Jacobson v. Department of Labor & Industries

• Decision Date: 24 November 1950
• Docket Number: 31452.
• Citation: 224 P.2d 338,37 Wn.2d 444
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: JACOBSON, v. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR & INDUSTRIES.

224 P.2d 338

37 Wn.2d 444

JACOBSON, v. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR & INDUSTRIES.

No. 31452.

Supreme Court of Washington.

November 24, 1950

Department 2.

Smith Troy, Olympia, Jack Rowles Bellingham, for appellant.

Powell &amp Nethercutt, Frank P. Weaver, Spokane, for respondent.

ROBINSON, Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment, rendered in accordance with a verdict of a jury, reversing an order of the board of industrial insurance appeals of the department of labor and industries of the state of Washington, which had disallowed the claim of respondent for compensation under the provisions of the industrial insurance act. The facts of the case are as follows:

Respondent, Foy M Jacobson, was hospitalized in November, 1944, at which time a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia was made. His response to thereapy was good, and he was discharged in January, 1945. After several months spent working on a farm belonging to his family, he obtained, in October of the same year, a job with the Carstens Packing Company in Spokane. With minor interruptions, he worked with this company until Mrach 19 1947. It is conceded that he performed his duties satisfactorily, although he was regarded by his fellow employees as somewhat shy and quiet, and perhaps more than ordinarily reserved. On March 19, he was finished with his regular work by noon, and was assigned to help an assistant foreman, Mr. Berry, in cleaning out a tank car which had been filled with soybean oil. The only entrance to this car was through a manhole, approximately fifteen inches in diameter, located at the top of the car. With Berry remaining at the opening of the manhole, respondent descended into the car, and proceeded to wash it out, using a hose from which either hot or cold water was running. It was warm in the car, and Berry told respondent to come up occasionally if it became uncomfortably hot. Respondent came up several times and appeared to be in good condition. On the last occasion he stated that he was almost finished, and again descended into the car. Shortly thereafter, Berry heard him cry out. He at once called two men to assist him, and, when they lying on the floor in a semi-conscious state. He was removed and laid on a stretcher, perspiring and gagging. Some time thereafter, he was taken to a hospital, where his condition was diagnosed as an acute heat stroke, with first and second degree burns on his face and one of his arms. With hospitalization, his physical condition improved, and he was discharged on April 7. His mental condition, however, rapidly deteriorated. He appeared to be suffering symptoms comparable to those he had manifested while undergoing treatment for schizophrenia. Five days after discharge, he was returned to the hospital and placed under the care of his former physician, Dr. Lewis. The therapy which had previously been successful did not prove to be so on this occasion; and since then, it is conceded that he has suffered from schizophrenia to such a degree that he is no longer able to engage in gainful employment.

On May 6, 1947, a claim was filed on behalf of respondent by his father as guardian, alleging that respondent's condition was the result of an industrial injury. The supervisor of industrial insurance accepted responsibility for respondent's condition, and medical expenses and time loss were paid. The employer appealed from the decision and hearings were held Before the joint board. On August 8, 1949, the board of industrial insurance appeals, which had succeeded the joint board, entered an order reversing the supervisor and disallowing all claims after July 24, 1947. The board's order was based on the ground that respondent's condition was due to a preexisting mental condition, to wit: 'Schizophrenia, a chronic mental disorder, and not due to his injury of March 19, 1947.' Respondent thereupon appealed to the superior court, and, after a trial to a jury, which rendered a verdict in respondent's favor, judgment was entered in favor of respondent.

The only serious dispute as to the facts relates to the question of whether hot or cold water was being used to clean out the tank car. Mr. Berry testified positively that cold water was employed. Respondent's father, however, testified that both Mr. Berry and Mr. Hale, the plant superintendent, had told him that the car was being cleaned with hot water. This testimony seems somewhat more consistent with the undisputed facts. Thus, although the date was only March 19, Mr. Berry testified that he told respondent, Before he began his work, that, if it got too hot in the car, he should come up and rest, and further testified that he actually did come up several times. Even if the effect of the warm sun beating on the exterior of the tank car is sufficient to explain this, it is less adequate to account for the fact that the injury suffered by respondent was a heat stroke. Further, there was no explanation for the burns which the doctor who treated him testified that he sustained, other than that they were caused by hot water. In any event, from whatever cause, it is clear, from all of the testimony, that it was abnormally warm inside the car while respondent was cleaning it.

What actually happened within the car is, of course, not clear, it appearing that respondent was in no condition to give a coherent account. One of the doctors testified that it was as reasonable to assume that a recurrence of schizophrenia caused respondent to fall in the car as it was to assume that a fall in the car caused a recurrence of schizophrenia. However, it does not seem to be disputed that there was evidence from which the jury could have found that the accident was brought about by reason of the excessive heat within the car, and that it consequently amounted to an industrial injury. If this injury resulted in a recurrence of respondent's schizophrenia, there can be no doubt about his right to recover, and the fact that he might have been predisposed to this type of mental disorder would not affect that right. It has been established, in a long line of cases, that, if an injury, within the statutory meaning, lights up or makes active a latent or quiescent infirmity or weakened physical condition occasioned by disease, then the resulting disability is to be attributed to the injury and not to the preexisting physical condition. Ray v. Dept. of Labor and Industries, 177 Wash. 687, 33 P.2d 375; Rikstad v. Dept. of Labor and Industries, 180 Wash. 591, 41 P.2d 391; Pulver v. Dept. of Labor and Industries, 185 Wash. 664, 56 P.2d 701; Miller v. Dept. of Labor and Industries, 200 Wash. 674, 94 P.2d 764. Whether the infirmity might possible have resulted in eventual disability or death, even without the injury, is immaterial upon the question of the department's liability under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Rem.Rev.Stat. § 7673 et seq. Smith v. Dept. of Labor and Industries, 179 Wash. 501, 38 P.2d 212. Nor does it matter that the injury might not have produced the same effect in the case of a man in normal health. Daugherty v. Dept. of Labor and Industries, 188 Wash. 626, 63 P.2d 434. The benefits of workmen's compensation are not limited to those who are in perfect health at the time they receive their injuries. Frandila v. Dept. of Labor and Industries, 137 Wash. 530, 243 P. 5.

Whether a given disability is the result of injury or solely of a preexisting infirmity is normally a question of fact. Brittain v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 178 Wash. 499, 35 P.2d 49. Therefore, in the ordinary case, it is properly a matter for the resolution of the jury. In the present instance, however, appellant contends that there is not sufficient evidence from which the jury could conclude that the schizophrenic condition from which respondent now suffers could possibly have been brought about by the incident in the tank car, whatever its exact nature may have been. Accordingly, it is appellant's position that the trial court erred in submitting the matter to the jury at all, or, in any event, in failing to grant its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

Schizophrenia has been defined as 'dementia praecox or adolescent insanity an affection marked by melancholia and selfabsorption, terminating in mental...