026, 1030 (8th Cir. 1974) (); see also Penny v. Social Security Administration , No. 4:12-CV-00370-KGB, slip op. at 2–3 (E.D. Ark. Jan. 28, 2013) (). Indeed, approximately three...
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