Jackson v. University of New Haven

• Decision Date: 30 October 2002
• Docket Number: No. CIV.A.3:00CV297(CFD).,CIV.A.3:00CV297(CFD).
• Citation: 228 F.Supp.2d 156
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
• Parties: James C. JACKSON, Plaintiff, v. UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAVEN, Deborah Chin Defendants.

228 F.Supp.2d 156

James C. JACKSON, Plaintiff, v. UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAVEN, Deborah Chin Defendants.

No. CIV.A.3:00CV297(CFD).

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

October 30, 2002.

Philip H. Schnabel, Hartford, CT, Michael H. Sussman, Stephen Bergstein, Christopher D. Watkins, Goshen, NY, for Plaintiff.

Peter J. Lefeber, Alisa T. Rulnick, Wiggin & Dana, New Haven, CT, Stephen B. Harris, Lori Rittman Clark, Wiggin & Dana, Hartford, CT, for Defendants.

RULING ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

DRONEY, District Judge.

I. Introduction

James C. Jackson ("Jackson") brought this action against the University of New Haven ("UNH") and Deborah Chin, the Athletic Director of UNH, alleging racial discrimination in hiring in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (Title VI), and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (Title VII).¹ Jackson seeks damages as well as equitable relief, costs, and attorney's fees. Pending before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. # 14]. For the following reasons, the motion is GRANTED.

II. Facts

In February 1999 the head football coach at the University of New Haven ("UNH") left to take a position with the Cleveland Browns of the National Football League. This dispute arises out of the ensuing search for a new head coach at UNH.

Beginning in early February of 1999, UNH posted the head coach position both internally and with the "NCAA market," an online professional publication for university and college athletics. The postings for the head coaching position listed the following requirements:

A bachelors degree is required, master's degree preferred. Successful collegiate coaching experience required. Experience in recruiting, game coaching and knowledge of NCAA rules and regulations is essential.

Def. Local R. 9(c)1 statement ¶ 6 (emphasis added). Further, the duties were listed as follows:

Implement and manage all aspects of a national caliber Division II football program in accordance with NCAA and university regulations. Areas of responsibility include, but are not limited to coaching, recruiting qualified student athletes, budget management, scheduling, hiring and supervising coaching staff, academically monitoring student-athletes, and promotions and fund-raising.

Def. Local R. 9(c)1 statement. ¶ 7.

After receiving 36 applications, UNH's Search Committee, which had been established to select a new head coach, decided to interview six applicants-all of whom had college coaching experience and are Caucasian. Jackson, an African-American, was not among the six applicants interviewed. Jackson had no college experience, but had been a professional minor league football coach, earned several "coach of the year" honors as such a coach, and was inducted into the minor league football hall of fame. The defendants assert that they decided not to interview Jackson because he lacked the requisite collegiate coaching experience. From the six applicants interviewed, the Search Committee ultimately selected Darren Rizzi, who had been an assistant coach at UNH for four years, to fill the position of head coach.

At the heart of this dispute lies the "collegiate coaching experience" requirement. The parties are in agreement that the posted job qualifications included that requirement and that all of the applicants selected for interviews possessed such experience. However, the parties differ markedly in their characterizations of that prior experience requirement. The defendants maintain that prior NCAA² coaching experience was essential to ensure the selection of a candidate sufficiently well-versed in NCAA rules and regulations to both pass the NCAA's annual tests on such regulations and manage the UNH football team successfully. Jackson, however, asserts that the requirement of previous collegiate coaching experience was not necessary to ensure familiarity with NCAA rules and regulations and that it served to exclude otherwise qualified minority applicants, such as himself.

Jackson asserts that the requirement that applicants have prior college coaching experience amounts to discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (Title VI), and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (Title VII).³ Jackson asserts all three of these statutory causes of action against defendant UNH. However, only the § 1981 claim is asserted against defendant Chin.⁴

Jackson appears to base his complaint on both the "disparate treatment" and "disparate impact" theories of recovery in that he alleges both that the challenged qualification had a discriminatory effect upon African Americans (disparate impact) and that the defendants intentionally discriminated against him based on his race (disparate treatment).

III. Summary Judgment Standard

In a summary judgment motion, the burden is on the moving party to establish that there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A court must grant summary judgment "`if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact.'" Miner v. City of Glens Falls, 999 F.2d 655, 661 (2d Cir.1993) (citation omitted). A dispute regarding a material fact is genuine "`if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.'" Aldrich v. Randolph Cent. Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 520, 523 (2d Cir.1992) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505). After discovery, if the non-moving party "has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of [its] case with respect to which [it] has the burden of proof," then summary judgment is appropriate. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

The Court resolves "all ambiguities and draw[s] all inferences in favor of the non-moving party in order to determine how a reasonable jury would decide." Aldrich, 963 F.2d at 523. Thus, "[o]nly when reasonable minds could not differ as to the import of the evidence is summary judgment proper." Bryant v. Maffucci, 923 F.2d 979, 982 (2d Cir.1991); see also Suburban Propane v. Proctor Gas, Inc., 953 F.2d 780, 788 (2d Cir.1992).

Finally, the Second Circuit has declared that a "trial court must be especially cautious in deciding whether to grant [summary judgment] in a discrimination case, because the employer's intent is often at issue and careful scrutiny may reveal circumstantial evidence supporting an inference of discrimination." Belfi v. Prendergast, 191 F.3d 129, 135 (2d Cir.1999) (citing Chertkova v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 92 F.3d 81, 87 (2d Cir.1996) and Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., Ltd. Partnership, 22 F.3d 1219, 1224 (2d Cir. 1994)). See also Schwapp v. Town of Avon, 118 F.3d 106, 110 (2d Cir.1997)("Because direct evidence of an employer's discriminatory intent will rarely be found, affidavits and depositions must be carefully scrutinized for circumstantial proof which, if believed, would show discrimination.") (citations and internal quotations marks omitted). Nevertheless, even when intent is at issue, "a plaintiff must provide more than conclusory allegations of discrimination to defeat a motion for summary judgment." Id.

IV. Analysis

A. Disparate Treatment Claim

As mentioned, Jackson alleges that he has been discriminated against in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 2000d (Title VI), and 2000e-5 (Title VII). To the extent that he claims that he has been discriminated against intentionally, the U.S. Supreme Court has developed a "burden shifting framework" for claims brought under Title VII alleging "disparate treatment." McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Courts have subsequently applied the same burden-shifting framework articulated in McDonnell Douglas to disparate treatment claims arising under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 2000d (Title VI). See Hudson v. International Business Machines Corp., 620 F.2d 351, 354 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied 449 U.S. 1066, 101 S.Ct 794, 66 L.Ed.2d 611 (1980) (holding that McDonnell Douglas's burden-shifting framework applies to § 1981 claims of race discrimination). See Fuller v. Rayburn, 161 F.3d 516, 518 (8th Cir.1998) (applying McDonnell Douglas analysis to disparate treatment claims under Title VI); McKie v. New York University, No. 94 Civ. 8610(LMM), 2000 WL 1521200, at *3 fn. 1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.13, 2000)(same). Thus, because the test is the same under each of the three statutes, this Court will apply the same McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework to the plaintiff's disparate treatment claim.

Under the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff alleging disparate treatment based on race and national origin must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817.⁵ The burden then shifts to the defendant to offer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory rationale for its actions. See James v. New York Racing Ass'n, 233 F.3d 149, 154 (2d Cir.2000). Finally, if the defendant does offer a non-discriminatory reason for its decision, the burden again shifts to the plaintiff to show that the defendant's stated reason is a mere pretext for discrimination. See Id. (citing St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506-10, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993)). In some circumstances, under Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105, (2000), after the plaintiff offers evidence to show that the defendant's asserted non-discriminatory reason for the hiring is pretextual, the evidence that established the prima facie case will be sufficient to survive a summary judgment motion. 530 U.S. at 148, 120 S.Ct. 2097 ("a plaintiff's prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to...