Jacobs v. Fouse

• Decision Date: 14 June 1876
• Citation: 23 Minn. 51
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court
• Parties: MARY JACOBS <I>vs.</I> JOHN FOUSE.

Page 51

23 Minn. 51

MARY JACOBS vs. JOHN FOUSE.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

June 14, 1876.

Appeal by defendant from an order of the district court for Nicollet county, Hanscome, J., presiding, overruling a demurrer to the complaint. The substance of the complaint is stated in the opinion.

Ladd & Stone, for appellant.

Cox & Gronlund, for respondent.

BERRY, J.

In § 7, art. 6, of our constitution it is declared that "a probate court shall have jurisdiction over the estates of deceased persons, and persons under guardianship, but no other jurisdiction except as prescribed in this constitution." The word "estates" is used only with reference to deceased persons, so that the proper reading of the constitutional provision is that a probate court shall have jurisdiction over the estates of deceased persons, and over persons under guardianship, etc. The jurisdiction over persons under guardianship embraces jurisdiction over their affairs in general, including the management and disposition of their property.

As the jurisdiction conferred is over persons under guardianship, it is contended in the case at bar that, when the guardianship ceases, the jurisdiction ceases, so that it is not competent for a probate court to settle the account of the guardian of a minor ward after such ward has become of age. If the words "persons under guardianship" were to be understood in the strictly literal sense of persons under guardianship at the precise time when the jurisdiction is exercised, this result would appear to follow. But this construction would be impractically narrow. It would deprive the probate courts of large and important portions of the jurisdiction which, at the time of the adoption of the constitution and prior thereto, they possessed and exercised under the statutes passed in pursuance of the organic act, and which they have, without challenge, continued to exercise, down to the present time, under the same statutes, or others from time to time enacted. This construction would deprive the probate courts of power to appoint a guardian where none had been appointed, or one had been removed. It would deprive them of the power of authorizing a guardian's bond to be prosecuted, under Gen. St. c. 55, after a ward had reached majority. It would deprive them of the power to compel a guardian — a creature of their own appointment — to settle his account after the ward had become of age and — what is perhaps equally or more important — it would, after the same event, deprive the guardian of the privilege of making a final settlement of his accounts in the court by which he was appointed, and under the direction of which he had acted. Indeed, unless possibly by some proceeding in chancery, the guardian would be unable to effect a settlement at all, after his ward had become of age, except at the latter's pleasure. It is not necessary to multiply instances of other inconveniences and hardships which would follow from the construction suggested. We do not think such is the proper construction of the constitutional provision, or that it was intended to have any such effect. If it was, the course of legislation upon the powers and duties of probate courts and the uniform practice of the eighteen years which have elapsed since the adoption of the constitution, are simply unaccountable.

In our opinion, it is the design and effect of the constitutional provision under consideration to invest the probate courts with a general jurisdiction over the subject of guardianship. To this end they possess authority to put persons...