Jacqueline B. v. Rawls Law Grp., P.C.
| Decision Date | 26 August 2021 |
| Docket Number | B308815 |
| Citation | 68 Cal.App.5th 243,283 Cal.Rptr.3d 279 |
| Parties | JACQUELINE B., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. RAWLS LAW GROUP, P.C., et al., Defendants and Respondents. |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Law Office of David Feldman and David Feldman for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Nemecek & Cole, Michael McCarthy, Encino, Vikram Sohal, Los Angeles, and Mark Schaeffer for Defendants and Respondents.
The State of California may exert specific personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant with respect to a particular lawsuit only if (1) the defendant has purposefully availed itself of the benefits of California as a forum, (2) the controversy giving rise to the lawsuit is related to or arises out of the defendant's contacts with California, and (3) the assertion of personal jurisdiction would comport with fair play and substantial justice. ( Pavlovich v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 262, 269, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 329, 58 P.3d 2 ( Pavlovich ).) In this case, a person with a federal tort claim arising out of injuries suffered in California retained a Virginia-based law firm with Virginia-licensed lawyers to represent her in negotiating a settlement with the pertinent federal agency's lawyers in Arizona. Can California exert specific jurisdiction over the firm and its lawyers if the person sues them for malpractice? We conclude that the answer is no, and do so because (1) the law firm and its lawyers did nothing to purposefully avail themselves of the benefits of doing business in California, and (2) the allegedly bad advice underlying the malpractice lawsuit was not sufficiently related to the firm's and its lawyers’ contacts with California. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's order quashing service of summons on these defendants and dismissing the client's malpractice suit.
Jacqueline B. (plaintiff) is a veteran of the United States armed forces.
In 2015 and 2016, plaintiff sought services from the United States Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) at the West Los Angeles facility. Specifically, she participated in the Domiciliary Residential Rehabilitation Treatment Program under the care of a VA social worker. The social worker initiated and pursued a sexual relationship with plaintiff while plaintiff was her patient; VA officials later concluded that the social worker's actions constituted "profound patient abuse."
Plaintiff was living in California at the time of this abuse, as she had been, on-and-off, since 1999.
In August 2016, and while still living in California, plaintiff filed a report with the VA complaining about the social worker. The VA had investigated the report, and concluded that it had merit.
On February 10, 2017, and while still living in California, plaintiff filed a claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act with the VA seeking $3 million in damages for the sexual and emotional abuse inflicted by the social worker.
The VA assigned an attorney in its Office of General Counsel located in Phoenix, Arizona to handle plaintiff's claim. On August 10, 2017, that attorney offered to settle plaintiff's possible federal tort claim for $125,000.
In the summer of 2017, plaintiff searched online for lawyers who might assist her with her administrative claim and, if necessary, with filing a Federal Torts Claim Act lawsuit. One of her search queries led her to the website for the Rawls Law Group, P.C. (the firm).
The firm is a Virginia-based corporation with all of its offices located in Virginia. Its founder and lead partner is Brewster S. Rawls (the partner), and one of its associates at the time was Rachel P. Maryan (the associate). The partner and associate were both licensed to practice law in Virginia, but not in California; the partner had appeared in federal court in California four times over his career, and the associate had appeared in federal court in California once.
In 2017, the firm's website stated that the firm has a "nationwide" practice that handled Federal Tort Claims Act cases all over the country, and listed several examples of cases that had resolved favorably to the firm's clients. Two of the examples involved settlements in cases arising out of claims against California-based VA facilities. The website listed the firm's toll-free number (i.e., 877-VET-4-VET) and had a "Reach Out" form that could be filled out and submitted to the firm from the website.
Based on what she read on its website, plaintiff contacted the firm. Plaintiff stated that she used a "live chat" function on the website. During a follow-up call with the associate, plaintiff stated that her claim involved injuries she suffered in California and that her claim was in the midst of being administratively exhausted with an attorney in Phoenix. The evidence is disputed as to whether the associate told plaintiff that the firm would file a lawsuit in federal court in California if the case did not settle in the course of administrative exhaustion: Plaintiff said this representation was made; the associate denied it and the partner denied having made any decision "on the venue of a future lawsuit."
On September 8, 2017, the firm sent plaintiff a letter with several enclosed documents, including a proposed retainer agreement, release forms to obtain her medical records from the VA, and an email communications consent form. The letter was sent to a P.O. box in California. In the letter, the firm said that it "would be pleased to represent [plaintiff] in a Federal Tort Claim against the Department of Veterans Affairs, arising out of [her] interactions with a social worker ... at the West Los Angeles VA Medical Center."
On September 11, 2017, plaintiff signed the agreement retaining the firm to "represent [her] in a potential claim for damages under the Federal Tort Claims Act," and faxed it to the firm the next day. The retainer agreement expressly contemplated settlement prior to the filing of any lawsuit because it (1) set forth two different contingency fees for the firm, one if the case settled before filing a lawsuit (at 20 percent) and one if it did not (at 25 percent), and (2) authorized the firm to "decline to continue to prosecute [plaintiff's] case" if it "later conclude[d] that the matter does not warrant filing a lawsuit." The agreement also emphasized that the firm "is a Virginia-based law firm," specified that the agreement was "subject to" Virginia law, and authorized the firm, at its discretion, to associate or "refer the case" to other counsel.
On the day she faxed the retainer agreement to the firm, plaintiff left California. Both the partner and the associate were aware of plaintiff's departure, and given the open-ended nature of that departure, believed that plaintiff was no longer based in California and was instead living a "transient lifestyle." On September 19, 2017, the firm conducted a due diligence search on plaintiff, and the search indicated that her "primary residence" was in Houston, Texas.
Between mid-September 2017 and early November 2017, the firm negotiated plaintiff's pending administrative claim with the Phoenix-based lawyer representing the VA. During this period, plaintiff was never in California; instead, she stayed with family and friends in Texas, Alabama, and Virginia. Also during this period, no one from the firm traveled to California to conduct any investigation, met anyone in California, or conferred with any attorneys in California. The associate made one phone call in September 2017 to one of plaintiff's private treatment providers in California to determine whether that provider's outstanding bill could be recovered as part of a possible settlement with the VA. On November 3, 2017, the firm secured a $200,000 settlement offer from the Phoenix-based VA lawyer. The firm mailed the offer to plaintiff's then-current address in Virginia, and recommended that she accept the offer on the ground that her noneconomic damages would be capped at $250,000 under the California law that would apply in any future lawsuit filed in federal court in California.
On November 8, 2017, plaintiff met with the partner and associate at the firm's Richmond, Virginia office to sign the settlement agreement.
A month later, the firm mailed the settlement check to plaintiff at the same Virginia address to which they mailed the settlement offer.
In May 2018, plaintiff made a post to her Facebook profile "[t]hank[ing]" the firm, the partner and the associate "who cared enough about this case" and proclaiming that it was "[w]ell worth the 3,100 mile drive to Richmond ...."
On January 6, 2020, plaintiff sued the firm, the partner, and the associate (collectively, defendants) for (1) legal malpractice, (2) breach of contract, and (3) breach of fiduciary duty. Specifically, plaintiff alleged that defendants gave her bad advice to settle because California's $250,000 cap would not have applied to her noneconomic damages.
On March 4, 2020, defendants moved to quash service of summons for lack of personal jurisdiction. Following briefing that was accompanied by declarations and other evidence as well as a hearing, the trial court issued an 11-page order granting the motion to quash. The court cited two reasons. First, the court ruled that defendants had not purposefully availed themselves of the benefits of California as a forum. In so ruling, the court found that defendants had no "actual[ ]" "contact" with California beyond sending the retainer agreement to plaintiff in California before she left the state, which the court found "insufficient to establish ... adequate contact...
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