Jackson v. US, 99-CM-575.
Decision Date | 27 March 2003 |
Docket Number | No. 99-CM-575.,99-CM-575. |
Citation | 819 A.2d 963 |
Parties | Ronald S. JACKSON, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee. |
Court | D.C. Court of Appeals |
Lauckland A. Nicholas for appellant.
David B. Goodhand, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Roscoe C. Howard, Jr., United States Attorney, and John R. Fisher, Roy W. McLeese III, and Kimberley S. Knowles, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on the brief, for appellee.
Before SCHWELB and WASHINGTON, Associate Judges, and FERREN, Senior Judge.
The questions presented in this case are: (1) whether a co-owner of property can be found guilty of malicious destruction of that property and (2) if yes, whether there was sufficient evidence presented in this case to find appellant guilty of destruction of property. While this court has not previously ruled on the first issue, we now hold that a co-owner of property may be found criminally liable for the destruction of that property. We also find that there was sufficient evidence presented in this case to convict appellant.
Appellant, Ronald Jackson, became a co-owner of a house located in Washington, D.C. when his wife, Mrs. Jackson, added his name to the deed of her house. Subsequently, in January 1998, the couple became estranged and appellant moved out. However, Mrs. Jackson continued to live in the house. On June 13, 1998, Mr. Jackson called his wife and stated he wanted to stop by the house to pick up a pair of sunglasses he had left. Although Mrs. Jackson informed appellant that he could not retrieve the sunglasses at that time, appellant nevertheless came to the house. Upon seeing him, Mrs. Jackson went inside and locked the door. However, appellant gained entry into the house by applying force to the locked door.1
After a bench trial, appellant was found guilty of malicious destruction of property, D.C.Code § 22-303 (2002), for damaging the front door of the house that appellant and Mrs. Jackson co-owned. The statute makes it a crime to "maliciously injure or break or destroy or attempt to injure or break or destroy, by fire or otherwise, any public or private property, whether real or personal, not his or her own . . . ." Appellant appeals his conviction because he interprets the phrase "not his or her own" as precluding the prosecution of anyone with any ownership rights, either full or partial, in the damaged property.
"[T]he construction of a statute raises a `clear question of law,' and we review the trial court's ruling de novo." Ashton Gen. P'ship. v. Federal Data Corp., 682 A.2d 629, 632 (D.C.1996) (citing District of Columbia v. Morrissey, 668 A.2d 792, 796 (D.C.1995)). "The primary and general rule of statutory construction is that the intent of the lawmaker is to be found in the language that he has used." Varela v. Hi-Lo Powered Stirrups, Inc., 424 A.2d 61, 64 (D.C.1980) (quoting United States v. Goldenberg, 168 U.S. 95, 102-03, 18 S.Ct. 3, 42 L.Ed. 394 (1897)).
The parties contend, and we agree, that the phrase "not his or her own" is ambiguous because it could either refer to property that is fully owned by an individual or property that is at least partially owned. Thus, we must look beyond the plain language of the statute to determine whether the legislature intended for the statute to apply to individuals who have an ownership interest in the damaged property. Typically, we would look next to the legislative history of the Act to help us interpret the intent of the legislature. Unfortunately, the legislative history of the Act provides no assistance in interpreting the language "not his or her own." Given the ambiguity of the language and the lack of any helpful legislative history, we have looked to other jurisdictions with similar statutes to determine whether their interpretations provide any guidance on how to interpret the phrase "not his or her own." In People v. Kahanic, 196 Cal.App.3d 461, 241 Cal.Rptr. 722 (1987), a defendant damaged property that she co-owned with her husband and was charged with vandalism. Under the relevant California statute, a person is guilty of vandalism "who maliciously (1) defaces with paint or any other liquid, (2) damages or (3) destroys any real or personal property not his or her own, in cases otherwise than those specified by state law." Id. at 723 (emphasis added). As in this case, the defendant argued that the statute did not apply to her because the property was her own. The California Court of Appeals, however, rejected this argument, holding that the statute was, in fact, applicable to her because "not his or her own" referred to sole ownership and, therefore, excluded "criminality only when the actor-defendant is involved with property wholly his or her own." Kahanic, 241 Cal.Rptr. at 725 (emphasis added). This interpretation by the California Court of Appeals is not without academic support as commentators have also interpreted the phrase "not his or her own" as meaning sole ownership. See 4 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW (14th ed.1981) (Malicious Mischief, § 490 p. 96, fns. omitted). In fact, to interpret such statutes as not protecting individuals with partial ownership rights would be inconsistent with the general purpose of such a statute. See 54 C.J.S. Malicious or Criminal Mischief § 2 (1987) ( ). While we have been unable to find any other jurisdictions with a statute substantially similar to our own, it is interesting to note that courts throughout the country have almost universally held that a defendant may be found criminally liable for damaging property he or she co-owns. See State v. Superior Court, 188 Ariz. 372, 936 P.2d 558, 559 (Ct.App.1997) ( ); People v. Jones, 145 Ill.App.3d 835, 99 Ill.Dec. 636, 495 N.E.2d 1371, 1372 (1986) ( ); State v. Zeien, 505 N.W.2d 498, 498-99 (Iowa 1993) ( ); State v. Mayhood, 308 Minn. 259, 241 N.W.2d 803, 804-05 (1976); New York v. Brown, 185 Misc.2d 326, 711 N.Y.S.2d 707, 713 (N.Y.Crim.Ct.2000) ( ); State v. Webb, 64 Wash.App. 480, 824 P.2d 1257, 1263 (1992) ( ).
In contrast to the significant number of jurisdictions that have looked at this issue and decided that joint owners of property may be prosecuted for destruction of their jointly owned property, appellant relies almost entirely on one case, New York v. Person, 239 A.D.2d 612, 658 N.Y.S.2d 372 (1997), as support for his contention that one cannot be prosecuted for such an act. In Person, the court held that a defendant cannot be convicted of criminal mischief and petit larceny because "the defendant had an equitable interest in the items he was charged with damaging or stealing." Id. at 373 (citations omitted). While this case appears to support appellant's position, it also appears to be an anomaly and has been widely criticized, even in New York. See Brown, 711 N.Y.S.2d at 713 ) ; see also State v. Coria, 146 Wash.2d 631, 48 P.3d 980, 984 (2002). In the absence of any legislative history to the...
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