Jacobs v. Taylor, s. 77416-77421

• Decision Date: 17 February 1989
• Docket Number: Nos. 77416-77421,s. 77416-77421
• Citation: 190 Ga.App. 520,379 S.E.2d 563
• Parties: JACOBS et al. v. TAYLOR et al. JACOBS et al. v. MURRAY et al. JACOBS et al. v. STARRETT et al. TAYLOR et al. v. DELATORRE. MURRAY et al. v. DELATORRE. STARRETT et al. v. DELATORRE.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 563

379 S.E.2d 563

190 Ga.App. 520

JACOBS et al. v. TAYLOR et al.

JACOBS et al. v. MURRAY et al.

JACOBS et al. v. STARRETT et al.

TAYLOR et al. v. DELATORRE.

MURRAY et al. v. DELATORRE.

STARRETT et al. v. DELATORRE.

Nos. 77416-77421.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Feb. 17, 1989.

Rehearing Denied March 1, 1989.

Certiorari Denied April 6, 1989.

Michael J. Bowers, Atty. Gen., H. Perry Michael, First Asst. Atty. Gen., William C. Joy, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Mary Foil Russell, Asst. Atty. Gen., Thomas J. Mahoney, Jr., Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., for Jacobs, et al.

Karsman, Brooks, Painter & Callaway, James L. Drake, Jr., David H. Connolly, Jr., and Edward M. Hughes, Savannah, for Taylor, et al.

SOGNIER, Judge.

The children of Marjorie Love Murray, William J. Quinlan, and Roma L. Quinlan, hereinafter referred to collectively as "Taylor," brought suit against seven psychiatrists who had treated or had administrative contact with Ronald Edwin Murray, the murderer of their parents, seeking damages for the doctors' alleged negligence in allowing Murray to be released, in failing to exercise proper control over Murray, in failing to warn the victims of Murray's release, and in failing to comply with the provisions of OCGA § 37-3-1 et seq. so as to be entitled to the good faith immunity set forth in OCGA § 37-3-4. The trial court denied the motions for summary judgment made by doctors Louis Jacobs, Lorenzo Lecumberri, and Simon Speriosu, and this court granted their applications for interlocutory appeal in Case Nos. 77416-77418. Cross appeals were taken in Case Nos. 77419-77421 from the grant of summary judgment in favor of the remaining four doctors, but the notices of appeal in those cases specified the judgment only insofar as Dr. Jose M. Delatorre is concerned. While Taylor acknowledges that no appeal is taken from the grant of summary judgment as to one of the remaining doctors, Taylor included arguments addressing the remaining two doctors in the enumerations and briefs before this court, despite the failure to name them in the notices of appeal. OCGA § 5-6-37. However, in view of the peculiar factual circumstances in these appeals which result in our holdings being directly applicable to the remaining doctors, one a clinical director at Central State Hospital and the other the superintendent at Georgia Regional Hospital, we necessarily address Taylor's arguments in regard to these two doctors as if Taylor had properly presented them as cross appellees in Case Nos. 77419-77421.

The record reveals that Ronald Edwin Murray, having been found not guilty by reason of insanity of the murder of Thomas Allen, was committed to Central State Hospital where he was treated by Jacobs beginning in September 1978. Under the version of OCGA § 17-7-131 applicable to Murray, he was entitled to be released when "the court which committed him finds and determines that [he] does not meet the criteria for civil commitment under Chapter 3 or 4 of Title 37." Former OCGA § 17-7-131(a). In May 1979, Murray filed a writ of habeas corpus seeking to be released from the hospital. Jacobs and the clinical director at Central State Hospital testified at the hearing on the petition, stating as their medical opinions that Murray did not meet the criteria for civil commitment under the version of OCGA § 37-3-1 et seq. then applicable, specifically OCGA § 37-3-1(12). Pursuant to former OCGA § 17-7-131(b), the Baldwin County Superior Court ordered Murray's release from Central State Hospital.

In March 1980, Murray had himself admitted as a voluntary patient to Georgia Regional Hospital in Savannah. After initially being treated by the doctor no longer involved in this suit, Murray was treated by Lecumberri from mid-March until Murray left the hospital without permission in early April 1980. In his affidavit, Lecumberri stated that because Murray was in the hospital on a voluntary basis, he could be brought back to the hospital on an involuntary basis only if he met the civil commitment criteria. Lecumberri determined that Murray did not meet the criteria for involuntary commitment, could not be brought back to the hospital involuntarily, and so completed an administrative discharge of Murray on April 8, 1980, after which Lecumberri had no further contact with Murray. On April 2, 1980, after the time Murray left the hospital, Murray allegedly threatened to kill his former wife, Marjorie Love Murray. When Murray returned to the hospital on April 14th to collect his belongings, Speriosu was contacted by the hospital's admissions office to do a psychiatric examination of Murray. In his affidavit Speriosu averred that at that time he found no sign of acute psychosis or suicidal or homicidal ideations in Murray and thus determined that Murray was not dangerous to himself or to others. He therefore determined that Murray did not meet the criteria for civil commitment and should not be admitted to the hospital on an involuntary basis. Speriosu had no further contact with Murray. The records at Georgia Regional Hospital indicate that because the staff was aware Murray had previously been found not guilty of murder by reason of insanity, calls were made to a local judge, Judge Robert Cook, who requested Murray be held, and that Murray left the hospital in the company of a deputy sheriff, who took him to jail. The records also reveal that the superintendent of the hospital during this time, who stated in his affidavit that he had no contact with Murray, could not recall reviewing Murray's record, and neither provided care nor assisted in the diagnosis, treatment, admission or discharge of Murray, did sign a form letter addressed to Judge Cook in which the superintendent stated that Murray was evaluated by hospital staff and the recommendation made by the staff was that hospitalization was not needed at that time, so Murray was released to the municipal court deputies. It does not appear, however, that Murray was incarcerated or otherwise detained by the authorities after his departure from the hospital.

In August 1980, Murray was arrested in Chatham County on charges of making terroristic threats against his former wife stemming from the April 2, 1980 incident. In October 1980, the Chatham County Superior Court, determining that the jail's facilities were not adequate to care properly for Murray, ordered Murray admitted to Central State Hospital, Forensic Services Division, to be treated until he had progressed sufficiently to be returned to the jail. Delatorre evaluated Murray upon his admission and found him to be psychotic, delusional, and disorganized. Delatorre recommended Murray be transferred to a treatment ward, where he came under the treatment of Jacobs, the ward physician. In January 1981, Jacobs recommended that Delatorre reevaluate Murray, who did so and determined Murray was sufficiently improved to be released back to the custody of the Chatham County sheriff's office pursuant to the court's order. Murray was released to the Chatham County jail on January 9, 1981, which is the last date any of the doctors in this case had any contact with Murray. After the superior court found Murray competent to stand trial on the terroristic threats charge, Murray was tried, acquitted, and released from custody in April 1981. On June 12, 1981, Murray murdered Taylor's decedents.

1. The trial court erred by denying summary judgment in favor of Jacobs, Lecumberri and Speriosu, and acted properly by granting summary judgment in favor of Delatorre and the remaining doctors. Although Taylor argues the doctors are liable for their negligent or recklessly indifferent examinations, diagnoses and treatments rendered Murray, even assuming the care given Murray was negligent and that the doctors knew it was inadequate, the gravamen of Taylor's complaint is that the doctors breached their duty to control Murray by negligently releasing or allowing him to be released, and it is on this issue that Taylor's complaints fall.

(a) As to Murray's September 1978-May 1979 commitment at Central State Hospital, under the law in effect at the time of the facts in this case, "[a] person committed to [a facility such as Central State Hospital] pursuant to this Code section shall not be released from confinement unless and until, after notice and hearing, the court which committed him finds and determines that the person does not meet the criteria for civil commitment," in this instance under OCGA § 37-3-1 et seq. (Emphasis supplied.) Former OCGA § 17-7-131(a). The judge, as the jury and finder of fact, was not bound by the opinions of expert witnesses such as Jacobs and the clinical director who testified at Murray's habeas corpus hearing. See Moses v. State, 167 Ga.App. 556, 558-560, 307 S.E.2d 35 (1983). Indeed, the record reveals that the Baldwin County Superior Court had rejected an earlier application for Murray's release in which Jacobs had likewise testified that Murray did not meet the criteria for civil commitment. Taylor argues that the courts are generally not in a position to evaluate objectively the opinions of psychiatrists and cites Hicks v. United States, 511 F.2d 407, 415-416 (D.C.Cir.1975) for the proposition that a third party's suit against a psychiatrist for injuries incurred by a court-released patient is not barred by the intervening court order where the evidence entertained by the court included testimony by psychiatrists based on their negligent treatment and/or evaluation of the patient. In Hicks the hospital was found negligent in its failure to transmit adequate information to the court concerning the patient's mental condition, in that the court was informed in unqualified language that the patient was "recovered." Id. at 415-417. No such "unqualified recovery" language was presented to the Baldwin County Superior Court by Jacobs and the clinical director. Rather, Jacobs and the clinical director both told the Baldwin County Superior Court...