Rizzo v. Children's World Learning Centers, Inc.
| Decision Date | 24 May 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 95-50423,95-50423 |
| Citation | 84 F.3d 758 |
| Parties | 5 A.D. Cases 1155, 8 NDLR P 87 Victoria RIZZO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHILDREN'S WORLD LEARNING CENTERS, INC., doing business as CWLC Inc., Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Robert S. Thompson, Jason J. Thompson, Thompson & Thompson, San Antonio, TX, for Victoria Rizzo, plaintiff-appellant.
Cynthia Glass Bivins, John Joseph Franco, Jr., Abel Martinez, Jenkens, Gilchrist, Groce, Locke & Hebdon, San Antonio, TX, for Children's World Learning Centers, Inc. dba CWLC Inc., defendant-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas.
Before DeMOSS and DENNIS, Circuit Judges, and DUPLANTIER, District Judge. 1
This Americans with Disabilities Act case was brought by Victoria Rizzo against Children's World Learning Centers, Inc., where she worked as a teacher's aide. Rizzo claims that she was removed from her van driving duties at Children's World because of her hearing impairment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Children's World. Finding that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Rizzo is a qualified individual with a disability, we reverse the district court's summary judgment and remand for trial.
Rizzo began working at Children's World as a teacher's aide in March 1991. She had a hearing impairment that required the use of hearing aids, which she disclosed to Children's World on her job application. Her duties at Children's World included assisting in the classroom, doing administrative paperwork and driving children in the Children's World van.
In February 1993, a parent complained to Children's World Director Myra Ryan about Rizzo being left alone with children, given her hearing impairment. The parent also expressed concern over Rizzo's ability to drive the van safely. Director Ryan discussed the complaint with Rizzo and Rizzo admitted that she had experienced further hearing loss and was scheduled to see her doctor to determine if stronger hearing aids were necessary. Director Ryan asked Rizzo whether she could hear a child choking in the back of the van. Rizzo said that she did not know if she could hear a choking child, but she thought that it was safe for her to drive the children.
Rizzo was removed from her driving responsibilities until she could bring a report from her audiologist stating that it was safe for her to drive the van. On March 11, 1993, Rizzo brought a report from her audiologist which said that she could hear emergency vehicles. However, the report did not discuss whether Rizzo could hear a child choking at the back of the van. Children's World told Rizzo that before she could drive the van it needed that information. Rizzo said that the audiologist would have to observe her at work to make that determination and Children's World said that this was acceptable. Nevertheless, the audiologist never observed Rizzo and no further report on her ability to hear a choking child was ever sent to Children's World.
After Rizzo's removal from her driving duties, she was assigned food preparation duties previously performed by Children's World's cook. She was asked to work a split shift (early mornings and late afternoons) and her hours were reduced. Rizzo asserts that as a result of Children's World's actions, she lost respect among her peers and she was shamed by having to prove that it was safe for her to drive the children.
Children's World contends that the reason Rizzo worked a split schedule and cooked meals was that she requested that she not be placed in a classroom by herself for more than thirty minutes at a time, and that she not be placed with school age children. Therefore, their actions were a reasonable accommodation for her disability, not discriminatory acts. Children's World further maintains that Rizzo remained a full-time employee and was not demoted.
Rizzo resigned her position with Children's World on May 20, 1993. She then filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which issued her a right to sue letter. Rizzo then filed suit against Children's World in federal district court under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., alleging that because of her hearing impairment she was (1) wrongfully demoted, (2) discriminated against, and (3) wrongfully perceived to be a direct threat to the health or safety of herself or others in the work place. She also alleges that Children's World failed to make reasonable accommodation for her disability.
The district court applied the McDonnell Douglas Title VII burden shifting paradigm. 2 McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973); Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). Applying the McDonnell Douglas framework, the district court found that Rizzo met her prima facie case of showing that "she was a disabled person who was 'otherwise qualified' to perform her job duties." The district court found that she was "otherwise qualified" because she could, with reasonable accommodation, perform the essential functions of her position. The district court found that there was "a relatively inexpensive device [which] might have been placed in the van to amplify sounds coming from behind the driver," thereby accommodating any disability she might have.
Because Rizzo met her prima facie case, the district court shifted the burden to Children's World to show a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision to temporarily remove her from driving duties. The district court found that Children's World met this burden because its statement that it removed Rizzo because she might not hear a choking child was a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.
The district court then placed the burden on Rizzo to come "forward with a genuine issue of fact as to whether Children's World's accommodations were discriminatory or unreasonable." The district court found that Rizzo did not meet this burden and, thus, held that as a matter of law Children's World did not violate the ADA.
We review district court orders granting summary judgment de novo, applying the same standards as the district court. Harper v. Harris County, Texas, 21 F.3d 597, 599 (5th Cir.1994). Summary judgment is appropriate when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).
As we recently said:
Summary judgment is proper if the movant demonstrates that there is an absence of genuine issues of material fact. Such a showing entitles the movant to summary judgment as a matter of law. The movant accomplishes this by informing the court of the basis for its motion, and by identifying portions of the record which highlight the absence of genuine factual issues. Once the movant produces such evidence, the nonmovant must then direct the court's attention to evidence in the record sufficient to establish that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial--that is, the nonmovant must come forward with evidence establishing each of the challenged elements of its case for which the nonmovant will bear the burden of proof at trial.
The nonmovant can satisfy its burden by tendering depositions, affidavits, and other competent evidence to buttress its claim.... Summary judgment is appropriate, therefore, if the nonmovant fails to set forth specific facts, by affidavits or otherwise, to show there is a genuine issue for trial.
Topalian v. Ehrman, 954 F.2d 1125, 1131-31 (5th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 825, 113 S.Ct. 82, 121 L.Ed.2d 46 (1992) (internal citations omitted).
When a party moves for summary judgment on an issue for which it bears the burden of proof at trial, it must demonstrate the absence of a fact issue as to that issue. Lindsey v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 16 F.3d 616, 618 (5th Cir.1994).
The district court improperly analyzed this case. This is not a circumstantial evidence case, where we apply the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework; rather, this is a direct evidence case. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121, 105 S.Ct. 613, 621-22, 83 L.Ed.2d 523 (1985).
A plaintiff can prove discrimination in two ways, either Mooney v. Aramco Services, Co., 54 F.3d 1207, 1216 (5th Cir.1995) (internal citation omitted). "The shifting burdens of proof set forth in McDonnell Douglas are designed to assure that the plaintiff has his day in court despite the unavailability of direct evidence." Trans World Airlines, 469 U.S. at 121, 105 S.Ct. at 622 (internal quotations omitted); see Mooney, 54 F.3d at 1217. "In the rare situation in which the evidence establishes that an employer openly discriminates against an individual it is not necessary to apply the mechanical formula of McDonnell Douglas to establish an inference of discrimination." Moore v. U.S.D.A., 55 F.3d 991, 995 (5th Cir.1995); see Trans World Airlines, 469 U.S. at 121, 105 S.Ct. at 621-22 ().
In the instant case there is direct evidence that Children's World made an employment decision because of a disability. Children's World does not deny that Rizzo was removed from driving duties because of her hearing impairment. Therefore, we need not engage in the McDonnell Douglas presumptions in order to infer discrimination: Children's World admits that it discriminated. Children's World, however, contends that it had a reason to discriminate. It argues that Rizzo's driving of the van would pose a direct...
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