Jackson v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc.
| Docket Number | 3:20-cv-00900-DWD |
| Decision Date | 24 August 2022 |
| Parties | YOLANDA JACKSON, Plaintiff, v. WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, INC., EVA LEVEN, MOHAMMED SIDDIQUI, GAIL WALLS, NICKOLAS MITCHELL, CHARLIE FRERKING, JEREMY FRERICH, and ANDREW BENNETT, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Illinois |
Before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion for Entry of a HIPAA-Qualified Protective Order (“Motion”) (Doc 86) under § 164.512(e) of the Code of Federal Regulations. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e). Defendants contest that Motion in a Joint Response (Doc. 90). The Court, consistent with this Memorandum and Order and the directives outlined below, GRANTS the Motion and ADOPTS the Proposed HIPAA-Qualified Protective Order.
Decedent Kevin Curtis, died while incarcerated at Menard Correctional Center. (Doc. 1, ¶ 1). Shortly before his death Decedent allegedly received inadequate medical care from Defendants after he fell into a catatonic and unresponsive state. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 2630). Plaintiff, as the mother and administrator of Decedent's estate, filed a 6-count Complaint against Defendants for violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1, generally). Plaintiff alleged, inter alia, Defendants caused Decedent's injuries and death by engaging in a widespread practice of providing inadequate medical care. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 56-61).
The Court previously entered a HIPAA-Qualified Protective Order (Doc. 41) for records produced by a covered entity under 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 pursuant to a request to produce or subpoena of protected health information (“PHI”). (Doc. 41, ¶ 2). The HIPAA-Qualified Protective Order extends only to PHI documenting Decedent's physical and mental condition and receipt of medical care, including information related to sexually transmitted diseases, from January 1, 2012, to September 5, 2018. (Doc. 41, ¶ 4). That HIPAA-Qualified Protective Order requires a separate protective order and authorization from the Court for disclosures of any other medical records. (Doc. 41, ¶ 5).
Now, Plaintiff seeks to modify and extend the previously entered HIPAA-Qualified Protective Order to third party PHI, namely, the PHI of other prisoners in Defendants' care. Plaintiff argues a modification and extension is necessary to discover how those prisoners, not just Decedent, were treated by Defendants. Plaintiff reasons, consistent with Monell v. Department of Social Services and Seventh Circuit precedent, she is required to prove separate incidents of Defendants' widespread practice of providing inadequate medical care. See 46 U.S. 658 (1978). Plaintiff argues Defendants, absent a modified HIPAA-Qualified Protective Order extending to third parties, have refused to provide such information in discovery. Plaintiff presents a Proposed HIPAA-Qualified Protective Order (“Proposed Order”) in the event that the Court grants the Motion.
In their Joint Response, Defendants argue any nonparty PHI disclosed in this case would be protected by the existing HIPAA-Qualified Protective Order (Doc. 41). As such, Defendants suggest the Motion is actually a motion to compel that improperly seeks a discovery order and avoids addressing their objections to Plaintiff's requests under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 34. Defendants also argue Plaintiff's Proposed Order is facially vague, overbroad, and confusing, as it does not expressly authorize the scope of disclosures, relating to third parties, that are sought by Plaintiff. Defendants purportedly explained to Plaintiff that they do not intend to produce the PHI of any individual other than Decedent due to their objections to Plaintiff's Rule 34 requests, which concern more than mere HIPAA protections. Defendants also submit that the parties have not agreed to the scope of discovery.
In a Reply in Support of the Motion (Doc. 93), Plaintiff emphasizes that, contrary to the representations of Defendants, the Motion only seeks to make the disclosure of third-party PHI lawful. Plaintiff also points out that, despite Defendants' assertions, the current HIPAA-Qualified Protective Order is expressly limited to the PHI of Decedent, as requested by the parties at the time of its entry, and does not extend to third-party PHI. See (Doc. 29, ¶ 5). Further, Plaintiff clarifies that she is not seeking to compel any documents from Defendants or definitively decide the scope of discovery into third-party medical records. Plaintiff posits that she is requesting a modified HIPAA-Qualified Protective Order as a necessary condition for the exchange of discovery that includes third-party medical information. In other words, Plaintiff seeks to make such discovery possible by ensuring the PHI of third parties remains confidential, is used only for purposes of the present litigation, and is kept only until the conclusion of this case.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not distinguish between public and private information. See Reed v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., No. 20-1139, 2021 WL 5578076, *2 (S.D. Ill. Oct. 19, 2021) (citing Seattle Times Co. v Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 35-36 (1984)). Similarly, the Rules do not apply only to the parties in litigation, as third parties may have relevant information subject to discovery. Id. (quoting Rhinehart, 467 U.S. at 35). This is true in cases presenting Monell claims, where third-party medical information is generally discoverable. See id. District courts “ ‘have routinely recognized that such claims often require a broad and substantial amount of discovery that would not be involved if the plaintiff sued only the individuals directly involved in the deprivation of” rights.' [Citation omitted].” Id.; accord Arsberry v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., No. 1750044, 2021 WL 5232733, *6 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 10, 2021). This is because a plaintiff must show an official policy, widespread custom or practice, or action by a final policy-maker was the “moving force” behind the constitutional injury. Dixon v. Cty of Cook, 819 F.3d 343, 348 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 379 (1989)); accord Dean v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 18 F.4th 214, 235 (7th Cir. 2021). Customs and practices must be so pervasive that acquiescence by final policymakers is apparent and amounted to a policy decision. Dixon, 819 F.3d at 348 (quoting Phelan v. Cook Cty, 463 F.3d 773, 790 (7th Cir. 2006)); accord Hildreth v. Butler, 960 F.3d 420, 426 (7th Cir. 2020). This requires proof that “systemic and gross deficiencies” impacted others and not just the person for whom the claim was brought. See Dixon, 819 F.3d at 343; Reed, No. 20-1139, 2021 WL 5578076, *2; accord Daniel v. Cook Cty, 833 F.3d 728, 734-35 (7th Cir. 2016); Hildreth, 960 F.3d at 426. The final policymaker must also know about and fail to correct the deficiencies. Dixon, 819 F.3d at 348 (citing Wellman v. Faulkner, 715 F.2d 269, 272 (7th Cir. 1983); City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 130 (1988)); accord Hildreth, 960 F.3d at 426. Due to the liberal nature of pretrial discovery in this and other contexts, the Court may enter protective orders. See Reed, No. 20-1139, 2021 WL 5578076, *2 (quoting Rhinehart, 467 U.S. at 34).
A party may move for a protective order under Rule 26(c)(1). See Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(c)(1). The motion must certify that the movant has, in good faith, conferred or attempted to confer with affected parties to resolve the dispute without Court action. Id. If good cause is shown, the Court may issue an order to protect a party from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including an order specifying the terms for disclosures in discovery. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(c)(1)(B); see also Reed, No. 201139, 2021 WL 5578076, *2 (). The burden of showing good cause is on the movant. Ball Corp. v. Air Tech of Michigan, Inc., 329 F.R.D. 599, 603 (N.D. Ind. 2019). The movant must “mak[e] a ‘particular and specific demonstration of fact, as distinguished from stereotyped and conclusory statements.' ” Id. (quoting Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 102 n. 16 (1981)); accord Harrisonville Tel. Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 472 F.Supp.2d 1071, 1078 (S.D. Ill. 2006) (quoting 8 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Richard L. Marcus, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2035 (3d ed. 1998 & Supp. 2006)); see also Andrew Corp. v. Rossi, 180 F.R.D. 338, 341 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (); Wiggins v. Burge, 173 F.R.D. 226, 229 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (). The Court has broad discretion to decide the appropriateness of and degree of protection required by a protective order. See Ball Corp., 329 F.R.D. at 603 (quoting Rhinehart, 467 U.S. at 36).
HIPAA generally prevents the disclosure of an individual's health-related information without that individual's consent. See Reed, No. 20-1139, 2021 WL 5578076, *2 (quoting Ligas v. Maram, No. 05-4331, 2007 WL 2316940, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 10, 2007)). However, subject to the applicable situations and requirements contained in § 164.512, a covered entity may disclose PHI without the written authorization of the individual or the opportunity of the individual to agree or object to the disclosure. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.512. For instance, a covered entity may disclose PHI to the extent that the disclosure is required by law and the disclosure complies with and is limited to the relevant requirements of the law. See id. § 164.512(a)(1). Such a disclosure must satisfy the requirements of paragraph (c), ...
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