Jacobson v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company
| Decision Date | 28 January 1916 |
| Docket Number | 19,576 - (158) |
| Citation | 156 N.W. 251,132 Minn. 181 |
| Parties | W. H. JACOBSON v. CHICAGO, MILWAUKEE & ST. PAUL RAILWAY COMPANY |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Action in the district court for Blue Earth county to recover $25,000 for injury received by plaintiff while a passenger upon defendant's mixed or accommodation train and to cancel a certain release of defendant company from all claims by reason of such injuries upon the payment of $150. The case was tried before Comstock, J., and a jury which returned a verdict for $10,000. From an order denying its motion for a new trial, defendant company appealed. Affirmed.
Jury -- submission of special issues.
1. The matter of submitting special issues to a jury in an action at law rests in the sound discretion of the trial court; and the discretion extends also to the form and substance of the special issues so submitted. There was no abuse of the discretion in this case.
Settlement and release -- rescission.
2. A settlement and release of a cause of action, induced and procured by false representations of material facts, the falsity of which was unknown to the person making them, may be rescinded and avoided, though there was no fraudulent or other wrongful intent to deceive or defraud.
Settlement and release -- reliance on false representations.
3. Plaintiff was injured while a passenger on one of defendant's trains; soon thereafter defendant's physician made a physical examination of plaintiff's person and, to induce or cause him to act thereon represented that he had suffered no serious injury, had no broken bones, and would recover in the course of two or three weeks. It is held that the representations were material plaintiff had the right to rely thereon in effecting a settlement with defendant, and since the representations were untrue in fact, though the falsity was not known to the physician at the time, and were not made with intent to deceive, plaintiff had the right to rescind the settlement. Such facts constitute fraud in law.
Charge to jury.
4. The instructions of the trial court upon the question of expert opinion evidence held not prejudicial to the rights of defendant.
C. J. Laurisch and Webber & Lees, for appellant.
S. B. Wilson, J. W. Schmitt and H. L. Schmitt, for respondent.
Action for personal injuries in which plaintiff had a verdict and defendant appealed from an order denying a new trial.
Plaintiff was a passenger upon one of defendant's accommodation trains running between Wells and Mankato. The train was wrecked and plaintiff was injured. The accident occurred on July 5, 1913, and plaintiff was removed to a hospital at Mankato, where he was given treatment by the defendant's local physician. On July 7, two days after the injury and when plaintiff was still at the hospital, a claim agent representing defendant called upon him and effected a settlement, paying to plaintiff in full for his injuries $150. Plaintiff signed and delivered the usual formal release. It was represented to him at the time of the settlement by the company physician, and also by the claim agent, that his injuries were not serious and that he would fully recover within three or four weeks. Within a few days thereafter plaintiff left the hospital and returned to his home at Mapleton, some 25 miles from Mankato. It appears that he was unable to walk unassisted and defendant's physician supplied him with a pair of crutches. He thereafter occasionally returned to Mankato for further treatment, but, not recovering as rapidly as represented by the physician, he applied, on August 4, to other physicians for relief. A thorough examination was made, an X-ray photograph taken of his back and hips, and the new physicians discovered what they termed an impacted fracture of the neck of the femur of the left leg; an injury to the sacro-iliac joint; a curvature of the spine, and a shortening of one of the legs. Thereupon he brought an action against the company to recover for his injuries, claiming that the settlement and release were obtained by fraud. That action was transferred to the Federal court where, after trial, it was dismissed without prejudice, and thereupon plaintiff brought the present action, joining therein the engineer and conductor of the train as parties defendant. When the cause was called for trial defendant company conceded liability for the injuries sustained by plaintiff, but claimed that settlement therefor had been made, and the sole issue litigated, aside from the nature and character of the injuries and the question of damages, was whether the release was obtained by fraud. The action was dismissed as to the individual defendants.
The assignments of error challenge the ruling of the court in refusing to submit to the jury certain special questions in the language and form requested by defendant, and certain of its instructions and refusals to instruct the jury. We dispose of these in their order.
1. At the conclusion of the trial, counsel for defendant requested the court to submit to the jury certain special questions embodying the issue whether either the claim agent or the defendant's physician at the time of the settlement made any false and fraudulent statements as to the character of plaintiff's injuries with intent to deceive and defraud him, and, if such statements were found by the jury to have been made, to indicate what they were. The court refused to submit the question in the form presented, but did submit two distinct questions, embodying the substance of those presented by defendant, with the exception that the intent to deceive was eliminated, and the jury was not required to state what the false statements were. In point of substance the special question submitted called for the general conclusion whether any false and fraudulent statements were made to bring about the settlement. The contention is that, though it was discretionary with the court to submit or not submit special issues to the jury (Morrow v. St. Paul City Ry. Co. 74 Minn. 480, 77 N.W. 303), having decided to submit them, they should have been so framed as to require the jury to state in their answer the facts called for by the questions proposed by defendant. And that, since the questions in fact submitted called only for the general conclusions of the jury, there was an abuse of discretion entitling defendant to a new trial. In this we do not concur. As conceded by counsel the question whether special issues shall be submitted to a jury in a case of this kind rests wholly in the discretion of the court. The matter so resting with the trial court, it necessarily follows that the form of the question or issue to be so submitted rests also in its discretion, in the exercise of which in this case we discover no substantial reason for serious criticism. 11 Enc. Pl. & Pr. 667. Decisions from courts of those states where by statute special issues are required to be submitted to the jury are not in point.
2. Defendant requested the court to charge the jury that fraud and intention to deceive were necessary ingredients of plaintiff's cause of action insofar as the validity of the release was concerned, and that unless the jury found that the statements made to plaintiff at the time of the settlement, by the physician and claim agent, as to the nature and character of plaintiff's injuries, were made with a knowledge of their falsity and with intent to deceive plaintiff, the release could not be set aside and plaintiff must fail in the action. The court refused to so instruct, and it may be conceded that the general charge did not include the element of intentional deception.
The physician of the company testified that soon after plaintiff was taken to the hospital he made a careful examination of his body with a view of determining the nature and character of his injuries, as a result of which he found no broken bones, and that the only injury suffered by plaintiff was in the form of bruises, from which he would soon recover. At the time of the accident plaintiff was seated in the accommodation coach of the train; this was derailed, and for some distance passed over the crossties, and violently bumped up and down until it came to a stop. Whatever injuries plaintiff received came from this violent bumping as the car passed over the ties. A fellow passenger received a dislocated ankle. The theory of plaintiff's case was that this violence resulted in an impacted fracture of the femur and dislocation of the sacro-iliac joint. The company's physician did not discover either injury, if either existed, by his examination. He advised the claim agent that plaintiff had no serious injury, and plaintiff testified that he stated to him at the time he introduced the claim agent: "He told me I was just bruised a little, and that I would be well in ten days or two weeks * * *, and capable of going to work; that I did not have any broken bones, and that I had better go ahead and settle." The physician denied having advised plaintiff to go ahead and settle with the claim agent, though he admitted that he stated...
To continue reading
Request your trial