Jacobs v. Jacobs

• Decision Date: 19 December 2018
• Docket Number: 2018–02990,Docket No. O–5137–14/17A
• Citation: 90 N.Y.S.3d 131,167 A.D.3d 890
• Parties: In the Matter of Kent JACOBS, Respondent, v. Samuel JACOBS, Sr., Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

167 A.D.3d 890

90 N.Y.S.3d 131

In the Matter of Kent JACOBS, Respondent,

v.Samuel JACOBS, Sr., Appellant.

2018–02990

Docket No. O–5137–14/17A

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

Submitted—November 5, 2018

December 19, 2018

Yasmin Daley Duncan, Brooklyn, NY, for appellant.

Kent Jacobs, Hopewell Junction, NY, respondent pro se.

Kelley M. Enderley, Poughkeepsie, NY, attorney for the child.

ALAN D. SCHEINKMAN, P.J., MARK C. DILLON, HECTOR D. LASALLE, VALERIE BRATHWAITE NELSON, JJ.

DECISION & ORDER

In a family offense proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 8, Samuel Jacobs, Sr., appeals from an order of the Family Court, Dutchess County (Joseph A. Egitto, J.), dated December 8, 2017. The order, after a hearing, upon finding good cause to extend an order of protection of the same court dated April 23, 2015, for a period of five years, extended the order of protection for a period of five years.

ORDERED that the order dated December 8, 2017, is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

An order of protection dated April 23, 2015, directed Samuel Jacobs, Sr. (hereinafter the father), to stay away from and refrain from harassing his son, Kent Jacobs (hereinafter the petitioner), for a period of two years. The order of protection was affirmed by this Court, which found sufficient evidence in the record that the father "engaged in a course of conduct, consisting of letters and phone calls, which alarmed the petitioner and served no legitimate purpose," and determined that "[t]hese acts constituted harassment in the second degree, warranting the issuance of an order of protection ( Penal Law § 240.26[3] )" ( Matter of Jacobs v. Jacobs , 138 A.D.3d 742, 743, 27 N.Y.S.3d 884 ).

In March 2017, the petitioner moved to extend the order of protection. After a hearing, the Family Court determined that the petitioner had shown good cause to extend the order of protection for five years. The father appeals.

Family Court Act § 842 provides that upon motion, the Family Court may "extend the order of protection for a reasonable period of time upon a showing of good cause or consent of the parties. The fact that abuse has not occurred during the pendency of an order shall not, in itself, constitute sufficient ground for denying or failing to extend the order." Good cause generally signifies a sound basis or legitimate need to take judicial action, and "in determining whether good cause has been established, courts should consider, but are not limited by, the following factors: the nature of the relationship between the parties, taking into account their former relationship, the circumstances leading up to the entry of the initial order of protection, and the state of the relationship at the time of the request for an extension; the frequency of interaction between the parties; any subsequent instances of domestic violence or violations of the existing order of protection; and whether the current circumstances are such that concern for the safety and well-being of the petitioner is reasonable" ( Matter of Molloy v. Molloy , 137 A.D.3d 47, 53, 24 N.Y.S.3d 333 ).

Here, the finding of good...