Jacksonville Paper Co. v. Tobin

• Decision Date: 29 July 1953
• Docket Number: No. 13936.,13936.
• Citation: 206 F.2d 333
• Parties: JACKSONVILLE PAPER CO. et al. v. TOBIN.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

206 F.2d 333 (1953)

JACKSONVILLE PAPER CO. et al. v. TOBIN.

No. 13936.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

June 30, 1953.

Rehearing Denied July 29, 1953.

Louis Kurz, Jacksonville, Fla., Ragland, Kurz & Layton, Jacksonville, Fla., for Jacksonville Paper Co. et al.

Bessie Margolin, Asst. Solicitor, U. S. Department of Labor, Washington, D. C., William S. Tyson, Sol., William A. Lowe and Sylvia S. Ellison, Attorneys, United States Department of Labor, Washington, D. C., Beverley R. Worrell, Regional Attorney, Birmingham, Ala., for appellee.

Before BORAH, RUSSELL and STRUM, Circuit Judges.

RUSSELL, Circuit Judge.

This appeal presents another phase of the long litigation, first initiated in 1940, seeking to require the appellants to comply with the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 201 et seq. The adjudication by the District Court of the existence and extent of coverage of the Paper Company's employees under the Act was affirmed by this court in Fleming v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 5 Cir., 128 F.2d 395, and finally by the Supreme Court in Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 U.S. 564, 63 S.Ct. 332, 87 L.Ed. 460, which affirmed, with certain modifications this Court's decision. The question of coverage is now involved. Reference to these cited cases obviates the necessity for any extended recital of the facts beyond the statement that the decision of this court reversed the judgment of the trial court granting an injunction, but only because the order provided injunction broadly "from violating any of the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938", 128 F.2d 399 (emphasis by the court), and directed that a decree be entered in conformity with the violations alleged and proved. Upon the coming down of the mandate from the Supreme Court, the District Court, on June 3rd, 1943, without a further hearing, entered an amended judgment which, as stated by that court in its present memorandum opinion, "did little more than extend the injunctive provisions of the former judgment to the branch offices excluded by the former judgment." It did, however, re-phrase the injunctive order as directed by this court. In April, 1946, the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division filed an application to adjudicate the defendants, present appellants, in civil contempt because of alleged violations of the decree of the court entered in 1941, (being that considered in 128 F.2d 395, supra, and 317 U.S. 564, 63 S.Ct. 332, 87 L.Ed. 460, supra), and the amended judgment entered in June, 1943, above referred to. This application was denied in the District Court and upon appeal here the judgment of that court was affirmed, but these judgments were reversed by the Supreme Court in McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187, 69 S.Ct. 497, 93 L.Ed. 599. That decision and the mandate of the court established that the failure of the defendants to comply with the prior decree of the court constituted a civil contempt which should be punished and purged by enforcement of the trial court's decree requiring restitution to the defendants' employees of the wages and overtime pay required by sections 6 and 7 of the Act in order to vindicate "its authority through enforcement of its decree". 336 U.S. at page 194, 69 S.Ct. at page 501, supra. In execution of this directive the District Court entered the judgment here appealed from, which imposed a fine of $1.00 for civil contempt, and additionally, ordered payment by the defendants of all unpaid wages to its former, as well as present, employees. This decree overruled the contentions of the defendants: (1) that such payments accruing during a period of more than one year prior to the filing of the application for a civil contempt adjudication were barred by the one year period of limitations provided by the statute of Florida,¹ or by application of the principle of laches; and (2) that in any event, the requirement of payment of the unpaid wages and overtime compensation accruing during the period from the date of the first injunction to the date of the amended judgment² was not proper because, in view of the reversal of the 1941 injunction, there was, during such period, no valid order of the court which had been violated. The court ruled that the defenses of limitation and laches were not available to the defendants and that the essential terms of the 1941 judgment had been at all times in full force and effect, and therefore required the defendants "to account for all unpaid wages of all persons in its service since August 29, 1941 entitled to benefit from this case."

Upon this appeal, the defendants assign as error that portion of the judgment which overrules its defenses as just stated. We find neither claim of error to be meritorious.

In this proceeding, having for its purpose the vindication of the court's authority and the exercise of its undisputed power to enforce its decree by requiring compliance with its terms, the United States Court was entirely unfettered and uncontrolled by the state statute of limitations, or by laches. In every relevant and substantial aspect such a proceeding falls within the well established rule that the United States is not bound by state statutes of limitations or by laches.³ Such state statutes are irrelevant in determining the rules which bar enforcement of an equitable right created by Congress.⁴ While the question was not there involved, in this very case, 336 U.S. 187, 194, 69 S.Ct. 497, 93 L.Ed. 599, supra, the Supreme Court considered the fact that one of the results of the restitution order would be the recovery by the employees of the back wages to be immaterial, since the primary purpose of the equitable remedy of civil contempt was a vindication of the court's authority. This is clear implication that a state statute of limitations upon the recovery in a suit for unpaid wages by the employee was not material in the equitable proceeding to require restitution. Such has been the uniform holding of this and other courts in similar proceedings seeking restitution under the Emergency Price Control Act, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 901 et seq.⁵

Appellants' remaining point of error is no better maintained. Its weakness results from the unsoundness of the premise asserted that the 1941 judgment was entirely reversed and set aside by this court. To the contrary, in substance and effect, the provisions of that decree which afford the basis for the order now questioned, that an accounting be made of unpaid wages from the period of its date, was not at all disturbed. The...