Jackson v. Wilmington Hous. Auth.

• Decision Date: 02 June 2014
• Docket Number: No. 7:13-CV-155-BO,7:13-CV-155-BO
• Parties: LATONYA JACKSON Plaintiff, v. WILMINGTON HOUSING AUTHORITY, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of North Carolina

LATONYA JACKSON Plaintiff, v. WILMINGTON HOUSING AUTHORITY, et al., Defendants.

No. 7:13-CV-155-BO

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA SOUTHERN DIVISION

SO ORDERED: June 2, 2014

ORDER

This cause comes before the Court on defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). [DE 44]. For the reasons discussed below, defendants' motion is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed this action against the Wilmington Housing Authority ("WHA") and several of its officers, board members, and employees for alleged violation of her civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Specifically, plaintiff alleges that defendants improperly terminated her application for the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program. Plaintiff, with leave of the Court amended her complaint bringing suit against defendants Richichi and Johnson in their individual capacities in addition to their official capacities. [DE 42]. Defendants now move for judgment on the pleadings as to all claims. [DE 44].

DISCUSSION

Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a party may move for judgment on the pleadings after the pleadings are closed, and within such time as not to delay the trial. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(c). Judgment on the pleadings is proper when, taking the allegations inthe pleadings as true, the non-moving party can prove no set of facts in support of its claim that would entitle it to relief. Bruce v. Riddle, 631 F.2d 272, 273-74 (4th Cir. 1980); see also Burbach Broad Co. of Del v. Elkins Radio Corp., 278 F.3d 401, 405 (4th Cir. 2002) (explaining that a motion for judgment of the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) is analyzed under the same standard as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss). In resolving a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the Court may rely on admitted facts in the complaint and answer as well as documents attached to the complaint and answer. Bradley v. Ramsey, 329 F. Supp. 2d 617, 622 (W.D.N.C. 2004); Fayetteville Investors v. Commercial Builders, Inc., 936 F.2d 1462, 1465 (4th Cir. 1991). Documents "integral to and explicitly relied on in the complaint" can be considered if the authenticity of the documents is not challenged. Phillips v. LCI Int'l, Inc., 190 F.3d 609, 618 (4th Cir. 1999).

A motion for judgment on the pleadings requires the Court to determine whether the complaint is legally and factually sufficient. Mendenhall v. Hanesbrands, Inc., 856 F. Supp. 2d 717, 723-24 (M.D.N.C. 2012) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)). The Court therefore accepts the factual allegations in the complaint as true, but need not accept legal conclusions drawn from the facts. Id. Additionally, the Court need not accept as true unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments. Giarrantano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 302 (4th Cir. 2008).

I. OFFICIAL CAPACITY CLAIMS AGAINST INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS.

Official capacity suits "generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent." Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985) (quotation omitted). The Fourth Circuit has held that official capacity claims are essentially the same as a claim against the entity, and should be dismissed as duplicative when the entity is alsonamed as a defendant. Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766, 783 (4th Cir. 2004). North Carolina courts have followed this line of reasoning. See May v. City of Durham, 525 S.E.2d 223, 229 (N.C. App. 2000) (holding official capacity suit to be a claim against the office of the employee rather than the particular individual occupying the office and therefore when a suit names the entity and individuals in their official capacity who work for the entity, the official capacity claims are redundant). Here, the WHA is named in addition to the official capacity claims against defendants Johnson, Richichi, Krause, Mack, Hovis, Land, and Hollifield who all work for the WHA. Therefore, the official capacity claims are redundant, duplicative, and unnecessary and judgment on the pleadings is appropriately granted in favor of defendants.

II. STATE FRAUD AND LIBEL CLAIMS.

Defendants argue that plaintiff's state law fraud and libel claims are subject to dismissal because the complaint fails to sufficiently plead the elements of fraud and libel.

A. Fraud.

It appears to the Court that plaintiff only alleges her claims for fraud and libel against defendant Johnson. The elements of actionable fraud are: "1) a false representation or concealment of a material fact, 2) reasonably calculated to deceive, 3) made with intent to deceive, 4) which does in fact deceive, and which 5) results in damage to the injured party." Hunter v. Spaulding, 388 S.E.2d 630, 634 (N.C. App. 1990). "A complaint charging fraud must allege these elements with particularity." Id. "[I]n pleading fraud, the particularity requirement is met by alleging time, place and content of the fraudulent representation, identity of the person making the representation and what was obtained as a result of the fraudulent acts or representations." Terry v. Terry, 273 S.E.2d 674, 678 (N.C. 1981). In order to survive this motion, the complaint "must allege with particularity all material facts and circumstancesconstituting the fraud." Hunter v. Guardian Live Ins. Co. of Am., 593 S.E.2d 595, 598 (N.C. App. 2004).

Here, plaintiff's fraud claim is based entirely on defendant Johnson "present[ing] to all involved, an email sent from plaintiff as cause for termination." [DE 42 ¶¶ 39-40]. However, plaintiff fails to allege all of the elements of fraud against Johnson. Plaintiff fails to allege that she was deceived by any false representation and that the false representation caused damage to her. Although it is clear from the pleadings that Johnson misinterpreted an email plaintiff wrote, there are no allegations that Johnson's misrepresentation did in fact deceive plaintiff. The complaint does not assert that plaintiff relied upon the misinterpretation. Further, it is clear that plaintiff cannot allege that she was deceived by the misinterpretation as plaintiff alleges that she sent a letter requesting a hearing and denying any admissions of signing forms fraudulently. Finally, plaintiff alleges that she was deprived of her section 8 voucher property interest and $1000, but fails to allege how Johnson's misinterpretation was tied to this as she also alleges that she requested a hearing and received a hearing on the issue. Because plaintiff has failed to allege with particularity all of the elements of fraud against Johnson, judgment on the pleadings in favor of Johnson is granted.

B. Libel.

Plaintiff alleges that Johnson falsely claimed plaintiff had committed fraud and that she admitted to fraudulently signing forms as the basis for her libel claim. To qualify as libelous per se, "an allegedly defamatory statement must meet certain well-established criteria." Farmer v. Lowe's Companies, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 612, 615-16 (W.D.N.C. 2001). North Carolina courts have "defined libel per se as a publication which, when considered alone without explanatory circumstances: (1) charges that a person has committed an infamous crime; (2) charges a personwith having an infectious disease; (3) tends to impeach a person in that person's trade or profession; or (4) otherwise tends to subject one to ridicule, contempt or disgrace." Id. (quoting Aycockv. Padgett, 516 S.E.2d 907, 909 (N.C. app. 1999).

Therefore, to establish a claim for libel per se, a plaintiff must show that: "(1) defendant spoke or published base or defamatory words which tended to prejudice him in his reputation, office, trade, business, or means of livelihood or hold him up to disgrace, ridicule, or contempt; (2) the statement was false; and (3) the statement was published or communicated to and understood by a third person." Cummings v. Lumbee Tribe of N.C., 590 F. Supp. 2d 769, 774 (E.D.N.C. 2008) (citing Friel v. Angell Care, Inc., 440 S.E.2d 111 (N.C. App. 1994).

Here the complaint does not allege that Johnson's statements tended to prejudice plaintiff in any respect or held plaintiff up to disgrace, ridicule, or contempt. The complaint also does not allege that the statements were published or communicated to and understood by a third person. There are no specifics about what was allegedly said, to whom it was said, or when it was said. Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently plead all of the elements of libel against Johnson. Accordingly, judgment on the pleadings is granted in favor of Johnson.

III. FEDERAL CLAIMS.

Plaintiff alleges that defendants have violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Chapter 8 of Title 42 of the United States Code, and its implementing regulations including 24 C.F.R. § 982.555 in her first and second claims. In claims 5, 6, and 7, plaintiff appears to allege that the WHA did not follow its own procedural guidelines in handling her complaint.

In order to seek redress through 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must assert a violation of a federal right, not merely a violation of federal law. Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340(1997). Courts consider three factors when determining whether a statutory provision gives rise to a federal right: (1) Congress must have intended that the provision in question benefits the plaintiff; (2) the plaintiff must demonstrate that the right claimed to be protected is not so vague and amorphous that its enforcement would strain judicial competence; and (3) the statute must unambiguously impose a binding obligation on the States - the provision giving rise to the asserted right must be couched in mandatory rather than precatory terms. Id. at 340-41.

Here the federal regulations upon which plaintiff bases her claim do not impose a binding obligation on defendants as to plaintiff. The complaint asserts numerous times that plaintiff's claims are based on defendants' violation of 24 C.F.R. §...