Jackson v. United States
| Decision Date | 19 September 2022 |
| Docket Number | 22-cv-547 |
| Parties | VERNON LAMAR JACKSON, SR., Plaintiff, v. THE UNITED STATES, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. Claims Court |
Vernon Lamar Jackson, Sr., Louisville, Kentucky, Plaintiff appearing pro se.
Miles K. Karson, United States Department of Justice, Washington D.C., appearing for Defendant.
ELENI M. ROUMEL JUDGE.
On May 13, 2022, Plaintiff Vernon Lamar Jackson, Sr., appearing pro se, filed a Complaint in this Court. See Complaint (ECF No. 1) (Compl.). Plaintiff's Complaint is the latest in a series of proceedings relating to the investigation and conviction of former Louisiana Congressman William J. Jefferson. See United States v Jefferson, 674 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 2012) (Jefferson I). In 2009, Jefferson was convicted for bribery and conspiracy, among other federal offenses. Id. at 334. Plaintiff was implicated in one of Jefferson's schemes and eventually pleaded guilty to bribing and conspiring to bribe Jefferson. See United States v Jackson, 371 F.Supp.3d 257 (E.D. Va. 2019). Thereafter, the Supreme Court decided McDonnell v. United States, 579 U.S. 550 (2016), which effectively narrowed the definition of an "official act" under federal bribery law. 579 U.S. 550, 575 (2016). After McDonnell, the acts upon which Plaintiff was convicted were no longer considered "official acts" under the Supreme Court's interpretation and were therefore not criminal. Jackson, 371 F.Supp.3d at 268-69. Subsequently, Plaintiff successfully petitioned the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia for a writ of coram nobis to vacate his convictions. Id. at 262.
Plaintiff seeks redress in this Court for Defendant United States' allegedly improper and unlawful conduct in investigating and prosecuting Plaintiff. Plaintiff's Complaint alleges several of causes of action, including civil conspiracy/collusion, misrepresentation/concealment, fraud, detrimental reliance, violations of Plaintiff's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights, and unjust conviction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1495 and 2513. Compl. at 30-50.[1]
Two motions are pending before this Court. The first is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims (Rule(s) or RCFC). See Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 7) (Mot.). Defendant argues this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims. Mot. at 1. The second is Plaintiff's Motion to Change Venue. See Plaintiff's Motion to Change Venue (ECF No. 10) (Transfer Mot.). Plaintiff "seek[s] [a] change of venue and transfer [to the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky] pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1402, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a)." Transfer Mot. at 1, 3. Plaintiff states he "found Federal Statues [sic] that support the federal court judges' ability to transfer cases with jurisdictional defects to the proper venue/jurisdiction, rather than dismissing them." Id. at 3. While Plaintiff does not cite the specific statute, this Court interprets Plaintiff's motion as a request to transfer his case to the Western District of Kentucky pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631. See also Transcript of Hearing Regarding Plaintiff's Motion to Change Venue (ECF No. 12) (Tr.) at 4:15-20 (); see also Pleasant-Bey v. United States, 99 Fed.Cl. 363, 368 (2011) ().
The Court agrees that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's Complaint. However, the Court determines it is in the interest of justice to transfer this action in part to the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky. For the reasons discussed in greater detail below, Plaintiff's Motion to Change Venue (ECF No. 10) is GRANTED in part. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 7) is GRANTED in part pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(h)(3) and is DENIED in part as MOOT.
According to the Complaint[2], Plaintiff "is currently the Founder, Chairman and CEO of SmartCopper Broadband, Inc., a new company launched for the purpose of re-introducing 'Highspeed Broadband Internet Access Services over copper telephone lines into the telecommunications marketplace.'" Compl. at 1-2. Plaintiff was previously the "Founder, Chairman, and CEO of iGate, Inc., a broadband innovation company." Id. at 2. Plaintiff "has more than 50 years' experience in telecommunications technology design and implementation;" Plaintiff was previously employed by AT&T and the Regional Bell Operating Companies. Id. Plaintiff claims he was "awarded" two U.S. patents relating to his expertise in telecommunications technology.[3] Id. at 2-3.
In 2000, when Plaintiff was CEO of iGate, he established a professional relationship with Congressman William J. Jefferson. United States v. Jefferson, 289 F.Supp.3d 717, 722 (E.D. Va. 2017) (Jefferson II). Plaintiff initially solicited Jefferson's support in selling iGate's technology to the U.S. Army. Id. "[I]mpressed by Jefferson's efforts on his behalf," Plaintiff agreed to hire Jefferson's family consulting firm, ANJ, "to assist with marketing iGate products." Id.; see also Compl. at 5. iGate agreed to pay ANJ $90,000 per year, as well as iGate shares and bonuses. Jefferson II at 722. While ANJ was ostensibly run by Jefferson's wife and daughter, Plaintiff soon realized "he was paying Jefferson to promote iGate technology to customers, including the Army." Id.
Plaintiff's and Jefferson's sights shifted to Africa. Jefferson II at 722. Jefferson traveled to West Africa - Nigeria in particular - to promote iGate's technology to "high-ranking foreign officials." Jefferson I at 343. Jefferson contacted a Nigerian company called NDTV and brokered an agreement between iGate and NDTV in which NDTV agreed to pay iGate approximately $44 million, including a $6.5 million down payment, for iGate's technology. Id. at 343; see also Compl. at 5 ("iGate signed a Business Agreement and Distribution Contract with a Nigerian company named NDTV."). After the iGate-NDTV deal, iGate increased its payments to ANJ "from five to thirty-five percent of iGate's profits." Jefferson I at 343. In late 2003 and early 2004, "ANJ collected more than $230,000 in fees from iGate to compensate Jefferson for his efforts in promoting iGate." Id.
The iGate-NDTV agreement unraveled in 2004. Id. at 344; see also Compl. at 6 (). Jefferson then brought in a Virginia businesswoman, Lori Mody, to invest in iGate's West African ventures. Compl. at 6; see also Jefferson I at 344. Jefferson began promoting the new iGate-Mody partnership, for which he was compensated by both iGate and Mody. Jefferson I at 344-45; see also Compl. at 6-8.
Eventually, the iGate-Mody partnership faltered. Jefferson I at 345. Mody, "concerned that Jefferson was engaged in criminal activity," Jefferson II at 723, approached the FBI and "began to cooperate with the FBI and the Department of Justice" in their investigation into Jefferson. Jefferson I at 345. According to Plaintiff's Complaint, in the summer of 2005 the FBI raided and searched Plaintiff's home. Compl. at 10-11; see also Jefferson I at 346. Soon after, the United States Attorney's Office in the Eastern District of Virginia notified Plaintiff that he was the subject of a federal criminal investigation relating to Jefferson and offered a "'pre-indictment' plea." Compl. at 11. Plaintiff was represented by a public defender. Id. at 12. Plaintiff contends that despite his desire to avoid pleading guilty, the U.S. attorney and Plaintiff's defense counsel encouraged Plaintiff to "negotiate a plea deal with the AUSA." Id. Plaintiff pleaded guilty "to bribing and conspiring to bribe [Jefferson] to perform 'official acts' for the benefit of" iGate, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (conspiracy) and 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(1)(A) (bribery). United States v. Jackson, 371 F.Supp.3d 257, 262 (E.D. Va. 2019); see also Compl. at 13-15. Plaintiff was initially sentenced to 60 months and 87 months of incarceration for conspiracy and bribery, respectively, to be served concurrently. See Jackson, 371 F.Supp.3d at 262; see also Compl. at 14. Jefferson, for his part, was eventually convicted of several crimes, including bribery, and sentenced to 13 years in prison. See Jefferson II at 721, 727. In recognition of Plaintiff's assistance testifying at Jefferson's trial, Plaintiff's sentence was reduced to 40 months of imprisonment. See Jackson, 371 F.Supp.3d at 262; see also Compl. at 15. Plaintiff was released from prison in 2010. Compl. at 15.
Six years after Plaintiff's release from incarceration, the Supreme Court issued a decision that "altered the legal landscape with respect to the principal element of bribery-the 'official act.'" Jefferson II at 721. In McDonnell v. United States, the Supreme Court held that the definition of an "official act" only encompassed acts involving "a formal exercise of governmental power that is similar in nature to a lawsuit before a court, a determination before an agency, or a hearing before a committee." 579 U.S. 550, 574 (2016). The Court held that everyday conduct like "[s]etting up a meeting, talking to another official, or organizing an event" is not an "official act" under the federal bribery statute. Id.
In light of McDonnell, Jefferson petitioned for habeas corpus in 2017, arguing the acts for which he was convicted...
To continue reading
Request your trial