Jacob v. Henderson
| Decision Date | 28 March 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 2D01-5718.,2D01-5718. |
| Citation | 840 So.2d 1167 |
| Parties | Wilma JACOB and Manuel Jacob, Appellants, v. Cal HENDERSON, Sheriff of Hillsborough County, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Claude H. Tison, Jr., of The Swope Law Group, Tampa, for Appellants.
Thea G. Clark and Christopher C. Sabella, Tampa, for Appellee.
Wilma Jacob and her husband Manuel Jacob appeal the trial court order that dismissed, with prejudice, their personal injury action against Cal Henderson, as sheriff of Hillsborough County. The trial court ruled that sworn deposition testimony of Mrs. Jacob, when compared to a surveillance video, constituted fraud on the court justifying dismissal with prejudice. We conclude dismissal with prejudice was too harsh a sanction and thus an abuse of discretion. Therefore, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
Mrs. Jacob alleged that, while a pedestrian, she was struck in the arm by the side-view mirror of a patrol car driven by a Hillsborough County deputy sheriff. At trial, Mrs. Jacob presented evidence that she sustained a severely fractured right arm resulting in nerve damage, continuing partial loss of function, and pain in the arm and hand caused by Reflex Sympathetic Dystrophy. The jury evaluated Mrs. Jacob's damages to be $235,000 and assessed fault at 53% to Mrs. Jacob and 47% to the Sheriff. For reasons not relevant in this appeal, both parties moved for a new trial which the trial court granted.
Before the new trial, the Sheriff arranged for surveillance videos to be made of Mrs. Jacob. After securing the surveillance videos, the Sheriff scheduled Mrs. Jacob's deposition. At this deposition Mrs. Jacob was asked a number of questions about her ability to perform certain tasks that the Sheriff knew were performed on the videos. Mrs. Jacob denied being able to perform a number of the same tasks that were demonstrated on the videos. The trial court viewed the videotape and reviewed the deposition testimony and found the discrepancies constituted fraud on the court and ordered the case dismissed with prejudice. The trial court found most telling her denial of the ability to close a car door with her right hand and to sweep her driveway, which the videotape displayed her doing.
While we apply the abuse of discretion standard, Morgan v. Campbell, 816 So.2d 251, 253 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002), case law has narrowed a trial court's discretion in cases involving dismissal for fraud, Young v. Curgil, 358 So.2d 58, 59 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978) (); see also Tri Star Invs., Inc. v. Miele, 407 So.2d 292, 293 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981)
(same). A more stringent abuse of discretion standard is appropriate because dismissal is an extreme remedy. The test we are to apply is set out most succinctly by Chief Judge Griffin in Cox v. Burke, 706 So.2d 43, 46 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998):
The requisite fraud on the court occurs where "it can be demonstrated, clearly and convincingly, that a party has sentiently set in motion some unconscionable scheme calculated to interfere with the judicial system's ability impartially to adjudicate a matter by improperly influencing the trier of fact or unfairly hampering the presentation of the opposing party's claim or defense." Aoude v. Mobil Oil Corp., 892 F.2d 1115, 1118 (1st Cir.1989). When reviewing a case for fraud, the court should "consider the proper mix of factors" and carefully balance a policy favoring adjudication on the merits with competing policies to maintain the integrity of the judicial system. Id. at 1117-18. Because "dismissal sounds the `death knell of the lawsuit,' courts must reserve such strong medicine for instances where the defaulting party's misconduct is correspondingly egregious." Id. at 1118. The trial court has the inherent authority, within the exercise of sound judicial discretion, to dismiss an action when a plaintiff has perpetrated a fraud on the court, or where a party refuses to comply with court orders. Kornblum v. Schneider, 609 So.2d 138, 139 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992). Because dismissal is the most severe of all possible sanctions, however, it should be employed only in extreme circumstances. Id.; Bird v. Hardrives of Delray, Inc., 644 So.2d 89, 90 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994).
Viewing the facts before this court, Mrs. Jacob either knowingly perpetrated a fraud, exaggerated her injuries, or unknowingly provided video evidence that her injuries are far less severe than she may believe. Only the first of these...
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