Jacobs v. Corley, 51393

• Decision Date: 21 April 1987
• Docket Number: No. 51393,51393
• Citation: 732 S.W.2d 910
• Parties: R. JACOBS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Marilyn CORLEY, Defendant-Respondent.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

Page 910

732 S.W.2d 910

R. JACOBS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Marilyn CORLEY, Defendant-Respondent.

No. 51393.

Missouri Court of Appeals,

Eastern District,

Division Four.

April 21, 1987.

Rehearing Denied July 21, 1987.

R. Jacobs, Clayton, for plaintiff-appellant.

Frank William Kriegel, Clayton, for defendant-respondent.

SIMON, Judge.

Plaintiff, R. Jacobs, appeals from an order entered in the Circuit Court of St. Louis County sustaining defendant's, Marilyn Corley, motion to dismiss Jacobs' petition for breach of contingent attorney fee contract and fraud. Even though the trial court dismissed the action without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the dismissal, nonetheless, serves as a final and appealable judgment. Hasemeier v. Smith, 361 S.W.2d 697, 699 (Mo. banc 1962).

This is the second action involving these parties. The initial action was an interpleader in which these parties cross claimed against each other. In that action Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. filed an interpleader to determine whether Jacobs or Corley was entitled to the cash portion of a settlement between Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. (Dean Witter) and Corley. Jacobs represented Corley as her attorney and claimed a portion of the settlement for his attorney fees.

Before the interpleader was filed, Jacobs and Corley had agreed to arbitration in order to settle the fee dispute. Pursuant to the arbitration, Jacobs was awarded $10,172.28. Corley refused to pay this amount and offered Jacobs $5,030.68. Both Jacobs and Corley refused to allow Dean Witter to disburse a portion of the settlement including the disputed claim. Thus followed the interpleader suit by Dean Witter in which numerous cross claims were filed between Jacobs and Corley. Jacobs' cross claim was set forth in three counts: Count I requested the confirmation of the arbitration award; Count II alleged prima facie tort for Corley's refusal to release any funds due him and his lost interest; Count III alleged abuse of process for Corley's failure to abide by the arbitration agreement after the award. Corley's cross claim also set forth three counts: Count I requested that the arbitration award be set aside because the award was allegedly procured by fraud and corruption, and because the arbitrators exceeded their powers, and because the arbitrators refused to hear evidence material to the controversy. § 435.405 RSMo (Supp.1980) (all further references shall be to RSMo 1980, unless otherwise provided); Count II sought damages for conversion of brokerage account records; Count III alleged prima facie tort for Jacobs' refusal to release funds held by Dean Witter to Corley.

Subsequent to a hearing, the trial court found for Corley on Counts I and II of Corley's cross claim. It set aside the arbitration award on Count I and awarded nominal damages on Count II. The trial court, however, did not designate the reason for vacating the arbitration award. As to Count III of Corley's cross claim, the trial court found for Jacobs. On Counts I, II and III of Jacobs' cross claim, the trial court found for Corley and against Jacobs. Jacobs appealed, and we dismissed for failure to provide a complete transcript. See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Corley and Jacobs, 699 S.W.2d 21 (Mo.App.1985), for a more complete statement of the facts giving rise to this action.

Subsequent to the dismissal of his first appeal, Jacobs instituted a new action against Corley alleging breach of contract in Count I and fraud in Count II. The subject matter of Jacobs' new action is the same contingent attorney fee contract, forming the basis of the interpleader action. Corley filed a motion to dismiss claiming the issues of fact and law were previously litigated. She alleged that even if new issues are presented by his petition Jacobs is precluded under Rule 55.32 from litigating them in a separate action, in that, he failed to raise them in response to Corley's cross claim in the previous Dean Witter action. The trial court sustained Corley's motion to dismiss without prejudice, but did not make any findings or conclusions.

On appeal, Jacobs contends that the trial court erred in dismissing his cause of action because: (1) he is entitled to file an original suit on a final arbitration or request a new arbitration when an arbitration award is vacated; (2) a binding, nonappealable arbitration award permitted him to rely on its efficacy without asserting existing causes of action until such award was vacated; (3) the issues of fact and law have not been previously litigated. We reverse and remand.

In support of his points, Jacobs contends that § 435.405 entitles him to file a new action on claims existing at the time of arbitration following the vacation of the arbitration award.

Section 435.405 RSMo (1980) provides in pertinent part:

1. Upon application of a party, the court shall vacate an award where:

(1) The award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means;

(2) There was evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral or corruption in any of the arbitrators or misconduct prejudicing the rights of any party;

(3) The arbitrators exceeded their powers;

(4) The arbitrators refused to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause being shown therefor or refused to hear evidence material to the controversy or otherwise so conducted the hearing, contrary to the provisions of section 435.370, as to prejudice substantially the rights of a party; or

(5) There was no arbitration agreement and the issue was not adversely determined in proceedings under section 435.355 and the party did not participate in the arbitration hearing without raising the objection;

but the fact that the relief was such that it could not or would not be granted by a court of law or equity is not ground for vacating or refusing to confirm the award.

In addition, subsection 3 of § 435.405 provides in pertinent part:

3. In vacating the award on grounds other than stated in subdivision (5) of subsection 1 of this section the court may order a rehearing before new arbitrators chosen as provided in the agreement, or in the absence thereof, by the court in accordance with section 435.360, or if the award is vacated on grounds set forth in subdivisions (3) and (4) of subsection 1 of this section the court may order a rehearing before the arbitrators who made the award or their successors appointed in accordance with section 435.360. ...

Since the trial court in the first action did not make any specific findings and/or conclusions, we are not advised of the ground or grounds on which the award was vacated. In any event, our Supreme Court in Pope Construction Co. v. State Highway Commission, 337 Mo. 30, 84 S.W.2d 920 (1935), had occasion to construe the predecessor of § 435.405, the relevant provisions of which are substantially identical. In Pope, the court held that if an arbitration award is vacated then "the parties to the controversy are in the same position they were in before they entered into the arbitration pact." Id. at 921. Pope, however, is somewhat distinguishable because cross claims were not filed therein. Pope only concerned a vacated arbitration award. Here, Jacobs and Corley advanced cross claims against each other in the interpleader action. The trial court heard the cross claims and entered judgment thereon. The mere setting aside of the arbitration award does not place the parties here "in the same position they were in before they entered into the arbitration pact." The principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel operate to forever bar relitigation of the cross claims and issues disposed of.

Here, Corley argues that Jacobs is attempting to relitigate those cross claims and issues previously litigated in the interpleader action. Corley claims that "the issues, subject matter, and transactions sought to be litigated by [Jacobs] in his present petition are identical to the same issues, subject matter, and transactions involved in the earlier case." Corley concludes that Jacobs is precluded from relitigating the same issues and facts by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel.

Traditionally, res judicata precludes the same parties from relitigating the same claim (claim preclusion), whereas collateral estoppel precludes the same parties from relitigating issues which have been previously adjudicated (issue preclusion). Oates v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 583 S.W.2d 713, 719 (Mo. banc 1979). Missouri courts hold that four concurring elements must be present to support res judicata: (1) the identity of the thing sued for; (2) the identity of the cause of action; (3) the identity of the parties to the cause of action; and (4) the identity of the quality or capacity of the person for or against whom a claim is made. See Eugene Alper Construction Co., Inc. v. Joe Garavelli's, 655 S.W.2d 132, 136 (Mo.App.1983), and cases cited therein. As to collateral estoppel, the court in reviewing its applicability should consider: (1) whether the issue decided in the prior adjudication is identical with the issue presented in the present action; (2) whether the prior adjudication resulted in a judgment on the merits; (3) whether the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication; and (4) whether the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior suit. Oates, 583 S.W.2d at 719.

We conclude that neither res judicata nor collateral estoppel precludes Jacobs from proceeding with the instant action. Res judicata fails because of the lack of the identity of the claims. Jacobs' claims in the first action pertain to affirming the arbitration award, an alleged intentional tort for refusing to allow the disbursement of funds, and an alleged abuse of process for failure to abide by the arbitration award. It is apparent that none of these...