Jacobs v. Jacobs
| Decision Date | 08 June 1966 |
| Docket Number | No. 2,CA-CIV,2 |
| Citation | 415 P.2d 151,3 Ariz.App. 436 |
| Parties | Arthur W. JACOBS and Rose Jacobs, his wife, Appellants, v. Edward C. JACOBS and Caroline B. Jacobs, husband and wife, Appellees and Cross-Appellants. * 80. |
| Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
Fickett & Dunipace, Robert D. Stauffer, by Fred W. Fickett, Tucson, for appellants.
Boyle, Bilby, Thompson & Shoenhair, by W. E. Dolph, Jr., Tucson, for appellees and cross-appellants.
Appellants were plaintiffs in an action to establish and terminate a trust, and appellees are cross-appellants on a claim to quiet title to land in Pima county, and a claim for money due on loans made to plaintiffs. They will be referred to in this opinion as plaintiffs and defendants as they appeared in the lower court. There were no findings of fact, so we will briefly state so much of the evidence as is pertinent to this opinion. The plaintiff, Arthur W. Jacobs, and defendant, Edward C. Jacobs, are brothers. The land involved is four patented mining claims located in Pima county, known as the 'Goat Ranch.' In December 1945, Arthur Jacobs purchased the property in his own name from the State of Arizona through the Pima County Board of Supervisors, it having been deeded to the state because of nonpayment of taxes. Edward had previously owned an interest in the property and furnished Arthur the money with which to purchase the property from the state after Arthur had informed him that he had read a notice advertising the property for sale. In 1951, Arthur delivered to Edward a quitclaim deed to the property. Arthur's wife, Rose Jacobs, refused to sign a quitclaim deed, and Edward then filed a quiet title action against both Arthur and Rose, who defaulted, and on March 17, 1953, judgment was taken against them quieting title in Edward.
In August 1954, Arthur and Edward entered into an agreement setting out that: (1) the property had been purchased with money furnished by Edward with the understanding that it would be jointly owned by them, and that Arthur would hold a one-half interest in trust for , Edward, (2) in June 1951, Arthur had conveyed to Edward with the understanding that Edward would hold a one-half interest in trust for Arthur, (3) Edward might sell at his discretion, but that upon sale Edward was to deduct the sum of $1,700 and any expenses, and then divided the proceeds equally between them, and (4) the parties agreed that Edward did then hold in trust a one-half interest in the property subject to the conditions just stated. The purported trust agreement was drafted by Carlos G. Robles, a Tucson attorney and brother-in-law of Arthur Jacobs, who testified that he was a friend of the brothers and put in the agreement the claim of each brother as stated by them.
It appears that Arthur found a purchaser willing to give $16,000 for the property, but Edward refused to sell unless Arthur would accept $2,000 as his sole share of the proceeds of the sale. Edward apparently threatened to convey the property to a relative for $1,700. As a result of the differences between the brothers, Arthur brought an action to establish his rights under the purported trust agreement, to terminate the purported trust, to appoint a receiver to sell the property, and to enjoin the sale of the property for less than its reasonable market value.
Defendants counterclaimed asking: (1) that title be quieted in them, (2) that the purported trust agreement be adjudged of no effect, (3) for a judgment in the sum of $800 for loans made to plaintiffs, and (4) for costs and attorney's fees.
Plaintiffs appeal from the judgment of the superior court quieting title in defendants, and defendants appeal from that part of the judgment denying attorney's fees, denying recovery on the loans, and ordering that the parties bear their own costs.
Plaintiffs base their assignments of error and argument squarely on the theory that their right to relief arises from a trust agreement and not from any theory of extrinsic or intrinsic fraud. In advancing the theory that Edward was holding the property in trust, plaintiffs argue that when Edward sued Arthur and his wife to quiet title he was suing as a trustee for the purpose of removing the cloud upon the legal title by virtue of the refusal of Arthur's wife to sign the quitclaim deed. They support their contentions with the legal propositions that: (1) a trustee must act in the interest of the trust; (2) where the trustee moves to establish title in himself as sole owner of the fee of the trust he is guilty of fraud upon the beneficiary of the trust; (3) where a trustee brings a quiet title action only to perfect legal title in himself as a trustee he does not violate the trust and is not guilty of frauds; (4) in cases of an ambiguity of the act of the trustee the law will presume the trustee performed the act for a proper motive; (5) property acquired by a trustee or by one holding in a trust relationship, is unaffected by the marital status of the trustee; and (6) where a trustee holds legal title to real property to be sold and the proceeds divided, the beneficial interest is personal property.
We will not attempt to discuss the propositions in full for the reason that we feel that they have no application in this action. Had they been urged by defendants in an answer to the 1953 quiet title action against Arthur and his wife they may well have caused a more just settlement of the dispute between the brothers and their wives and we would not find ourselves trying to fathom the dealings of these brothers starting in December 1945.
Plaintiffs' position is that after the purchase from the state, Arthur held in trust an undivided one-half equitable interest for Edward, and that the position reversed upon Arthur's deed to Edward in 1951. The testimony of the two brothers differed widely concerning the original purchase from the state. Arthur claimed that Edward gave him the money to bid on the property with instructions to hold it in Arthur's name, and upon sale they would split the profits. Edward's version was that he had asked Arthur to bid for him, but that Arthur had bid in his own name without Edward's knowledge, and that when he found out about it he had demanded a deed back from Arthur which was delivered on June 15, 1951.
There were no findings of fact requested. There was evidence from which the court could have concluded that there was no oral agreement to share in the land or the proceeds of its sale prior to the execution of the purported trust agreement in August 1954. Edward explained the agreement by testifying that he signed the agreement only because Arthur was in financial distress, and at the time it was signed the value of the property was such that each would have profited to the extent of approximately $2,000. Under the circumstances we must assume that the trial court found the facts essential to sustain the judgment, there being testimony, although conflicting, from which it reasonably could have done so. Porter v. Porter, 67 Ariz. 273, 195 P.2d 132 (1948); Rossi v. Stewart, 90 Ariz. 207, 367 P.2d 242 (1961). The deed from Arthur to Edward was prepared by Arthur and contained no indication that he was conveying to a trustee or that he retained any interest in the property. The testimony of Edward was that Arthur's wife had refused to sign a later quitclaim deed because she in the past had experienced some kind of difficulty by signing papers. Since Edward was also married it is difficult to see how the plaintiffs could think that the title would be any more merchantable in the name of Edward than in the name of Arthur. Edward may have appeared to be impeached upon a showing that in 1947, 1948, and 1949 he had paid taxes on the property. The 1949 tax receipt, the only one in evidence, showed the property was among twenty pieces of property assessed to Arthur. Edward testified that during the period from 1947 to 1951 Arthur managed a hotel and ran errands for him, such as making tax payments. Upon further questioning by the court Edward testified that he first knew that the property was in Arthur's name shortly after the death of their father in 1950. We cannot say that the evidence clearly shows that Edward knew the property was in the name of Arthur prior to 1950.
Defendants contend that the former quiet title judgment is res judicata and not subject to collateral attack. The complaint therein sets out that Edward was the owner in fee simple; that the defendants claimed some estate, interest or right adverse and in conflict with plaintiffs' title; and that the defendants had 'no Estate, right, title, Claim or Interest in said lands, or any part thereof, and the claims of the defendants were without any right whatsoever.' (Emphasis added.) The prayer of the complaint prayed for judgment that title to the lands be in plaintiff 'free and clear of any claim of the defendants, and that defendants be barred and forever estopped from claiming or having any Right or title to the lands above described adverse to plaintiff.' (Emphasis added.) The judgment, signed on March 17, 1953, found that 'the allegations of plaintiff's amended complaint are true.' It adjudged that the plaintiff have judgment as prayed for; that all adverse claims of defendants were invalid and groundless; that the 'plaintiff be, and he is hereby declared and adjudged to be, the True and lawful owner of the land, described in his amended complaint * * *' (emphasis added); '* * * that his title thereto is adjudged to be quieted against all claims or demands of the defendants, or either of them, who are hereby perpetually estopped from setting up any claim or claims thereto * * *.' It is an incredulous assumption to suppose that Arthur could have thought that the statement that he had 'no estate, right, title, claim or interest' in land would be subject to an interpretation that he in fact owned...
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Nutt v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue (In re Estate of Nutt) , Docket Nos. 77669 and 77670.
...our attention has been directed or which we have found dealing with the nature of funds in a joint bank account is Jacobs v. Jacobs, 3 Ariz.App. 436, 415 P.2d 151 (1966). That case involved an issue of whether certain patented mining claims which had been purchased in 1945 with funds taken ......
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...obtain another and independent judgment which will destroy the effect of the former judgment"). 6.APTL's reliance on Jacobs v. Jacobs, 3 Ariz. App. 436, 415 P.2d 151 (1966), is misplaced. In that case, the court held the plaintiffs could not, in a new action, attack a prior judgment quietin......