Jackvony v. Berard

• Decision Date: 14 March 1941
• Docket Number: Nos. 1560-1563.,s. 1560-1563.
• Citation: 18 A.2d 889
• Parties: JACKVONY, Atty. Gen., ex rel v. BERARD. SAME v. JARRET. SAME v. LA ROCHELLE. SAME v. SCHMETZ.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

18 A.2d 889

JACKVONY, Atty. Gen., ex rel

v. BERARD.

SAME

v. JARRET.

SAME

v. LA ROCHELLE.

SAME

v. SCHMETZ.

Nos. 1560-1563.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

March 14, 1941.

Four separate petitions in equity in the nature of quo warranto by Louis V. Jackvony, Attorney General, on the relation of different relators, against Albert M. Berard, Hugo A. Jarret, Wilfrid W. La Rochelle, and Joseph Schmetz to oust the respondents as Commissioners of the Housing Authority of the City of Woonsocket under Gen.Laws 1938, c. 585, § 1 et seq.

Decrees for relators.

Ira Lloyd Letts and Alan P. Cusick, both of Providence, for relators.

John J. Mee, of Woonsocket, for respondents.

Felix A. Toupin, of Woonsocket, amicus curiae.

BAKER, Justice.

These are petitions in equity in the nature of quo warranto, each on behalf of a different relator, brought under General Laws 1938, chapter 585, in the name of the Attorney General.

We shall hereinafter refer to the relators as the petitioners. The petitions are similar and set out in substance, among other things, that on March 7, 1940, the petitioners were appointed commissioners of the Housing Authority of the city of Woonsocket, pursuant to the provisions of G.L. 1938, chap. 344, to hold office for certain specified terms; that they accepted the appointments and entered upon the performance of their duties, in which they conducted themselves in a proper, orderly and legal manner; that on August 28, 1940, the mayor of the city of Woonsocket, Felix A. Toupin, caused to be given to them copies of charges made by him, wherein they were accused of inefficiency, neglect of duty and misconduct in office, and that to such charges the petitioners thereafter filed written objections with the said mayor and with the secretary of said Housing Authority.

It is further alleged that between the dates of September 12 and October 19, 1940, hearings upon the above charges were held by the mayor, the petitioners being present in person and represented by counsel; that the mayor presided at such hearings, conducted the prosecution, examined witnesses, introduced exhibits, cross-examined the petitioners' witnesses and testified himself in rebuttal; and that on December 6, 1940, he found the petitioners guilty as above charged and ordered them removed as commissioners of said Housing Authority.

In the petitions it is also set out that on December 7, 1940, the mayor purported to appoint the four respondents to succeed the petitioners as commissioners of said Housing Authority; that on said lastmentioned date the respondents purported to qualify as commissioners, and since that date have unlawfully assumed, exercised and performed the duties and powers of that office.

The petitions are brought to try title to the offices in question. The petitioners contend that they were unlawfully removed from office as such commissioners by the mayor; that they still are and continuously have been, since March 7, 1940, the duly appointed, qualified and lawful holders of such offices and entitled to exercise and perform all the functions, powers and duties thereof; but that the respondents have usurped and intruded into said offices, which they purport to hold without warrant, title or right; and that they have prevented the petitioners from performing their duties therein. The petitioners pray that they may be confirmed in their said offices as commissioners of the Housing Authority of Woonsocket; that the appointment of the respondents by the mayor of that city to said offices be declared illegal and void; and that the respondents be ousted and expelled therefrom.

The petitioners maintain that their petitions should be granted, first, because the evidence and the record show that they were not given a fair hearing by the mayor and that he had prejudged the case against them; and second, that there was no legal, competent or adequate evidence presented at the hearing which justified or supported their removal from office.

An examination of the evidence and the exhibits leads us to the conclusion that the issue raised by these petitions can be disposed of by a consideration of the nature of the charges made by the mayor against the petitioners and a consideration of the evidence presented to support such charges. We shall not discuss, therefore, the matter of the fairness of the hearing given the petitioners, or of the mayor's alleged bias against them.

It is not seriously questioned that in these proceedings, being in equity in the nature of quo warranto, the petitioners have the burden of establishing that they were illegally removed from their offices and that they are legally entitled thereto. See McGroarty v. Ferretti, 56 R.I. 152, 184 A. 508. They contend that there were no vacancies in these offices and that the certificates of appointment of the respondents, as filed by the mayor, were therefore invalid and of no effect. On the other hand, the respondents contend that the express provisions of § 5 of chap. 344, supra, make the certificate of appointment of any commissioner, as filed by the mayor, conclusive evidence of such commissioner's due and proper appointment.

While the words "conclusive evidence" do appear in the section in question, it is obvious that this provision can not be given the literal and sweeping construction for which the respondents argue, without defeating other express provisions of the statute. It is well established that a statute will be so construed as to reasonably give effect to all its express provisions, if possible.

If the occasion arises when it is admittedly lawful and proper for the mayor to make appointments of commissioners, then by the terms of the statute the certificates are made conclusive evidence of the latters' due and proper appointment. However, in the situation before us, it is clear that there must first have been vacancies in the offices in question, brought about by the proper and legal removal of the petitioners, before the respondents can rely upon the above provision of the statute. The construction contended for by them would make the hearing by the mayor upon charges preferred a useless formality. Therefore, the statute in question, standing alone, is of no aid to the respondents. The facts and circumstances in evidence relating to the alleged removal of the petitioners from office must first be considered, in order to determine the correctness of such removal, because upon that rests entirely the validity of the respondents' alleged appointments.

The general object and purpose of housing authority statutes, such as chap. 344, supra, are well known. By means of funds advanced by the federal government the local housing authority set up under that act was to acquire land and erect thereon suitable houses to be occupied by families within a low-income range. Such was the purpose of the Woonsocket Housing Authority. By the express terms of the act it was constituted "a public body and a body corporate and politic", and its powers are extensive. However, before any federal funds became available to the local housing authority the United States Housing Authority had to be satisfied as to certain facts and conditions, and had to give its approval to certain steps taken by the local body.

By the provisions of chap. 344, supra, the authority to appoint commissioners, five in number, in any city was conferred upon the mayor thereof. He could also...