Phelan v. Cook County
Decision Date | 18 September 2006 |
Docket Number | No. 04-3991.,04-3991. |
Citation | 463 F.3d 773 |
Parties | Laura PHELAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COOK COUNTY, et al., Defendants-Appellees. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Brian R. Holman (argued), Holman & Stefanowicz, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Craig M. Sandberg (argued), Office of the Cook County State's Attorney, Chicago, IL, for Defendants-Appellees.
Before COFFEY, EVANS, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.
This case examines whether a Title VII plaintiff who is wrongly terminated should be foreclosed from pursuing her claims where her employer eventually reinstates her with back pay. Plaintiff Laura Phelan brought this suit against her employer and eight co-workers and supervisors under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging sexual harassment, gender discrimination, race discrimination, and retaliation. Phelan also brought state law claims of assault, battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress against three of her co-workers. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on all of the federal claims, and then declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims. Primarily because the district court erroneously found that Phelan was not subject to an adverse employment action, we reverse the grant of summary judgment with regard to all but one of Phelan's Title VII claims and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment on Phelan's Section 1983 Claims.
Laura Phelan began working as a mechanical assistant in the boiler room (also known as the "Powerhouse") of Cook County Hospital on March 1, 1999. The boiler room is part of Cook County's Buildings and Grounds Department. Cook County did not provide Phelan, a Caucasian woman, with either an orientation packet or a copy of the hospital's sexual harassment policy at the start of her employment.
Phelan's co-workers in the boiler room began subjecting her to various abusive behaviors immediately after she began working there. She was the target of sexually offensive comments and solicitations, sexually offensive touching and displays of pornography. On multiple occasions, Phelan's co-workers told her that, in order to survive in the department, she would need to perform sexual acts.
On April 15, 1999, after Phelan complained to her supervisor, Jack Callaghan about this behavior, Callaghan contacted Lucia Kelly-Freeman in Cook County's Department of Human Resources. Kelly-Freeman was responsible for investigating complaints of sexual harassment. On April 20, 1999, Phelan and Kelly-Freeman met to discuss Phelan's complaints. Phelan informed Kelly-Freeman that she had been the target of sexually abusive actions. Kelly-Freeman instructed Phelan to create a log of the incidents and to report back to her. However, Phelan did not immediately do so because Callaghan told her that she should not have further contact with Kelly-Freeman.
On July 14, 1999, Phelan again met with Kelly-Freeman to discuss the harassment. Kelly-Freeman had taken no action with regard to Phelan's case since the first meeting, stating that she had been waiting for Phelan to report back to her with further details. At this second meeting, Phelan showed Kelly-Freeman a bruise on her thigh, which she said was the result of a July 9, 1999 incident in which two of her co-workers physically assaulted her. Kelly-Freeman notified her supervisor of the incident and directed Phelan to file an incident report and receive medical treatment. Phelan subsequently met with members of the Cook County Hospital Police Department and the Chicago Police Department. She identified co-workers Ronald Jotzat and John Hussak in a photo-lineup prepared by the Cook County Hospital Police and signed criminal complaints against them. Phelan was notified by the Cook County Hospital police that she needed to file a report with the Chicago Police Department to further the prosecution of her case, but, after speaking with the CPD officers, she did not file a report. The two hospital employees who assaulted Phelan were suspended without pay while the matter was investigated. Phelan was directed not to report back to work until a suitable resolution was determined and she was notified that she would be paid while the hospital sought to resolve the situation.
On August 5, 1999, Phelan met with Claudette Giles, one of the hospital's human resources supervisors, and Paris Partee, an assistant administrator at the hospital who was second in command in the human resources department. In the course of this meeting, Giles and Partee told her that she could either accept a transfer to the hospital's CORE Center, where she would work as a medical assistant, or she would be terminated. The CORE Center was also part of the Buildings and Grounds Department. Phelan claims that the two women, who are African American, made derogatory references to her race and gender during this meeting, including referring to her as a "stupid white woman." Phelan ultimately signed a memorandum acknowledging her acceptance of a transfer to the CORE Center.
Phelan's problems with co-workers continued after her transfer to the CORE Center. At one point, one of Phelan's CORE Center supervisors, Ronald Silva,1 placed Phelan in a headlock. Phelan states that she informed Callaghan of this incident and that he stated he would address it. Callaghan denies making these statements. The next day, Phelan encountered Silva in an elevator, and he again put Phelan in a headlock. One of Phelan's supervisors at the CORE Center, Chuck Gunther, witnessed the second attack and forced Silva to remove Phelan from the headlock. Employees at the CORE Center also subjected Phelan to gender-related verbal abuse and other offensive conduct. Phelan reported these incidents to the human resources department, but she did not file a formal complaint.
In July of 2000, Phelan did not report for work and called in sick. The reason for her non-attendance was distress over the treatment she had received from her co-workers and the inadequate response from human resources and management. She began seeing a psychiatrist, who diagnosed her as suffering from major depression and post-traumatic stress disorder.
As a result of these psychological and emotional problems, in August of 2000, Phelan applied for a medical leave of absence. Cook County denied the request. On September 20, 2000, Callaghan sent Phelan a letter notifying her of an impending pre-disciplinary hearing to determine whether Phelan's absence from work necessitated her termination. On October 11, 2000, after Phelan had been absent from work for 58 days, Cook County held the hearing, which Phelan attended. After being selected by Callaghan, Partee acted as the hearing officer. At the conclusion of the hearing, Partee concluded that Phelan should be terminated, and Cook County terminated Phelan's employment. Phelan later appealed the result of the hearing.
On February 7, 2001, Phelan filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the Illinois Department of Human Rights. On February 9, 2001, Cook County reversed its decision to terminate Phelan, at which point Phelan was reinstated to her job at the CORE Center and awarded back pay. On April 25, 2001, Phelan received a notice of right to sue on the basis of her EEOC Charge. Phelan filed her Complaint in the instant case on May 17, 2001.
After discovery was completed, the district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment as to the federal claims, and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. This appeal followed.
Our review of the district court's grant of summary judgment is de novo, and we must construe all facts and reasonable inferences in favor of Phelan. See Telemark Dev. Group, Inc. v. Mengelt, 313 F.3d 972, 976 (7th Cir.2002). Summary judgment is properly granted when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
The defendants first argue that Phelan's claims are barred by the statute of limitations because she failed to timely file her EEOC Charge, and because her complaint was filed too late for her to pursue her Section 1983 claims. We have held that "the scope of the subsequent judicial proceedings is limited by the nature of the charges filed with the EEOC." Rush v. McDonald's Corp., 966 F.2d 1104, 1110 (7th Cir.1992). However, in Rush, we also observed that "the goals behind the requirement of prior resort to administrative relief would be frustrated if the filing of a general charge with the EEOC would open up the possibility of judicial challenges to any related conduct that took place in connection with the employment relationship." See id. Here, both of the defendants' statute of limitations arguments fail as they are predicated upon the defendants' incorrect assertion that Phelan's EEOC Charge and Section 1983 claims refer only to incidents alleged to have occurred at the Powerhouse and not in the CORE Center.
Nothing in the EEOC Charge or the Complaint's Section 1983 paragraphs limits Phelan's allegations to the Powerhouse; the Complaint references "gender discrimination within the Buildings and Grounds Department of the Hospital." Complaint ¶ 23. It is undisputed that both the Powerhouse and the CORE Center are within the Buildings and Grounds...
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