Jacobs v. City of Port Neches

• Decision Date: 04 June 1998
• Docket Number: No. 1:94-CV-767.,1:94-CV-767.
• Citation: 7 F.Supp.2d 829
• Parties: Audwin JACOBS v. CITY OF PORT NECHES, et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas

7 F.Supp.2d 829

Audwin JACOBS v. CITY OF PORT NECHES, et al.

No. 1:94-CV-767.

United States District Court, E.D. Texas, Beaumont Division.

June 4, 1998.

Steve D. Glover, for Plaintiff.

Kerry McKnight, George Cole, Port Neches, TX, Frank Calvert, Port Arthur, TX, Steven Wiggins, Beaumont, TX, Defendants

MEMORANDUM ORDER ADOPTING THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

HEARTFIELD, District Judge.

The court heretofore ordered that this matter be referred to the Honorable Earl S. Hines, United States Magistrate Judge, at Beaumont, Texas, for consideration pursuant to applicable laws and orders of this court. The court has received and considered the Report of the United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to such order, along with the record, pleadings and all available evidence. No objections to the Report of the United States Magistrate Judge were filed by the parties.

Accordingly, the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the magistrate judge are correct and the Report of the Magistrate Judge filed on May 6, 1998, is ADOPTED. It is therefore

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that defendant George Cole's Motion For Summary Judgment is DENIED as moot.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE RE: CITY OF PORT NECHES' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

HINES, United States Magistrate Judge.

This action is referred to the undersigned for review, hearing, if necessary, and recommendation of findings of fact and conclusions of law, pursuant to Title 28, United States Code Section 636(b) and Local Rules for Assignment of Duties to Magistrate Judges. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) (1993).

This report considers the motion for summary judgment filed by defendant, the City of Port Neches.

I. BACKGROUND / PRIOR PROCEEDINGS

Plaintiff initiated this action against 12 defendants, raising 22 separate allegations of civil rights violations. Interim pretrial rulings dismissed some of the original defendants and substantially narrowed the issues for trial. Remaining defendants are: Jefferson County, Texas; City of Port Arthur, Texas; George Cole, a detective employed by the City of Port Neches; and City of Port Neches, Texas.

Plaintiff brings this cause of action against Port Neches under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). He alleges Port Neches is liable for its failure to adequately train and supervise Police Chief Charles Bennefield and Officer George Cole for their activities as part of a multi-jurisdictional illegal drug interdiction task force known as the "Jefferson County Narcotics Task Force."¹ Plaintiff alleges a widespread task force practice of baseless traffic stops of African-American males driving nice automobiles; planting small amounts of narcotics; and institution of false drug possession charges and civil forfeiture proceedings.² Plaintiff further alleges both Cole and Bennefield, or other task force members, then used the illegally seized vehicles for personal use and enjoyment.

Plaintiff's failure to train and supervise claim arises from an incident in October, 1992. According to plaintiff, Port Arthur police officers came into possession of Mr. Jacobs' pistol in a case involving his ex-wife. On October 19, 1992, plaintiff received a telephone call notifying him that he could retrieve the pistol from the police department. After plaintiff retrieved his firearm around 4:00 that afternoon, defendant Cole, accompanied by George Barnes, a federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms agent, commenced tailing plaintiff. Later that day, plaintiff was driving his new 1992 Dodge Stealth in the city limits of Port Arthur, accompanied by a friend. Cole pulled over plaintiff's car. Cole allegedly searched plaintiff's vehicle without consent and found the pistol still in the evidence wrappings from the Port Arthur police department.

Cole arrested Jacobs and took him to jail for unauthorized transportation of a weapon. Port Arthur police officers Baise, Duriso, Mathis, and Carona arrived on the scene as the events unfolded and witnessed the arrest. The weapon charge was filed in Jefferson County Court at Law No. 3, case number 168787-1.

Plaintiff further alleges that Cole thereafter planted narcotics in plaintiff's car. As a result, civil forfeiture proceedings against the Dodge Stealth were commenced. The civil forfeiture case was filed in the 136th Judicial District Court of Jefferson County and docketed as proceeding number D-144284. Further, a possession of narcotics action was filed in the Criminal District Court in Jefferson County, and docketed as proceeding number 63369.

II. THE MOTION AND RESPONSE

A. Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment

Port Neches moves for summary judgment on several grounds, including an assertion that there is no evidence of an unconstitutional municipal custom or policy. Port Neches offers documentary evidence confirming numerous law enforcement training seminars in which both Chief Bennefield and Cole participated. Specifically, the city provides evidence that Chief Bennefield participated in nine training courses from 1957 through 1992, and received the Master Peace Officer award from the Texas Commission on Law Enforcement in 1997. (Dft's Mot, Exh A). Port Neches also provides documentary evidence that Cole participated in six training courses from 1988 through 1991. (Dft's Mot, Exh B). Further, Cole received the Intermediate Certificate and Master Peace Officer Award from the State of Texas, in 1989 and 1997, respectively. Because of the training received by these individuals, defendant argues, there is no proof of inadequate training or supervision of these officers.

B. Plaintiff's Response

Plaintiff's response includes several exhibits. The only exhibit relevant to the city's argument that no evidence establishes an unconstitutional policy or custom is Exhibit F, an internal investigative report prepared by James C. Rose, while employed as investigator in the Jefferson County Criminal District Attorney's Office September 23, 1994. The report, obtained from disclosures made by Jefferson County in this case, concerns allegations of wrongdoing by Cole made by a fellow Port Neches police officer in September, 1994. Basically, those allegations were that (1) Cole twice planted cocaine on criminal suspects after their arrests in 1990 and 1991 in order to confiscate cash and a Corvette automobile; (2) Cole made trips to Las Vegas after large cash busts; and (3) Cole had recently purchased a Porsche car.

Rose interviewed two other Port Neches police officers who said they witnessed Cole's planting of narcotics on criminal suspects in 1990 and 1991. They reported Cole's actions to a department captain who initially expressed indignation and stated Cole should be fired if the allegations were true. However, a few days later, he dropped further investigation and chastised the reporting officers for their roles. They believed that "Chief Bennefield was behind the dropping of the investigation due to the fact that George Cole contributes a large amount of money to the Police Department thru (sic) drug seizures."

Finally, the complaining officer believed "Chief Bennefield may be taking money from the drug forfeiture fund because all cars forfeited are placed in Bennefield's name and no one knows exactly how much money is received when the vehicles are sold."

Plaintiff argues that if Bennefield and Cole committed the acts reported in Rose's report, a genuine issue of material fact is established as to the adequacy of training given Bennefield and Cole. Plaintiff further contends that the city's failure to voluntarily disclose the report in the discovery phase of this litigation is sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to a policy of condoning wrongful acts of its police officers.

C. The City of Port Neches Reply

Port Neches separately moves to suppress or strike Rose's report. Port Neches argues that the report is hearsay, contains double hearsay and is unauthenticated. Therefore, it is not proper summary judgment evidence. (Dft's Mot to Strike at 2).

III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDS

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) authorizes granting a motion for summary judgment only when the moving party establishes that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P 56(c) (1998). Thus, the movant has the initial burden of proof. Longstreth v. Maynard, 961 F.2d 895 (10th Cir.1992). This burden is satisfied when the movant shows that if the evidentiary record were reduced to admissible evidence at trial, it would be insufficient to permit the nonmovant from carrying its burden of proof. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2554, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

Once the movant meets its burden under Rule 56, the opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to a material fact. Matsushita Elec. Indus., Inc. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (omitting citations). Rather, as the Supreme Court stated in Catrett, the nonmoving party must "go beyond the pleadings, and by her own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553 (internal quotation removed); See also, Rizzo v. Children's World Learning Centers, Inc., 84 F.3d 758, 764 (5th Cir.1996); McGann v. H & H Music, Co., 946 F.2d 401, 408 (5th Cir.1991).

The party opposing summary judgment is required to identify specific evidence in the record and to articulate the precise manner in which that evidence supports his or her claim. See Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1537 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 871, 115 S.Ct. 195, 130 L.Ed.2d 127 (1994). The court has no duty to sift through the entire record in search of evidence to support a party's opposition to summary judgment. Ragas v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 136...