Jackson v. United States
| Decision Date | 27 June 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. 17-CF-943,17-CF-943 |
| Citation | 210 A.3d 800 |
| Parties | Ronald J. JACKSON, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee. |
| Court | D.C. Court of Appeals |
Mindy A. Daniels for appellant.
Eric Hansford, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Jessie K. Liu, United States Attorney, and Elizabeth Trosman, Michael P. McCarthy, and Ryan Creighton, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on the brief, for appellee.
Before Fisher and Beckwith, Associate Judges, and Ferren, Senior Judge.
A jury found appellant Ronald Jackson guilty of assault with a dangerous weapon. The sole question before this court is whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence that appellant used PCP eighteen hours before the attack without any accompanying expert testimony enabling the jury to evaluate whether Jackson was under the influence of the drug at the time of the assault. We reverse and remand for a new trial.
Appellant Ronald Jackson and Desmon Beasley had been best friends for over forty years. In 2014, Jackson moved into Beasley's apartment. At that time, Beasley weighed over 600 pounds and, as a result, had limited mobility. Jackson paid Beasley a small amount in rent and assisted Beasley with daily activities.
By November 2015, the situation between Beasley and Jackson had changed, and Beasley wanted Jackson to move out. Beasley had lost a considerable amount of weight and was better able to move around. He began to pursue a romantic relationship with his friend, Erika Williams, and found it difficult to do so with Jackson in the apartment. Additionally, Beasley was frustrated by Jackson's inability to maintain a steady job and had difficulty supporting both himself and Jackson on his Social Security income.
Tensions between Jackson and Beasley came to a head on November 13, 2015. That morning, Beasley told Jackson to leave the apartment and offered him money for a Metro fare. Beasley heard Jackson leave, and then went back to sleep in the bedroom with Williams. Later that afternoon, Williams woke up and asked Beasley to escort her to the bathroom. From the hallway, Beasley saw Jackson sitting on the couch in the living room, shucking clams and eating ice cream.
According to the evidence at trial, Beasley approached Jackson and demanded multiple times that he leave the apartment. Jackson did not respond to Beasley and, instead, stared at the television with a blank face and glassy eyes. Beasley grew upset that Jackson was not responding to him. Although Beasley and Jackson had never physically fought during their forty-year friendship, Beasley struck Jackson hard on the head. During the ensuing scuffle, Jackson picked up the knife he was using to shuck clams and swung it at Beasley's face, striking him in the eye. By all accounts, the attack was out of character for Jackson, who is normally a peaceful person. The attack left Beasley blind in his left eye.
Prior to trial, the government moved in limine to admit evidence that Jackson used phencyclidine (PCP) on November 12, 2015, the night before the fight. The government contended that such evidence provided important context that would serve to explain Jackson's odd behavior, why Beasley wanted Jackson to leave the apartment, and why Beasley was in the living room when he was assaulted. Jackson opposed the motion, arguing that any evidence of PCP use was evidence of other crimes or bad acts which was unfairly prejudicial.
Judge Marisa Demeo ruled the evidence admissible. Citing cases which we discuss below, the court found that such testimony would provide context and serve to explain the witnesses' observations, beliefs, and behaviors. The court determined that there was a close temporal relationship between Jackson's use of PCP on November 12 and the attack the following afternoon.
After reviewing the proffered evidence, the court found that its probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The court denied the government's request to admit testimony of Jackson's use of PCP prior to November 12, 2015.
At trial, both Williams and Beasley testified that they smelled PCP in the apartment prior to the assault. Williams testified that at around 8:00 p.m. on November 12, while she was at the apartment, she saw Jackson smoke a cigarette which had a "plastic" odor, similar to embalming fluid. Over objection, Williams testified that the cigarette smelled like PCP, an odor she recognized from walking past individuals smoking it on the streets. Williams further testified that Jackson began acting strangely after smoking the cigarette. She described Jackson's movements as being "disconjointed" and "demonic." Williams stated that the apartment smelled like PCP the following morning as well. Beasley, who had used PCP in the past, corroborated this testimony, stating that he smelled the odor in the apartment on November 13. Williams testified that because she felt uncomfortable around PCP, and "wasn't sure what was going to happen," she asked Beasley to walk her to the bathroom. Despite the testimony from Williams and Beasley, Jackson denied using PCP on November 12 or 13, or smelling it in the apartment either day.
At trial, Jackson testified that he stabbed Beasley in self-defense. He said that Beasley struck him so hard on the head that he "lost a little ... understanding of what was going on." Jackson stated that as he lay "sideways" on the couch, he felt Beasley "pin[ ] down" his left arm. Then, Beasley put his entire body weight on Jackson. Jackson testified that while Beasley was pushing into him with his whole weight, he was struggling to get off the couch, but "couldn't breathe and ... was in fear for [his] life." To defend himself, Jackson grabbed the clam shucker which was "right at [his] reach" and swung it at Beasley. It is undisputed that Jackson called the police after the fight and stated that he stabbed Beasley in the eye, but did not mention anything about doing so in self-defense. A character witness testified that Jackson's "reputation was exceptional for being a very peaceful person."
Ultimately, the jury acquitted Jackson of aggravated assault while armed but convicted him of the lesser-included offense of assault with a dangerous weapon. This timely appeal followed sentencing.
As a general rule, evidence of another crime is "inadmissible to prove disposition to commit" the charged offense. Drew v. United States , 331 F.2d 85, 89 (D.C. Cir. 1964). However, we have long recognized a distinction between other crimes evidence that is used to suggest propensity and that which is relied upon to prove the charged offense. Johnson v. United States , 683 A.2d 1087, 1096-98 (D.C. 1996) (en banc). In Johnson , we discussed three instances in which such evidence falls into the latter category: "where [it]: (1) is direct and substantial proof of the charged crime, (2) is closely intertwined with the evidence of the charged crime, or (3) is necessary to place the charged crime in an understandable context." Id. at 1098.
In Toliver v. United States , 468 A.2d 958, 960-61 (D.C. 1983), we held that evidence of another crime "is admissible when relevant to explain the immediate circumstances surrounding the offense charged." Id. at 960. Such evidence serves to provide the jury with the necessary context of the charged offense and to "complete the story of [that] crime." Id. (citation omitted). Indeed, because of its nature, "this limited class of evidence is not other crimes evidence because it is too intimately entangled with the charged criminal conduct" and falls outside of Drew . Id. Regardless of whether such evidence is admissible under Drew or Toliver / Johnson , it is still subject to a balancing of its probative value and prejudicial effect. Johnson , 683 A.2d at 1098-99 (adopting Federal Rule of Evidence 403 ).
We agree with the government that testimony regarding Jackson's use of PCP qualifies as Toliver/Johnson evidence. It was not offered for the impermissible purpose of showing propensity to commit crime, see Drew , 331 F.2d at 89-90, but "to explain the immediate circumstances surrounding" the attack, see Toliver , 468 A.2d at 960. The evidence served to provide context for the crime itself, to explain Jackson's behavior, and to test his memories and perceptions of the fight. Id.
However, our inquiry into the admissibility of the PCP evidence does not end there. As with all evidence, this testimony is inadmissible if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See Johnson , 683 A.2d at 1098-99. A wide "variety of factors" are considered in this analysis, "including the need for the evidence, the efficacy of alternative proof, and the degree to which the evidence probably will rouse the jury to overmastering hostility." United States v. Morton , 50 A.3d 476, 482 (D.C. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). We recognize that this evaluation is "quintessentially a discretionary function of the trial court, and [is] owe[d] a great degree of deference." Malloy v. United States , 186 A.3d 802, 811 (D.C. 2018) (quoting Holmes v. United States , 143 A.3d 60, 63 (D.C. 2016) ). However, we cannot defer to the trial court's judgment in this instance. As appellant contends, and we discuss further below, without the testimony of an expert, the probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect.
As a threshold matter, government counsel asserted for the first time at oral argument that appellant failed to preserve this argument. Appellee therefore argues that we must review only for plain error. We disagree. At a pretrial hearing on the government's motion to admit the PCP evidence, appellant asserted multiple times that it was "speculative." Appella...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Jones v. United States
...federal test for the admission of expert testimony under Daubert / Federal Rule of Evidence Rule 702 ); see also Jackson v. United States , 210 A.3d 800, 805-06 (D.C. 2019) (assessing "whether the jurors are ‘just as competent as the expert to consider and weigh the evidence and draw the ne......
-
Jones v. United States
...federal test for the admission of expert testimony under Daubert/Federal Rule of Evidence Rule 702); see also Jackson v. United States, 210 A.3d 800, 805-06 (D.C. 2019) (assessing "whether the jurors are 'just as competent as the expert to consider and weigh the evidence and draw the necess......
- In re Ekekwe-Kauffman, 17-BG-860