Jacobsen v. State

• Decision Date: 06 October 1977
• Docket Number: No. 44440,44440
• Citation: 569 P.2d 1152,89 Wn.2d 104
• Parties: Samuel J. JACOBSEN a/k/a Sam Jacobsen and Catherine E. Jacobsen, his wife, Leon R. Williamson and Patricia J. Williamson, his wife, Chester Kramer and Elizabeth Kramer, his wife, George A. Petrosik and Rachel L. Petrosik, his wife, Inga Homan, a widow, William John Moorman and Helen Louise Moorman, his wife, Alice Homan Olson, a widow, Susan Ramstad and Mark Ramstad, John R. Parfitt a/k/a J. Ray Parfitt and Elnora Parfitt, his wife, Robert Smith and Edna R. Smith, his wife, Alice E. Weaver, a widow, Owen R. McGinn and Hazel M. McGinn, his wife, Edward J. Garity, Jr. and Alison A. Garity, his wife, Theo Bushnell, a widow, Roger Emerson and Mary Emerson, his wife, Respondents, v. The STATE of Washington, Ocean City Land Company, a corporation, and all other persons unknown claiming any right, title, estate or interest herein, adverse to plaintiffs' ownership, or any cloud upon plaintiffs' title thereto, Appellants.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

Page 104

89 Wn.2d 104

569 P.2d 1152

Samuel J. JACOBSEN a/k/a Sam Jacobsen and Catherine E Jacobsen, his wife, Leon R. Williamson and Patricia J Williamson, his wife, Chester Kramer and Elizabeth Kramer his wife, George A. Petrosik and Rachel L. Petrosik, his wife, Inga Homan, a widow, William John Moorman and Helen Louise Moorman, his wife, Alice Homan Olson, a widow, Susan Ramstad and Mark Ramstad, John R. Parfitt a/k/a J. Ray Parfitt and Elnora Parfitt, his wife, Robert Smith and Edna R. Smith, his wife, Alice E. Weaver, a widow, Owen R. McGinn and Hazel M. McGinn, his wife, Edward J. Garity, Jr. and Alison A. Garity, his wife, Theo Bushnell, a widow, Roger Emerson and Mary Emerson, his wife, Respondents, v. The STATE of Washington, Ocean City Land Company, a corporation, and all other persons unknown claiming any right, title, estate or interest herein, adverse to plaintiffs' ownership, or any cloud upon plaintiffs' title thereto, Appellants.

No. 44440.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

Oct. 6, 1977.

Slade Gorton, Atty. Gen., Carol Smith, Asst. Atty. Gen., Olympia, for appellants.

Omar Parker, Hoquiam, for respondents.

STAFFORD, Associate Justice.

Appellant State of Washington (State) seeks direct review of a trial court order granting plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment.

On September 26, 1975, plaintiff Jacobsen and others similarly situated brought suit in Grays Harbor County to quiet title to certain ocean front platted tracts and all accretions lying westerly thereof, naming the State and the original platter, Ocean City Land Company (Ocean City), as codefendants. Plaintiffs claimed ownership by adverse possession. Defendant State's answer alleged the land belonged to the people of the State by virtue of a deed dated March 4, 1970, in which defendant Ocean City dedicated the land in question to the State for public use. The deed of dedication was attached to and incorporated in the pleadings. Defendant Ocean City answered by general denial and also by a crossclaim not relevant to the issues herein.

On May 21, 1976, defendant Ocean City, acting through its attorney, Charles Welsh, entered into a stipulation with plaintiffs' attorney. They agreed to be bound by judgments previously entered in Grays Harbor County in Matson, et al. v. State and Ocean City Land Company, Cause No. 57037 ¹ (hereinafter Matson) and Hamilton v. State and Ocean City Land Company, Cause No. 63074 (hereinafter Hamilton). Plaintiffs in Matson and Hamilton had been adjudged the owners of certain platted lands and all accreted lands lying westerly thereof. It was further stipulated that a judgment would be entered identical to those in Matson and Hamilton and that plaintiffs would be deemed the rightful owners of the questioned land.

On May 24, 1976, judgment was entered pursuant to the above stipulation providing that this case was identical to Matson and Hamilton and that defendant Ocean City had no interest in the accreted lands lying westerly of the platted lands owned by plaintiffs. Defendant State was not a party to either the stipulation or the judgment.

On July 8, 1976, plaintiffs moved for a summary judgment against defendant State claiming there was no genuine issue of material fact and that plaintiffs were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Plaintiffs asserted that since the State had not appealed the trial court's determination in Matson, which quieted title in the upland owners and held that the State had no interest in the accreted lands in the "area" now in question, Matson was controlling in the instant case. Plaintiffs claimed further that in Matson v. State, 12 Wash.App. 635, 531 P.2d 836 (1975) defendant Ocean City was held to have no interest in the "area adjacent to the land, the title of which is being quieted" in this action. Thus, plaintiffs alleged, defendant Ocean City's deed of dedication to the defendant State, dated two years after Matson v. State, was invalid because at that time defendant Ocean City possessed no interest in the land which it could have conveyed to the State.

In July, defendant State filed an amended answer which amounted to a general denial of plaintiffs' allegations and again alleged that the State owned the contested property by virtue of the Ocean City deed of dedication. As before, the deed of dedication was attached to and incorporated in the pleadings. Defendant State also added three affirmative defenses by the following bare assertions : "Defendant State . . . sets out adverse possession, the doctrine of custom and theory of prescriptive easements as affirmative defenses . . ."

According to an affidavit of the State's attorney, interrogatories were served on plaintiffs following which plaintiffs filed objections on the ground that the motion for summary judgment would be dispositive. Plaintiffs asked that the issue as to interrogatories be continued until after the August 6 hearing on the motion for summary judgment. Defendant State moved to compel answers asserting that the summary judgment could not prevail and would not be dispositive of the issues. For reasons not disclosed by the record, this issue was not disposed of prior to the hearing on the motion for summary judgment.

On August 6, 1976, the motion for summary judgment came on for hearing. The trial court considered the pleadings including the claim of "adverse possession," the deed of dedication by which defendant Ocean City conveyed the disputed property to defendant State, the stipulation entered into between defendant Ocean City and plaintiffs, and the affidavits of the attorneys for the parties. It also considered the various legal memoranda, briefs, the Hamilton and Matson causes, and the Matson v. State decision.

The trial court gave no effect to the deed of dedication, to the stipulation between defendant Ocean City and the plaintiffs, or to defendant State's claim of "adverse possession." However, the court felt itself bound by Hamilton, Matson, and Matson v. State because these cases were concerned with "properties either adjacent to or in close proximity to the property" involved herein and because plaintiffs had prevailed against both of these defendants in each of those cases. The trial court granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and declared plaintiffs owners of the accreted lands in dispute.

Defendant State appealed directly to this court and we accepted review.

The State has assigned error to the trial court's granting of plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment; thus, the basic issue is whether there are any genuine issues of material fact which would contravene plaintiffs' motion. The purpose of the summary judgment procedure is to avoid an unnecessary trial when there is no genuine issue of material fact. However, a trial is absolutely necessary if there is a genuine issue as to any material fact. LaPlante v. State, 85 Wash.2d 154, 158, 531 P.2d 299 (1975); Morris v. McNicol, 83 Wash.2d 491, 519 P.2d 7 (1974); Preston v. Duncan, 55 Wash.2d 678, 681, 349 P.2d 605 (1960). A "material fact" is one upon which the outcome of the litigation depends. Morris v. McNicol, supra; Barber v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 81 Wash.2d 140, 500 P.2d 88 (1972). Each party must furnish the factual evidence on which he relies. Lundgren v. Kieren,64 Wash.2d 672, 677, 393 P.2d 625 (1964). CR 56(c) provides that summary judgments may be rendered on the basis of "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any," submitted by the parties. Supporting and opposing affidavits must be made on personal knowledge and must set forth facts that would be admissible in evidence and must show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify on the matters stated therein. CR 56(e).

Initially the burden is on the party moving for summary judgment to prove by uncontroverted facts that there is no genuine issue of material fact. LaPlante v. State, supra, 85 Wash.2d at 158, 531 P.2d 299; Rossiter v. Moore, 59 Wash.2d 722, 370 P.2d 250 (1962); 6 J. Moore, Federal Practice P 56.07, P 56.15(3) (2d Ed. 1948). If the moving party does not sustain that burden, summary judgment should not be entered, irrespective of whether the nonmoving party has submitted affidavits or other materials. Preston v. Duncan, supra, 55 Wash.2d at 683, 349 P.2d 605, see also Trautman, Motions for Summary Judgment: Their Use and Effect in Washington, 45 Wash.L.Rev. 1, 15 (1970). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must consider the material evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom most favorably for the nonmoving party and, when so considered, if reasonable people might reach different conclusions, the motion should be denied. Balise v. Underwood, 62 Wash.2d 195, 199, 381 P.2d 966 (1963); 45 Wash.L.Rev. at 4, 5. See also 6 Moore's Federal Practice P 56.11(3), P 56.15(3). It is in this context that we review the trial court's summary dismissal.

Plaintiffs have attempted to meet their initial burden of proof by relying on Hamilton, Matson and Matson v. State. These two cases and the subsequent appeal in Matson v. State establish that the State had no right to certain accreted lands in another area of Ocean City Land Company's plat that was, according to the trial court's findings, either "adjacent to or in close proximity to the property" here in question. Additionally, Matson and Matson v. State held that defendant Ocean City had no right to certain accreted lands in that other area. Based on the rulings in Matson and Matson v. State, as well as on the stipulation between plaintiffs and defendant Ocean City, plaintiffs contend Ocean City's deed of dedication issued two years subsequent to Matson and Matson v. State conveyed no interest in the disputed land to the State.

Plaintiffs' reliance on Matson and Matson v. State is misplaced. First, the trial court found quite correctly that the stipulation entered into between defendant Ocean City and pl...