Jackson v. Warden, Chillicothe Corr. Inst.

Decision Date27 March 2023
Docket Number2:20-cv-3934
PartiesKAREEM JACKSON, Petitioner, v. WARDEN, Chillicothe Correctional Institute, Respondent.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio

KIMBERLY A. JOLSON, MAGISTRATE JUDGE

OPINION AND ORDER

ALGENON L. MARBLEY, CHIEF JUDGE

Petitioner Jackson, a prisoner sentenced to death by the State of Ohio has filed, with authorization by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, a successive habeas corpus petition. This matter is before the Court for consideration of Jackson's Motion to Request Evidentiary Hearing (ECF No. 35) and Motion for Leave to Supplement Doc. 29, Habeas Rule 7 Supplement to the Record (ECF No. 36). Also before the Court are the Respondent-Warden's Memoranda in Opposition (ECF Nos. 37 and 38) and Jackson's Replies (ECF Nos. 39 and 40). Because the Court is satisfied that Jackson has both demonstrated that this Court should exercise its discretion to hold an evidentiary hearing and satisfied the standards for expansion of the record, both motions are GRANTED.

I. OVERVIEW

As the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit remarked in its decision authorizing the instant successive petition, this is not Jackson's second federal habeas petition, but his fourth.[1] In re Jackson, 12 F.4th 604, 611 (6th Cir. 2021); ECF No. 12, at PageID 197. Jackson raises the following three claims for relief:

First Claim for Relief: Petitioner's sentence is void or voidable because material, exculpatory evidence was withheld from him in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
Second Claim for Relief: Petitioner's sentence is void or voidable because his rights to Due Process and a fair trial were violated by the false and coerced testimony of Ivana King in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959).
Third Claim for Relief: Ohio's successor post-conviction statute, O.R.C. § 2953.23(A)(1)(b), as applied, violates the Supremacy Clause because it mandates a post-conviction petitioner must satisfy an additional, higher, standard of proof than this Court's constitutional precedent requires in order to obtain postconviction review, effectively raising the standard of proof necessary to win relief.

(Petition, ECF No. 1-2, at PageID 36, 38.)

The Sixth Circuit determined that Jackson had satisfied the statutory prima facie showing for filing a successive petition-namely that Jackson had presented sufficient allegations of fact together with some documentation that would warrant fuller exploration in the district court. At issue with respect to Jackson's Brady claim, as framed by the Sixth Circuit, is that police suppressed (1) “evidence that Rebecca Lewis, who was a key witness at trial, had initially described the suspect who had hit her in the head with a gun in a way that did not match Jackson, but did match a shorter alternative suspect, ‘Little Bee;' and (2) “a statement from a neighbor support[ing] the inference that Little Bee committed the murders.” In re Jackson, 12 4.th at 609; ECF No. 12, at PageID 194. As for the Napue claim, Sixth Circuit noted that Ivana King provided Jackson's counsel with a declaration that law enforcement had intimidated her into falsely testifying that Jackson had confessed to the murders.” Id.; Page ID 195. The issues presently before this Court are not the merits of Jackson's claims, or even whether he can satisfy the gateway showing for successive claims set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b), but: (1) whether the Court should exercise its discretion to hold an evidentiary hearing; and (2) whether Jackson has satisfied the standard for supplementing the record with an affidavit in support of the search warrant of Jackson's person.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Evidentiary Hearings

Evidentiary hearings are primarily addressed in 28 U.S.C. 2254(e)(2).[2] Section 2254(e)(2) states in relevant part that a court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on any claim that the petitioner failed to develop in state court proceedings unless the factual predicate could not have been previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence and the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the petitioner guilty of the underlying offense. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2); see also Cunningham v. Shoop, 23 F.4th 636, 64950 (6th Cir. 2022) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2), and Michael Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 437 (2000)).

In Clark v. Warden, 934 F.3d 483, 491 n.2 (6th Cir. 2019), the Sixth Circuit observed that the standard for holding a hearing set forth in § 2254(e)(2) is similar to the standard for authorizing a successive petition set forth in § 2244(b)(2). But the Sixth Circuit in Clark also noted that the “heightened standard” for holding a hearing set forth in § 2254(e)(2) “applies only if the petitioner failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court proceedings,” and that [a] petitioner has not ‘failed' to develop the record in the manner contemplated by this subsection where he was unable to develop his claim in state court despite diligent effort.” Id. (quoting Michael Williams, 529 U.S. at 437) (cleaned up). Clark is particularly instructive because it involved the decision of whether to hold an evidentiary hearing not in connection with an initial habeas corpus petition, but with a successive habeas corpus petition.

B. Motions to Supplement

Rule 7 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases permits federal district courts to direct the record to be supplemented with materials relevant to the Court's resolution of the petition. Thus, under the language of the rule, expansion has only a relevancy limitation. That is, the materials need only be relevant to the determination of the merits of the constitutional claims in order to be added. Loza v. Mitchell, Case No. 1:98-cv-287, 2002 WL 31409881, *1 (S.D. Ohio Jul. 17, 2002). Under Fed.R.Evid. 401, evidence is relevant if it has a tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Further, expansion of the record is within the discretion of the judge. Ford v. Seabold, 841 F.2d 677, 691 (6th Cir. 1988).

III. MOTION FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING
A. Factual Context

In the late evening of March 24, 1997, four young men, driven by a young woman, set out to steal drugs and money from an apartment on Lupo Court, from which two other young men were known to sell drugs. The perpetrators and their driver were Derrick Boone/“Red,” Michael Patterson, “Little Bee,” Petitioner herein Kareem Jackson, and Malaika Williamson (the driver). Due to inconsistent police statements and testimony, it remains unclear who planned the robbery. However, it appears to have been Little Bee who knew the occupants of the targeted apartment, Antorio Hunter and Terrance Walker. (Boone testimony, ECF No. 15-2, at PageID 2065-66.) It also appears that Jackson was how the other four perpetrators had come to know each other. Jackson and Little Bee were the first to enter the apartment, ostensibly to purchase drugs, but all four men at various times also entered the apartment after that initial entry/drug purchase by Jackson and Little Bee. In connection with the robbery, shortly after midnight on March 25, 1997, Hunter and Walker were both killed by a single gunshot (from a handgun) to the backs of their heads while they were lying or kneeling down. The identity of the shooter was always the primary question. Boone, Patterson, and Williamson struck plea deals with the prosecution. Boone and Williamson testified at Jackson's trial; Boone identified Jackson as the sole shooter and Williamson linked Jackson to the handgun determined to be the murder weapon. Little Bee was never apprehended or ever even identified by any other name than Little Bee (although Boone testified he thought Little Bee's name was Brian (Boone testimony, ECF No. 15-2, at PageID 2111)).

Rebecca Lewis and Nikki Long were with Hunter and Walker in the apartment when Jackson and Little Bee, and eventually all four men, entered the apartment. Lewis was struck on the head with a “little gun” by a man she identified from a photo array and at trial as Jackson. Both women were in the kitchen when Hunter and Walker were shot in the living room, and did not witness the shootings. Long was able to give police enough of a description of Boone/Red for the police to construct and distribute a sketch-a sketch so accurate that Boone immediately turned himself in and implicated the others in the robbery and shootings. Patterson and Williamson followed suit in eventually cooperating with police striking plea deals with the prosecution. Only Williamson and Boone testified at Jackson's trial.[3]

Williamson testified in relevant part that on the evening of the murders, when she drove the four perpetrators to the Lupo Court apartment, it was Jackson who had given her directions as to where to drive and who had told her, as had been relayed to him by someone else, that they were planning to rob the apartment for drugs and money. She also testified that Jackson and Little Bee had handguns that evening, while Boone and Patterson each took a long gun from the trunk once they arrived at the Lupo Court apartment. She testified that Jackson and Little Bee went into the apartment first followed almost immediately by Boone and Patterson. According to Williamson, Little Bee came back out and sat in the car, then went back toward the apartment, which is...

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