Jacobsen v. Iowa Dept. of Transp.
| Decision Date | 07 May 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. 4:12-cv-00446 - JEG,4:12-cv-00446 - JEG |
| Parties | HARLAN L. JACOBSEN, Plaintiff, v. IOWA DEPT. OF TRANSPORTATION; PAUL TROMBINO III, DIRECTOR OF IOWA DOT, Individually and in That Capacity; STEVEN McMENAMIN, REST AREA ADMINISTRATOR, IOWA DOT, Individually and in That Capacity; ROBERT YOUNIE, DIRECTOR OF MAINTENANCE, Individually and in That Capacity; and DAVID GORHAM, SPECIAL ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, Individually and in That Capacity, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Iowa |
This matter is before the Court on Motion of Defendants Iowa Department of Transportation (IDOT), Paul Trombino III (Trombino), Steven McMenamin (McMenamin), Robert Younie (Younie), and David Gorham (Gorham) to Dismiss Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).1 Plaintiff Harlan Jacobsen (Jacobsen) resists. A hearing was not requested, and the Court finds a hearing is unnecessary. Accordingly, the matter is fully submitted and ready for disposition.
Jacobsen is an individual who resides in Tempe, Arizona, and owns a newspaper publishing and distribution business located in Sioux Falls, South Dakota. He publishes newspapers like "Country Singles," "Iowa Casino Fun," "Diabetes Cure 101," "18 Wheel Singles," and "Add15 Years," which are distributed on either monthly or quarterly bases at Iowa public rest areas along the interstate highway system. Jacobsen alleges Defendants used a corrosive ice melt on the sidewalks at Iowa's public rest areas, and that they used the ice melt in order to damage Jacobsen's newsrack machines to "kill [his] sales." Compl., p. 3, ECF No. 1. Additionally, Jacobsen asserts he "has been thru [sic] 19 years of []so called Constitutionally protected distribution hell with Iowa DOT and has sought Court assistance three times because of constant barrage of new tricks to eliminate and destroy Plaintiffs [sic] rights to distribute." Id. at 4.
During the 19 years that Jacobsen has distributed newspapers in Iowa, he claims Defendants "have moved [his] machines at will, away from all foot traffic, have as a result cut [his] distribution sales to inadequate to pay costs of distribution, and have in each and every case ended distribution for all other for sale publications who left." Id. Most recently, he alleges that Defendants were selectively salting the public rest areas for one winter season, with the intention of corroding any metal newspaper racks that they disliked. Further, he contends Defendants threatened to seize and dispose of his now-degraded machines without his permission.
Jacobsen filed a Complaint alleging violation of his free speech and due process rights under the federal and state constitutions against Defendants on September 24, 2012. Jacobsen challenges Defendants' actions and any law supporting their actions in using the ice melt and then asking Jacobsen to fix or move his machines, and he asserts both facial and as applied challenges. Jacobsen requested declaratory relief; damages in excess of two million dollars, court costs, and attorney fees under 41 U.S.C. § 1983; and temporary and permanent injunctive relief. He specifically requested that this Court enjoin Defendants "from removing, seizing or disposing of Jacobsen's newsracks, newspapers and receipts, from sidewalk areas of the highway rest stop system," as he has no adequate remedy at law. Id. at 8. Defendants filed a Motion toDismiss Jacobsen's Complaint on October 26, 2012, pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Jacobsen resisted the motion on November 15, 2012.
Rule 8(a)(2) requires only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." However, the "plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (alteration in original). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The Plaintiff's complaint must be read as a whole, rather than "parsed piece by piece to determine whether each allegation, in isolation, is plausible." Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 594 (8th Cir. 2009) ).
Under the current pleading standard, "[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Thus, the Court, in examining a motion to dismiss, must determine whether the Plaintiff raises a plausible claim of entitlement to relief after assuming all factual allegations in the Complaint to be true. Id. at 678-79.
As a preliminary procedural matter, Defendants contend any of Jacobsen's constitutional claims alleging action taken before September 24, 2010, are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. It has long been the rule that "all section 1983 claims accruing within a particular state are to be governed by that state's personal injury statute of limitations." Wycoff v. Menke, 773 F.2d 983, 984 (8th Cir. 1985); see also Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 280 (superseded by statute on other grounds, Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089, as recognized in Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons, Co., 541 U.S. 369, 378 (2004)) (1985) (concluding that claims brought under section 1983 "are best characterized as personal injury actions"). Iowa's personal injury statute of limitations is set forth in Iowa Code § 614.1(2), and it only allows suit within two years from the alleged injury. See Iowa Code § 614.1(2) (2011) (). Defendants' statute of limitations defense "may properly be asserted through a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss" when it "'appears from the face of the complaint itself that the limitation period has run.'" Wycoff, 773 F.2d at 984-85 (quoting R.W. Murray Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 697 F.2d 818, 821 (8th Cir. 1983)).
Jacobsen alleges wrongful actions by Defendants over the past 19 years, but only actions taken by Defendants on or after September 24, 2010, are actionable in this Court due to theapplicable statute of limitations, as Jacobsen did not file suit in this Court until September 24, 2012. Thus, any claims Jacobsen may have against Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 before September 24, 2010, must be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6).
The Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution states that "[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." The Supreme Court has established that "an unconsenting State is immune from suits brought in federal courts by her own citizens as well as by citizens of another state." Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984) (quotation omitted). Further, "in the absence of consent a suit in which the State or one of its agencies or departments is named as the defendant is proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment." Id. (citations omitted). "This jurisdictional bar applies regardless of the nature of the relief sought," applying to suits brought in equity or in law. Id. (citation omitted). The Eleventh Amendment "by its terms clearly applies to a suit seeking an injunction, a remedy available only from equity." Cory v. White, 457 U.S. 85, 91 (1982).
Although 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989) (citation omitted).
As explained by the Eighth Circuit, Jacobsen's claims against the IDOT must fail as a matter of law because the IDOT is a department of the State of Iowa, and neither Iowa nor the IDOT has waived its sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. See Jacobsen v. IowaDep't of Transp., 450 F.3d 778, 779-80 (8th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (); see also Doe v. Nebraska, 345 F.3d 593, 597 (8th Cir. 2003) (). All three of Jacobsen's claims against the IDOT must fail - declaratory, monetary, and injunctive - as the IDOT has not waived its sovereign immunity, and this Court therefore lacks jurisdiction over the claims against the IDOT.
Jacobsen's claims against Trombino, McMenamin, Younie, and Gorham in their official capacities must fail in the same way his claims against the IDOT failed. "The Eleventh Amendment bars a suit against state officials when 'the state is the real, substantial party in interest.'" Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 101 (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Dep't of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945)) (citations omitted). The general rule applied by cou...
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