Jacobson v. Winter
| Decision Date | 10 June 1966 |
| Docket Number | No. 9700,9700 |
| Citation | 415 P.2d 297,91 Idaho 11 |
| Parties | Willard R. JACOBSON, Petitioner-Respondent, v. Earl WINTER, Sheriff of Elmore County, Idaho, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
Allan G. Shepard, Atty. Gen., and M. Allyn Dingel, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Boise, and Fred Kennedy, Pros. Atty., Elmore County, Mountain Home, for appellant.
Robert F. McLaughlin, Mountain Home, for respondent.
Earl Winter, the Sheriff of Elmore County, Idaho, as appellant, brings this appeal from an order of the district court which granted the petition of Willard R. Jacobson, respondent, for a writ of habeas corpus, and under which order the respondent was discharged from the custody of appellant.
The events leading to this appeal started in Mountain Home, when respondent Jacobson, on February 28, 1964, commenced to issue what were asserted to be 'no account' checks. On March 6, 1964, a criminal complaint in four counts was filed charging Jacobson with the felony of issuing checks without funds. Elmore County officials determined respondent had been arrested by Ada County authorities and had been incarcerated in the Idaho State Penitentiary, for violation of terms of his probation. On July 24, 1964, they forwarded to the penitentiary a request that respondent be held for them upon his discharge, this procedure being called a 'hold' order.
In February, 1965, an order of the district court was entered authorizing officials of the penitentiary to deliver respondent to the custody of the Elmore County Sheriff. Upon delivery of respondent to the sheriff, pursuant to this order, he was arrested on February 24, 1965, under a warrant of arrest.
While in the penitentiary, respondent wrote two letters, one on September 29, 1964, and the other on December 18, 1964, to the Elmore County Prosecuting Attorney, requesting that he be given a speedy trial.
On March 4, 1965, a preliminary hearing was held and respondent was bound over to district court to answer the charges of the complaint.
On May 4, 1965, respondent petitioned the district court in this action for a writ of habeas corpus. The writ issued, directing appellant to produce the respondent, who made his return to the writ, alleging that respondent was held by him pursuant to the order of commitment entered following preliminary hearing.
A hearing was held, and the trial court, after entering a memorandum decision, issued the order of discharge from which this appeal is taken.
Summarized, appellant's assignments of error are that the trial court erred: in determining that respondent had not been given a speedy trial, and in discharging him by reason thereof; in ruling there were two different guarantees of a speedy trial and that the statutory guarantee of a speedy trial was accorded respondent, but that the constitutional guarantee was not; in considering the time elapsed between the criminal complaint to the time of arrest in determination of whether respondent was accorded a speedy trial.
Idaho Constitutional provisions and statutory provisions involved are set out in the footnote below. 1 In Ellenwood v. Cramer, 75 Idaho 338, 343, 272 P.2d 702, 705, this court in considering the constitutional and statutory provisions pertaining to the right to a speedy trial stated:
'The right of a defendant to a speedy trial was recognized at common law and this right has been embodied in our Constitution. Idaho Statutes, Sec. 19-3501, I.C., has defined in substance what is meant by a speedy trial, that is, one accused of crime should be tried not later than the next term of court subsequent to being held to answer, unless the trial is postponed upon defendant's application, or with his consent, or other lawful, valid reason.
'One accused of crime is entitled to be tried under fixed standards and rules, free from capricious and oppressive unnecessary delays and with reasonable diligence. * * *'
In Schrom v. Cramer, 76 Idaho 1, 275 P.2d 979, decided the same year as Ellenwood v. Cramer, supra, this court held that a person must be charged by information or indictment filed not later than the term of court following his commitment, and further that the information or indictment having been filed during a current term of the court, the defendant must be tried during the following term of court unless good cause to the contrary be shown.
The trial court, in its memorandum opinion, pointed out that respondent was arrested and held to answer during the same term of court, and it appears that trial date was set during the same term. The cases of Ellenwood v. Cramer and Schrom v. Cramer, (both supra), dealt with a different question. Here, the issue is presented whether, when an accused is incarcerated in the state penitentiary, the time intervning between the filing of the criminal complaint to the time he is arrested, should be computed in determination of whether the accused was being afforded a speedy trial. The trial court in its memorandum opinion, follwoing what is denominated as the majority rule, held that the time between filing of the charge and arrest must be computed, and ordered respondent's discharge.
There is no reporter's transcript of the district court's proceedings of this cause, and it is impossible to just when the authorities of Elmore County had notice of Jacobson's whereabouts, but it is undisputed they knew he was in the penitentiary by at least July 24, 1964, the date the 'hold' order was issued at their request. The fact that the respondent was incarcerated in the penitentiary cannot be asserted as an excuse for denying an accused person a speedy trial, at least when the accused has sought to have his cause tried. 21 Am.Jur.2d 284, Criminal Law § 249. As stated by the author of the annotation on this point, 118 A.L.R. 1037:
'The general rule, followed in the majority of the states and in the Federal courts, is that, under a constitutional provision guaranteeing to accused a speedy trial, and under statutes supplementing the constitutional provisions and enacted for the purpose of rendering it effective, and prescribing the time within which accused must be brought to trial after indictment, a sovereign may not deny an accused person a speedy trial even though he is incarcerated in one of that sovereign's...
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Richerson v. State
...in one of the state's penal institutions under a prior conviction and sentence in a court of that state. (See: Jacobsen v. Winter, 91 Idaho 11, 415 P.2d 297 (1966).) However, that court, distinguishing between the case of an accused held by penal authorities of the state and an accused held......
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State v. Talmage
...which provided definition of the concept of "speedy trial." See State v. Hobson, 99 Idaho 200, 579 P.2d 697 (1978); Jacobson v. Winter, 91 Idaho 11, 415 P.2d 297 (1966). I.C. § 19-3501 required that a criminal action be dismissed if the defendant was not tried during the next term of court ......
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Commonwealth v. Butler
...trial applies to “[e]very subject of the [C]ommonwealth.” Art. 11 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. See Jacobson v. Winter, 91 Idaho 11, 14, 415 P.2d 297 (1966) (same, as to Idaho constitution). Of perhaps greatest significance, the subject of a criminal complaint typically faces ......
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State v. Smith
...S. Ct. at 463. But a number of state supreme courts have interpreted the triggering event differently. See, e.g. , Jacobson v. Winter , 91 Idaho 11, 415 P.2d 297, 300 (1966) ; People v. Mitchell , 356 Ill.App.3d 158, 292 Ill.Dec. 230, 825 N.E.2d 1241, 1244–45 (2005) ; Commonwealth v. Butler......